Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Superior Court County of Ventura, Super. Ct. No. 2008022049, John Dobroth, Judge.
Miriam R. Arichea, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Michael C. Keller, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
YEGAN, J.
Paul Bryan Snyder appeals from the judgment entered following his conviction by a jury of unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) and receiving a stolen motor vehicle. (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a).) Appellant admitted three prior prison terms (Id., § 667.5, subd. (b)) and one prior serious or violent felony conviction within the meaning of California's "Three Strikes" law. (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d); 667, subds. (b)-(i).) He was sentenced to prison for seven years.
Appellant contends: (1) the trial court erroneously refused to exclude evidence of a prior incident during which he had towed and abandoned a vehicle that he believed to be stolen; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for receiving a stolen motor vehicle. We affirm.
Prosecution Case
On May 31, 2008, Officer Jeff Brooke of the Ventura Police Department stopped a tan 1985 Toyota truck that appellant was driving. Immediately after the stop, Brooke "ran" the license plate number. Police dispatch informed him that the truck was stolen. Appellant got out of the vehicle, and Brooke placed him in handcuffs. Tory Baxter, a passenger in the truck, ran away shouting that "she had to go pee." Brooke searched the truck but found no documentation showing ownership or registration of the vehicle.
Pursuant to Vehicle Code section 4454, subdivision (a), every owner of a vehicle "shall maintain" the vehicle registration "with the vehicle for which issued."
The Toyota truck belonged to Larry Lorenzetti. He had owned it for 24 years. Lorenzetti said that the truck had "four-wheel drive." On March 23, 2008, he parked the truck outside a store in Bakersfield and locked the doors. When he returned several hours later, the truck was gone. Lorenzetti had the original keys to the truck. They turned in the ignition and unlocked the doors.
When the stolen Toyota truck was recovered on May 31, 2008, the key in the ignition was an "aftermarket" product. It fit into the door locks, but it would not turn these locks. The key appeared to be "fairly new" and was not shaved, i. e., not altered in any way to make it operative. A burglary detective testified that, in old Toyotas with a worn ignition, a shaved key will turn in the ignition but will not open the door locks: "The ignition wears over time, the tumbler in it, but [the tumbler] doesn't wear with the door locks because you are not using it all the time." A screwdriver can be used to start an old Toyota "once that ignition gets very worn."
When the Toyota was returned to Lorenzetti, he found that the original keys opened the doors but would not turn in the ignition. The ignition "was all shiny" and "looked brand-new."
On April 22, 2008, 30 days after Lorenzetti's truck was stolen, Barbara Mora saw a tan Toyota truck towing a white Ford Expedition sport utility vehicle (SUV). Appellant was driving the truck, and a woman was steering the SUV. Mora telephoned the sheriff because the SUV was "abandoned in the desert" about 100 yards away from where she lived in Kern County.
Deputy Robert Patrick went to the location where Mora had reported the SUV to have been abandoned. He found the SUV in a vacant field at the end of a small street. The SUV was not visible from the nearby main road. Patrick went to a house "around the corner." A "tan Toyota, four-wheel drive, pickup truck" was parked in an alley by the house. Patrick knocked on the door of the house, and appellant walked out. Patrick arrested appellant after Mora had identified him as the driver of the tan Toyota truck. Patrick did not tell appellant why he was being arrested.
Patrick asked appellant "if he knew anything about" the abandoned SUV. Patrick did not say that the vehicle had been stolen. Appellant replied that "[h]e'd never seen it before." Patrick said that, next to the SUV, he had found shoe tracks that matched appellant's shoes. Appellant responded, " 'Okay, yeah, I towed the [SUV] out there.' " Appellant "mentioned that he didn't know it was stolen, and that his girlfriend asked him to tow it out there after it ran out of gas." This was the first time that anyone had referred to the SUV as a stolen vehicle. Appellant said that his girlfriend's name was Tory Baxter. Patrick asked appellant "what he thought when his girlfriend told him to tow this truck into the field where nobody could see it[?]" Appellant "said he probably thought it was stolen."
Defense Case
The sole defense witness was Art Rodriguez, appellant's brother-in-law. Rodriguez was a painting contractor. Appellant started working for him on about April 14, 2008. At that time, appellant did not own a vehicle. "Towards the end of April," Rodriguez loaned money to appellant so that he could purchase a truck. The next morning, appellant came to work driving a 1985 tan Toyota truck.
Admission of Evidence of Prior Incident
Before the jury trial began, the prosecutor filed a motion to admit evidence of the prior incident involving the SUV. The prosecutor alleged that the SUV had been "found stripped and abandoned in a field in Bakersfield." The prosecutor contended that, pursuant to Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), evidence of the prior incident was admissible to establish appellant's intent: "This prior conduct is indicative of [his] intent here – he chooses to take trucks without the owner's permission." "The people do not seek to introduce evidence to support an improper propensity inference. Instead, this evidence will be used for the sole purpose of establishing [appellant's] intent."
During oral argument on the motion, defense counsel acknowledged that the SUV "is towed into a field, and it's stolen." But counsel argued that evidence of the prior incident should be excluded because "[i]t's just not enough to add to the intent... for it to help intent in this case, and it really... ends up being very prejudicial." The prosecutor protested: "The cops never told him [the SUV] was stolen. He volunteered this information.... There's more to it than him just dumping it in the field. He knew it was stolen when he did it, and that's what he told the cops."
