Opinion
A156424
10-01-2019
In re S.N., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. S.N., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Solano County Super. Ct. No. J44327)
Minor S.N. appeals from the juvenile court's dispositional order committing him to the Department of Juvenile Facilities (DJF). We affirm.
BACKGROUND
In November 2018, Minor admitted four counts of felony second-degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) and further admitted he committed the offenses when the principal was armed with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (a)(1)). According to the probation report, Minor (then 16 years old) and a co-participant, J.N., approached seven high school students near the students' school. J.N. pointed a loaded gun at the victims and ordered them to get down and remove their valuables. Minor searched them and took property. J.N. did not fire the gun but struck at least two of the victims with it, and both Minor and J.N. asked the victims, "Do you want to die today?" When Minor left to put the stolen property in his car, the victims attacked J.N. and then fled when Minor returned. Police subsequently detained a vehicle driven by Minor with J.N. as the sole passenger. The victims' property was inside the car. A bloody, loaded pistol was found near the crime scene. Minor told police he took property from the ground that did not belong to him, but denied planning a robbery with J.N. or knowing in advance that J.N. was armed. He also told police "the victims were really intimidated" and he had not expected they would "retaliate."
Multiple additional allegations arising from the same incident were dismissed on the People's motion following Minor's admissions. The jurisdiction hearing was held in Napa County Superior Court but the matter was transferred to Solano County Superior Court for disposition.
The probation report filed prior to the disposition hearing noted that, less than six months before the instant offense, Minor was arrested after driving over eighty miles per hour on city streets and ignoring police commands to stop when he ran from the vehicle. He was cited for resisting an officer (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)) and successfully completed a diversion program. Minor was in 11th grade at the time of the current offense, with a GPA of 0.44. Minor denied any history of mental health issues, substance abuse, physical/sexual abuse, or gang affiliation. Before his arrest, he lived at home with both parents and an older brother. He has had no negative discipline records in juvenile hall. In an interview with the probation officer, Minor indicated remorse for the victims and regretted doing "something dumb" without thinking of the consequences, but was unable to explain why he committed the offense.
The probation officer recommended a DJF commitment. The probation officer noted the serious and violent nature of the offense, in which Minor "assisted" J.N. and did not attempt to "dissuade his friend from further violence." The probation officer opined that Minor's needs "can be addressed through [the DJF], including education, cognitive behavioral therapy, vocational training, and it will provide for the safety of the community." At the disposition hearing, the People submitted a packet of DJF publications describing various programs offered at the DJF.
Minor's counsel argued he should instead be committed to the county's "Challenge Program," located in juvenile hall. Minor's counsel submitted a five-page document he received from the probation officer describing the Challenge Program. The program was approximately nine months long, depending on how quickly the youth progressed through its phases, and used "the cognitive-behavioral model, focusing on changing negative thinking and behavior patterns to more realistic and pro-social patterns." It also provided "academic instruction and employability skills."
In response to questioning by the juvenile court, the probation officer represented that a committee consisting of herself, two probation supervisors, and a probation services manager concluded that, based on the violence of the offense and the trauma to the victims, Minor needed a longer period of rehabilitation services than was available in the Challenge Program. Before issuing its decision, the juvenile court held a recess to review the packet of DJF materials.
In announcing its decision, the juvenile court began by observing that Minor was "an active participant" in the robbery, "made intimidating comments" to the victims, and had failed to "take[] full responsibility for his involvement." The robbery resulted in continuing "trauma" to the victims, and the court reasoned that "safety and protection of the public" was "a high priority." The court found it probable that Minor would benefit from a DJF commitment, noting the DJF packet "outlines all of the resources available, a very intense program . . . . that has the ability to provide significant rehabilitation at a level that I think is appropriate in this case." Although the Challenge Program has "some similarities" to the DJF programming, the court found "the intensity and the duration" was insufficient to address Minor's needs, particularly in light of the rapid escalation from Minor's police evasion to the instant offense. The court committed Minor to the DJF.
