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People v. Smith

Illinois Appellate Court, Fourth District
Nov 2, 2022
2022 Ill. App. 4th 210634 (Ill. App. Ct. 2022)

Opinion

4-21-0634

11-02-2022

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KEITH SMITH, Defendant-Appellant.


This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Livingston County No. 13CF137 Honorable Robert M. Travers, Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE TURNER delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Knecht and Justice Harris concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

TURNER JUSTICE

¶ 1 Held: Because defendant's appointed postconviction counsel failed to file a certificate of compliance pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017) and the record does not establish appointed counsel complied with the requirements of Rule 651(c), we reverse the circuit court's dismissal of defendant's postconviction petition and direct the circuit court to appoint new postconviction counsel for defendant for new second stage proceedings under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2020)).

¶ 2 In November 2020, defendant, Keith Smith, filed a pro se postconviction petition. In February 2021, the circuit court appointed counsel to represent defendant. In July 2021, the court dismissed all of defendant's claims in his postconviction petition except his claim his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to reconsider his sentence and a notice of appeal. In September 2021, the court granted defendant leave to file a motion to reconsider his sentence. In October 2021, the court denied defendant's motion to reconsider his sentence.

¶ 3 Defendant appeals, arguing this court should vacate his armed habitual criminal conviction (720 ILCS 5/24-1.7 (West 2012)) because one of the predicate convictions the State relied on to establish his guilt was void ab initio. For the same reason, defendant argues his aggravated unlawful use of a weapon conviction in this case was improperly elevated from a Class 4 felony to a Class 2 felony. Defendant also argues his appointed postconviction counsel provided an unreasonable level of assistance and failed to satisfy the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017). Because we conclude postconviction counsel failed to substantially comply with Rule 651(c), we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 5 In June 2013, the State charged defendant by information with the following offenses: (1) being an armed habitual criminal (count I) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.7 (West 2012)); (2) unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (count II) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2012)); (3) aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (count III) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(C) (West 2012)); (4) unlawful possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance (count IV) (720 ILCS 570/401(c) (1) (West 2012)); and (5) unlawful possession of a controlled substance (count V) (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2012)). The trial court appointed the public defender to represent defendant but early in the proceedings the court allowed defendant to proceed pro se. On May 6, 2014, the trial court denied defendant's motion-which relied on People v. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116, 2 N.E.3d 321-to prohibit the State from using his earlier conviction for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon to support its armed habitual criminal charge.

¶ 6 Prior to the start of jury selection in June 2014, defendant told the trial court he wanted to stipulate to his status as a felon, stating he did not want the name and nature of his prior convictions stated in front of the jury because of the prejudicial effect of naming the prior convictions. Defendant told the court the same thing again later, stating: "I object to the actual facts, the nature of the actual offenses that the State is going to try and use. And I would like to stipulate to the felony; so, therefore, the name and nature of any offenses do not have to be mentioned during trial." The State and defendant then engaged in plea negotiations at defendant's request and informed the court they had agreed to have a stipulated bench trial with a sentencing cap of 20 years. Defendant acknowledged he understood he was waiving his right to a jury trial and was stipulating to facts that would result in a conviction on the State's charges against him.

¶ 7 The trial court then asked the State for the stipulated facts. The State indicated the police located a handgun during a search of defendant's vehicle. The handgun was examined and determined to be in working condition and loaded. Defendant's fingerprint was found on the gun. The police also found a plastic baggie which held seven smaller plastic baggies which contained a substance that tested positive for the presence of more than one gram of heroin. The presence of multiple baggies indicated an intent to sell the heroin. The State noted defendant had never been issued a valid Firearm Owners Identification card, had prior felony convictions, and as a felon would not be allowed to possess the recovered firearm. The State also indicated defendant's prior felonies it was referencing were alleged in the charging document. Further, the State told the court it would present certified copies of defendant's convictions for manufacturing and delivery of cocaine and aggravated unlawful use of a weapon in Cook County case No. 07-CR-582401. The State also mentioned defendant's conviction of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a Class 4 felony, in Cook County case No. 04-CF-1979201. The State indicated these convictions satisfied the felony convictions necessary to establish the armed habitual criminal charge.

¶ 8 The trial court later asked the State about defendant's Sangamon County conviction. The State indicated that conviction was for manufacturing/delivery of a controlled substance for which defendant was sentenced to eight years in prison. The State noted the Sangamon County conviction was cited for purposes of determining defendant's sentence. After considering the stipulated facts, the trial court found they were sufficient to prove defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on all the charged offenses.

¶ 9 On August 7, 2014, defendant filed a motion for the appointment of counsel. On August 19, 2014, defendant filed a posttrial motion. Later that month, the trial court denied defendant's request for counsel.