The trial court ruled that evidence of the prior incident would be admissible. The jury was subsequently instructed as follows: "The People presented evidence of other behavior by the defendant that was not charged in this case that the defendant knowingly possessed a stolen vehicle on April 22, 2008.... [¶] If you decide the defendant committed the uncharged act, you may, but are not required to consider that evidence for the limited purpose of deciding whether or not the defendant acted with the intent to deprive the owner of his vehicle for any time in this case, the defendant's alleged actions were not the result of mistake or accident, [or] the defendant had the opportunity to commit the offense."
Appellant argues that evidence of the prior incident was inadmissible because it "did not meet the standard of Evidence Code section 1101(b)." (Underscoring omitted.) (AOB 10) Appellant asserts: "The Kern County incident should have been excluded as improper character evidence."
Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), provides in pertinent part that evidence that a person committed an uncharged act is admissible " 'when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident...) other than his or her disposition to commit such an act.' " However, the admission of an uncharged act " ' " 'must not contravene other policies limiting admission, such as those contained in Evidence Code section 352.' " ' [Citation.] Under Evidence Code section 352, the probative value of the proffered evidence must not be substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission would create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury. [Citations.]" (People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 586-587.)
To be admissible under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), an uncharged act must bear some degree of similarity to the charged offense. " 'The least degree of similarity (between the uncharged act and the charged offense) is required in order to prove intent. [Citation.] "[T]he recurrence of a similar result... tends (increasingly with each instance) to negative accident or inadvertence or self-defense or good faith or other innocent mental state, and tends to establish (provisionally, at least, though not certainly) the presence of the normal, i.e., criminal, intent accompanying such an act.... [Citation.] In order to be admissible to prove intent, the uncharged misconduct must be sufficiently similar to support the inference that the defendant " 'probably harbor[ed] the same intent in each instance.' [Citations.]" [Citation.]' " (People v. Kelly (2007) 42 Cal.4th 763, 783.)
" ' " 'On appeal, we review a trial court's ruling under Evidence Code section 1101 for abuse of discretion.' " ' [Citation.]" (People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 1003.) We also review for abuse of discretion the trial court's determination under Evidence Code section 352 that the prejudicial effect of uncharged misconduct does not substantially outweigh its probative value. (People v. Kelly, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 783.)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the prior incident was admissible to establish appellant's intent pursuant to Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b). Appellant's uncharged act was sufficiently similar to his charged offense to support an inference that he " ' " 'probably harbor[ed] the same intent in each instance.' " ' " (People v. Kelly, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 783.) As the prosecutor characterized it, that intent was to "take [vehicles] without the owner's permission." On May 31, 2008, when appellant committed the charged offense, he was driving a stolen tan Toyota, four-wheel drive truck, and Tory Baxter was a passenger in the vehicle. After the police stopped the vehicle, Baxter fled. Her flight tended to show consciousness of his guilt. (People v. Garrison (1989) 47 Cal.3d 746, 773 ["evidence of flight supports an inference of consciousness of guilt"].) Approximately one month earlier, on April 22, 2008, appellant was driving a tan Toyota, four-wheel drive truck when he towed and abandoned an SUV that he admittedly believed to be stolen. It was reasonable to infer that the Toyota truck driven by appellant on both occasions was the same vehicle. Baxter was also present during the incident on April 22, 2008, and she aided and abetted appellant's misconduct. Baxter was inside the SUV steering it while appellant was towing it.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in impliedly concluding that the probative value of the proffered evidence would not be "substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission" would "create substantial danger of undue prejudice." (Evid. Code, § 352.) Evidence of the prior incident was highly probative to undermine the defense theory that appellant had purchased the Toyota truck in good faith with money provided by his brother-in-law. The prior incident was not inflammatory and was no more prejudicial than the charged offense.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for receiving stolen property because there is no "substantial evidence of the element of knowledge – that appellant knew the truck had been stolen." "[W]e review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence - that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value - from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.]" (People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 66.) "Reversal... is unwarranted unless it appears 'that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].' [Citation.]" (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.)
Substantial evidence supports the jury's implied finding that appellant knew the Toyota truck had been stolen. Although the defense theory was that appellant had been a bona fide purchaser of the truck, there was no evidence of an actual transfer of ownership to appellant. The truck contained no documentation showing ownership or registration of the vehicle. The flight of appellant's passenger/girlfriend was evidence of her consciousness of guilt. If she knew that the truck had been stolen, it is reasonable to infer that appellant had the same knowledge. Furthermore, the ignition was brand-new, and the ignition key did not turn the door locks. These unusual circumstances should have led a reasonable purchaser to suspect that the truck had been stolen without using a key while it had been left unattended.
Finally, the prior incident of April 22, 2008, strongly suggests that appellant knew the Toyota truck had been stolen. On that date, only about one month after the theft of the truck, appellant used the truck to tow and abandon an SUV that he admittedly believed to be stolen. In People v. Anderson (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 414, 422, the court concluded that it was "well within reason for a jury to have determined that possession within four and a half months, and certainly possession within approximately one month, of the theft should lead to an inference of knowledge of the stolen nature of the property." (Italics added.) Moreover, a trier of fact could reasonably infer that, since appellant believed the SUV to be stolen, his simultaneous possession of a stolen Toyota truck was not an innocent happenstance.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: GILBERT, P.J., COFFEE, J.