The parties note some confusion in the record with respect to Minor's maximum period of confinement. Upon review, it is clear that this confusion results from the fact that " '[Welfare and Institutions Code s]ection 731 sets two ceilings on the period of physical confinement to be imposed. The statute permits the juvenile court in its discretion to impose either the equivalent of the "maximum period of imprisonment that could be imposed upon an adult convicted of the offense or offenses" committed by the juvenile [citation] or some lesser period based on the "facts and circumstances of the matter or matters that brought or continued" the juvenile under the court's jurisdiction.' " (In re A.G. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 791, 801.) The juvenile court determined that 12 years was the maximum period of imprisonment that could be imposed upon an adult convicted of Minor's offenses (although the court said 18 years at the disposition hearing, it subsequently amended this by written order). The juvenile court also determined that eight years was the maximum period for which Minor could be confined at DJF, in light of the facts and circumstances of this matter.
DISCUSSION
Minor argues no substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's findings that a DJF commitment would be of probable benefit to Minor and that less restrictive alternatives would be inappropriate.
" 'We review the [juvenile] court's placement decision for an abuse of discretion. [Citation.] We review the court's findings for substantial evidence, and " '[a] trial court abuses its discretion when the factual findings critical to its decision find no support in the evidence.' " ' " (In re Carlos J. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1, 5.) "In order to ensure the necessity of a DJF placement, there must be evidence 'supporting a determination that less restrictive alternatives are ineffective or inappropriate,' " as well as " '[substantial] evidence in the record demonstrating . . . a probable benefit to the minor by a [DJF] commitment . . . .' " (Id. at p. 6.) For purposes of the latter finding, "there must be some specific evidence in the record of the programs at the DJF expected to benefit a minor." (Id. at p. 10.)
We reject the People's suggestion that In re Carlos J. was wrongly decided. --------
I. Probable Benefit
Minor argues there was insufficient evidence to support the finding of probable benefit from the DJF commitment because the probation report did not contain specific information about relevant DJF programs that would benefit Minor, and instead referred only to the types of programs he needed. Minor also argues the packet of DJF publications presented by the People at the disposition hearing was insufficient because the People did not identify any particular programs or pages in the packet. The probation report identified Minor's need for "education, cognitive behavioral therapy, [and] vocational training." The DJF packet described specific programs offered at the DJF that would address these needs: the CounterPoint cognitive behavioral program, Education Services, and a career technical education program. It was not necessary for these programs to be described in the probation report or for any particular program or page number to be identified by the People, as long as the evidence was before the juvenile court. (Cf. In re Carlos J., supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 4 [no substantial evidence of probable benefit where there was "no specific information in the record regarding the programs at the DJF" (italics added)].)
Minor also argues that some of the packet's program descriptions are "pithy and extremely general." But the People are not initially required "to provide in-depth information about the DJF's programs . . . . [Instead], where the probation officer has identified programs of benefit to a minor and provided brief information about the most important programs, it may be presumed the probation officer's recommendation is based on an assessment the programs are available and appropriate." (In re Carlos J., supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 13.) The program descriptions provided in the DJF packet were sufficient.
Finally, Minor criticizes the probation report for mentioning DJF's mental health counseling and gang intervention services without evidence supporting Minor's need for such services. Minor cites no authority that excess information about the DJF's programs undermines other supporting evidence in the record.
We conclude substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's finding that it was probable Minor would benefit from a DJF commitment.
II. Less Restrictive Alternatives
Minor also challenges the finding that a less restrictive alternative—the county's Challenge Program—was ineffective or inappropriate.
Minor argues the probation report opined the Challenge Program was inappropriate solely because of punitive reasons. While the probation report and the juvenile court both emphasized the impact of Minor's conduct on the victims, this does not mean their purpose in selecting DJF was solely punitive. Instead, the court was properly focused on public safety. " 'A juvenile court may properly consider 'a restrictive commitment as a means of protecting the public safety.' " (In re Carlos J., supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 6.)
Minor also argues that the juvenile court primarily found the Challenge Program ineffective because of its short duration, which was an insufficient reason because Minor does not have a history of dangerous or violent behavior and no less restrictive alternatives have been tried. " ' "Although the [DJF] is normally a placement of last resort, there is no absolute rule that a [DJF] commitment cannot be ordered unless less restrictive placements have been attempted." ' " (In re Carlos J., supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 6.) The juvenile court could reasonably find, based on the evidence, that the intensity and duration of the Challenge Program rendered it inappropriate for Minor's rehabilitation.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
/s/_________
SIMONS, J. We concur. /s/_________
JONES, P.J. /s/_________
NEEDHAM, J.