¶ 10 On November 4, 2014, the trial court denied defendant's posttrial motion. On December 30, 2014, the trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of 20 years in prison on counts I, II, III, and IV and 6 years on count V. However, count II merged with count I and count V merged with count IV.

¶ 11 On direct appeal, defendant argued "(1) the trial court erred in denying his request to revoke his waiver of counsel, (2) the court erred in requiring him to wear leg shackles, (3) the court erred in denying his renewed request for a motion to suppress, and (4) his conviction for the offense of being an armed habitual criminal should be vacated." People v. Smith, 2017 IL App (4th) 150003-U, ¶ 3. This court held the trial court erred by denying defendant's request for appointed counsel to represent him during the sentencing phase of the case and vacated defendant's sentences. Smith, 2017 IL App (4th) 150003-U, ¶ 37.

¶ 12 However, this court disagreed with defendant's argument his armed habitual criminal conviction should be vacated because his predicate conviction for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon was unconstitutional and void ab initio. Smith, 2017 IL App (4th) 150003-U, ¶ 61. Citing People v. McFadden, 2016 IL 117424, 61 N.E.3d 74, People v. Perkins, 2016 IL App (1st) 150889, 63 N.E.3d 207, and People v. Faulkner, 2017 IL App (1st) 132884, 73 N.E.3d 25, this court agreed defendant's aggravated unlawful use of a weapon conviction could serve as a predicate conviction for his armed habitual criminal conviction if the prior conviction had not been vacated prior to the armed habitual criminal conviction. Smith, 2017 IL App (4th) 150003-U, ¶¶ 64-65. This court stated: "Until such time as our supreme court or the United States Supreme Court holds otherwise, we find no authority to vacate defendant's conviction for being an armed habitual criminal." Smith, 2017 IL App (4th) 150003-U, ¶ 65.

¶ 13 On remand, the trial court appointed the public defender to represent defendant for resentencing. On January 24, 2018, the parties appeared for a scheduled sentencing hearing. Defense counsel asked for a continuance after speaking with defendant. According to defense counsel, he had been presented with information that certain of defendant's sentences and convictions had been vacated in Cook County which could impact defendant's sentencing range in this case. Defense counsel indicated he needed time to examine the issue. The State did not object but indicated its position regarding the validity of defendant's armed habitual criminal conviction did not change because defendant had other convictions in his criminal history to replace the aggravated unlawful use of a weapon conviction if it was vacated.

¶ 14 At the beginning of the sentencing hearing on March 9, 2018, the State asked for leave to file an amended charging information in this case. The State indicated one of the convictions originally listed in the information had been vacated. According to the State:

"It's come to our attention that the defendant was successful in having one of the convictions listed in the original charging document vacated. However, he has enough priors and other priors that can be moved right in to still sustain the charge of armed habitual criminal. Your Honor knows that a, the fact of a prior conviction is not a fact or consequence that the judge has to find when it comes to
trial, it's merely an issue for sentencing. It's not a surprise to the defendant that he has these convictions. He's known about it. In fact[,] most of them are listed throughout the other charges in there as, when we alleged either extended term eligibility or nonprobationable status of the charges.
So, again, we're seeking leave to file this amended information, specifically with Count 1, swapping it out with one of the defendant's prior convictions for another prior conviction thus still making him an armed habitual criminal." Defense counsel objected to the State being allowed to amend the information. The trial court allowed the State to amend the information over defendant's objection, finding defendant was not prejudiced by the amendment because defendant was not surprised and the classification for the offense remained the same. The court then imposed the same sentence originally imposed on defendant. Defense counsel did not file either a motion to reconsider sentence or a notice of appeal on defendant's behalf.

¶ 15 On October 16, 2018, defendant filed a petition for relief from judgment pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2016)). Defendant indicated his armed habitual criminal conviction and sentence had been affirmed in his direct appeal based on McFadden, but McFadden had been overruled by our supreme court in In re N.G., 2018 IL 121939, ¶ 1, 115 N.E.3d 102. Defendant asked the circuit court to vacate his armed habitual criminal conviction and sentence.

¶ 16 On November 8, 2018, the State filed a motion to dismiss defendant's section 2-1401 petition. The State argued this case was more like McFadden than N. G. because it was not clear whether defendant had been convicted under one of the facially unconstitutional provisions of the aggravated unlawful use of a weapon statute. In addition, the State argued it had additional bases to convict defendant of being an armed habitual criminal in addition to his 2007 conviction for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon.

¶ 17 On February 15, 2019, the trial court held a hearing on defendant's petition for relief from judgment. The court granted the State's motion to dismiss based on res judicata.

