Opinion
F061312 Super. Ct. No. BF127216A
12-21-2011
Jill Marnie Klein, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Carlos A. Martinez and Wanda Hill Rouzan, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
OPINION
THE COURT
Before Wiseman, Acting P.J., Detjen, J. and Franson, J.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Kenneth C. Twisselman, II, Judge.
Jill Marnie Klein, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Carlos A. Martinez and Wanda Hill Rouzan, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury found appellant, Andrew Diego Snyder, guilty of second degree burglary (count 1/Pen. Code, § 460, subd. (b)), fraudulent use of an access card (count 3/Pen. Code, § 484g), forging an access card to defraud (count 4/Pen. Code, § 484f, subd. (a)), possession of methamphetamine (count 5/Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)), assault with a deadly weapon (motor vehicle) on a peace officer (count 6/Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (c)), reckless evading of a peace officer (count 7/Veh. Code, § 2800.2), resisting an executive officer (count 11/Pen. Code, § 69), possession of burglary tools (count 14/Pen. Code, § 466), and possession of drug paraphernalia (count 15/Health & Saf. Code, § 11364).
On October 22, 2010, the court sentenced Snyder to an aggregate term of six years four months: the upper term of five years on count 6, an eight-month term on count 1 (one-third the middle term of two years), an eight-month term on count 5 (one-third the middle term of two years), concurrent 180 day terms on counts 14 and 15, and stayed terms on counts 3, 4, 7, and 11.
On appeal, Snyder asks this court to: 1) conduct an independent review, pursuant to Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess), of the documents reviewed by the trial court to determine whether the court abused its discretion in refusing to disclose any of the contents of Officer Abshire's personnel records; and 2) modify the judgment on count 3 to conform to the unredacted verdict form for that count. Having conducted the requested review of Officer Abshire's personnel records and having examined the unredacted verdict form for count 3, we affirm the judgment.
FACTS
On December 17, 2008, Snyder attempted to make a credit card purchase of $910.27, at a Wal-Mart store in Bakersfield, and was declined. A short while later he attempted to make a credit card purchase of $1,171.14, at the same store and that charge was accepted. An asset protection associate approached Snyder and asked him for the credit card. The associate compared the card with the receipts for the two transactions and saw that the last four numbers on the card did not match the last four numbers of the card number on the receipts. Snyder was arrested and during a booking search a bindle containing .29 gram of methamphetamine was found in one of Snyder's socks.
On October 19, 2009, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Bakersfield Police Officers Christina Abshire and Aaron Stringer saw Snyder driving a Honda Accord with its headlights off. Snyder pulled the car over to the curb, got out and began walking away. However, when he saw the officers in their patrol car he got back into the car. The officers shined two spotlights on Snyder's car, exited their patrol car and began giving Snyder orders. Snyder, however, refused to comply and attempted to start his car. His car eventually started and as he drove away he turned his car towards Officer Abshire, missing her by inches. The officers pursued Snyder as he drove at speeds up to 100 miles per hour. After officers disabled the car with stop sticks, Snyder abandoned it and fled. Inside the car, the officers found a makeshift burglary tool made from a spark plug, and two hypodermic needles, one of which contained a clear liquid residue.
DISCUSSION
The Pitchess Motion
On February 26, 2010, Snyder filed a Pitchess motion seeking discovery of records showing "the names, addresses and phone numbers of people who [had] filed complaints relating to dishonesty as to false reporting (as to [Officers Abshire and Stringer]) and false testimony (as to Officer Abshire)" or alternatively, an in camera review of the records and an order for the release of all discoverable records.
On March 23, 2010, the court denied Snyder's request for an in camera review of Officer Stringer's personnel records and granted it as to Officer Abshire with respect to complaints relating to false reporting. The court then conducted an in camera review of Officer Abshire's personnel records and, after doing so, denied Snyder's motion for discovery.
Under Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d at pages 537-538, and Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045, a defendant may file a motion for discovery of certain personnel records concerning police officers, when those records are material to the defense of a pending criminal prosecution. Upon a proper showing of good cause by the defendant, the court is required to review the personnel records in camera and order disclosure of appropriate records. (See, People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1219-1220.) Here, the court conducted that review and did not order disclosure of any records to Snyder. The court, as required, ordered the record of its in camera review and the records themselves sealed.
On this appeal, Snyder requests this court conduct its own review of the in camera hearing and of the personnel records to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining that no records were discoverable. (See, People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal. 4th 287, 330.) Respondent concurs that such review is appropriate in the present case.
We have reviewed the reporter's transcript of the in camera hearing of March 23, 2010, and the records of Officer Abshire, which were submitted to the trial court under seal. Based upon such review, we conclude there is nothing in the officer's sealed file that is relevant to the matters Snyder sought to discover. Further, based on our review of the sealed reporter's transcript of the in camera hearing, we conclude that the trial court properly discharged its duty with respect to Snyder's motion.
The Verdict Form Pertaining to Count 3
Snyder was convicted in count 3 of using a forged access card to obtain money, goods, etc., of a value in excess of $400. The verdict form for count 3 has four possible findings: a finding of guilty on that count, a finding of not guilty on that count, a finding that the value of the goods involved in that count exceed a value of $400, and a finding that the value of the goods taken in that count did not exceed $400. Each of these findings has a signature line for the jury foreman to sign. The redacted verdict form for count 3 that is part of the original record on appeal has the jury foreman's signature redacted but it is hard to tell from which findings it was redacted because the signature was eliminated from the redacted form with "white out." Further, the signature line for the guilty finding on count 3 and the not guilty finding on count 3 each have stamped on them the words, "Signature Redacted" (original all in capital letters), whereas neither of the findings on the value of goods involved in that count were similarly stamped.
Snyder relies on the above anomalies to argue that the absence of a finding on the value of goods involved in count 3 indicates that there was no finding of guilt as to count 3. Alternatively, he argues that even if there was a finding of guilt, the absence of a finding on the value of goods involved in that count requires that his conviction on count 3 be reduced to a misdemeanor. Snyder is wrong.
Per Snyder's request, the original unredacted verdict form for count 3 was augmented into the record. Our examination of the unredacted verdict form for count 3 confirmed that the jury foreman signed the verdict form for count 3 indicating that the jury found Snyder guilty on that count and that the foreman also signed the form indicating that the jury found that the value of the goods involved in that count exceeded $400. Further, it is clear from the original unredacted verdict form for count 3 that whoever prepared the redacted verdict form for that count erroneously stamped the not guilty finding with the words "Signature Redacted" instead of stamping these words on the finding that the value of the goods involved in that count exceeded $400.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.