Opinion
No. 2008–999ORCR.
2012-07-17
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Harrison SNYDER, Appellant.
Appeal from judgments of the Justice Court of the Town of Newburgh, Orange County (Jude T. Martini, J.), rendered December 3, 2007. The judgments convicted defendant, upon jury verdicts, of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree and disorderly conduct, respectively.
Present: MOLIA, J.P., LaCAVA and IANNACCI, JJ.
ORDERED that the judgment convicting defendant of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree is reversed, on the law, and the matter is remitted to the Justice Court for a new trial on that charge; and it is further,
ORDERED that the judgment convicting defendant of disorderly conduct is reversed, on the law, and the accusatory instrument charging that offense is dismissed.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree (Penal Law § 195.05) and disorderly conduct (Penal Law § 240.20[2] ).
Contrary to the People's assertion, defendant's contention with respect to the court's charge to the jury regarding the offense of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree is preserved ( see People v. LaPetina, 34 AD3d 836, 840 [2006] ). Turning to the merits of defendant's contention, we find that the Justice Court erred in failing to give the requested minstruction to the effect that a defendant cannot be convicted of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree for interfering with a public servant in the performance of an official function unless it is established that the official function was an authorized one ( see People v. Greene, 221 A.D.2d 559, 560 [1995];People v. Lupinacci, 191 A.D.2d 589 [1993];People v. Stewart, 32 Misc.3d 133[A], 2011 N.Y. Slip Op 51445[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]; People v. Vogel, 116 Misc.2d 232 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 1982] ). Since, in the instant case, the jury was not so instructed, the judgment convicting defendant of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree is reversed and the matter is remitted to the Justice Court for a new trial on that charge.
Defendant's argument that the evidence of his guilt of the disorderly conduct charge was legally insufficient is also preserved, as defense counsel renewed a previously made motion to dismiss, brought specifically on this ground, after the defense had rested ( see People v. Payne, 3 NY3d 266, 280 [2004] ). Upon a review of the record, we find that the evidence adduced at trial, when considered in the light most favorable to the People ( see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621 [1983] ), was legally insufficient to establish defendant's guilt of disorderly conduct. “[T]he disorderly conduct statute ... applies to words and conduct reinforced by a culpable mental state to create a public disturbance” (People v. Tichenor, 89 N.Y.2d 769, 775 [1997] ). A person may be guilty of disorderly conduct only when the situation extends beyond the exchange between the individual disputants to a point where it becomes “a potential or immediate public problem” (People v. Weaver, 16 NY3d 123, 128 [2011], quoting People v. Munafo, 50 N.Y.2d 326, 331 [1980] ). In assessing whether an act carries public ramifications, relevant factors to be considered are the time and place of the episode under scrutiny; the nature and character of the conduct; the number of other people in the vicinity; whether they are drawn to the disturbance and, if so, the nature and number of those attracted; and any other relevant circumstances (People v. Weaver, 16 NY3d at 128, citing People v. Munafo, 50 N.Y.2d at 331;People v. Pritchard, 27 N.Y.2d 246, 248–249 [1970] ).
Here, the complained-of conduct occurred on defendant's own property, just outside of his home, and consisted of defendant shouting in protest of what he reasonably believed to be his wrongful treatment by the police. These facts fail to support a conclusion that defendant possessed the requisite intent to cause a public disturbance. Furthermore, the prosecution failed to present any evidence about the effect of defendant's conduct on the public. Indeed, we note that the defense established at trial that no members of the public were attracted to the scene. Accordingly, the judgment convicting defendant of disorderly conduct is reversed and the accusatory instrument charging that offense is dismissed.