¶ 18 On March 18, 2019, defendant filed a motion to reconsider the trial court's order dismissing his section 2-1401 petition, which the court denied. Defendant filed a notice of appeal, and the Office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD) was appointed to represent defendant. On October 29, 2020, OSAD filed a motion to dismiss defendant's appeal, indicating defendant had been informed of the consequences of dismissing his appeal. On October 29, 2020, this court allowed defendant's motion to dismiss his appeal.

¶ 19 On November 12, 2020, defendant filed the postconviction petition at issue in this appeal, raising the following issues. First, defendant alleged his direct appeal appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to amend or supplement defendant's brief and argument on appeal, as requested by defendant, with the order vacating defendant's conviction for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon in Cook County case No. 07-CR-582401. Second, defendant alleged his trial counsel failed to file a motion to reconsider his sentence or a notice of appeal after defendant's resentencing hearing. Third, defendant alleged he possessed new evidence to impeach the testimony of Officer Mark Scott, which he obtained after the February 18, 2014, suppression hearing. Fourth, defendant alleged his federal and state due process rights were violated because the State introduced a different conviction at his resentencing hearing to establish his armed habitual criminal conviction. Fifth, defendant argued he was subject to an improper double enhancement with regard to his conviction of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (count III) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(C) (West 2012)) and was not eligible to be sentenced as a Class X offender for that offense.

¶ 20 On February 24, 2021, the trial court entered an order appointing counsel for defendant because his postconviction petition had not been dismissed within 90 days of docketing. Defendant's appointed counsel did not file an amended postconviction petition on defendant's behalf. Appointed counsel also failed to file a certificate of compliance pursuant to Rule 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017).

¶ 21 On April 6, 2021, the State filed an answer to defendant's postconviction petition denying defendant's allegations. The State also filed a motion to dismiss the postconviction petition. On July 16, 2021, the trial court held a hearing on the State's motion to dismiss and dismissed all of defendant's claims except his claim his appointed counsel on remand for resentencing was ineffective for failing to file a motion to reconsider sentence and a notice of appeal.

¶ 22 On September 13, 2021, the trial court accepted an agreed order from the State and defendant indicating defendant's appointed counsel for his resentencing hearing was ineffective for failing to file a motion to reconsider sentence and notice of appeal. The court granted defendant leave to file a motion to reconsider his sentence.

¶ 23 On September 27, 2021, defendant filed a motion to reconsider his sentence. According to the motion, the trial court erred in allowing the State to amend the charging instrument at defendant's resentencing hearing. Defendant also argued his sentence was excessive. Defense counsel filed a certificate of compliance pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017) with the motion to reconsider sentence.

¶ 24 On October 22, 2021, the trial court held a hearing on defendant's motion to reconsider his sentence and denied the motion. Defendant filed a notice of appeal on October 27, 2021, which listed the denial of defendant's motion to reconsider sentence. On November 18, 2021, OSAD filed an amended notice of appeal, listing both the dismissal of defendant's postconviction petition and the denial of defendant's motion to reconsider sentence as the orders being appealed. On February 14, 2022, OSAD filed a motion for leave to file a late notice of appeal to ensure this court had jurisdiction over the parts of defendant's postconviction petition the circuit court dismissed. On February 23, 2022, this court allowed defendant's motion for leave to file a late notice of appeal.

¶ 25 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 26 Defendant first argues this court should vacate his armed habitual criminal conviction in this case because one of the predicate convictions the State relied upon to prove defendant guilty is a void ab initio conviction. The predicate conviction in question was defendant's aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6 (West 2006)) conviction in Cook County case No. 07-CR-582401. Defendant also argues this same void ab initio conviction was used improperly to elevate his aggravated unlawful use of a weapon conviction in this case from a Class 4 felony to a Class 2 felony.

¶ 27 Our supreme court in People v. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116, 22, 2 N.E.3d 321, and People v. Burns, 2015 IL 117387, ¶¶ 21, 32, 79 N.E.3d 159, respectively, has found sections 24-1.6(a)(1) and 24-1.6(a)(3)(A) of the Criminal Code of 2012, which are subsections of the aggravated unlawful use of a weapon statute (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A) (West 2012)), to be facially unconstitutional pursuant to the second amendment.

¶ 28 In People v. McFadden, 2016 IL 117424, ¶ 21, 61 N.E.3d 74, our supreme court was faced with the question whether a prior conviction based on a statute subsequently deemed facially unconstitutional may serve as a predicate conviction for a different offense. Our supreme court held:

"It is axiomatic that no judgment, including a judgment of conviction, is deemed vacated until a court with reviewing authority has so declared. As with any conviction, a conviction is treated as valid until the judicial process has declared otherwise by direct appeal or collateral attack. Although Aguilar may provide a basis for vacating defendant's prior 2002 AUUW conviction, Aguilar did not automatically overturn that judgment of conviction. Thus, at the time defendant committed the UUW by a felon offense, defendant had a judgment of conviction that had not been vacated and that made it unlawful for him to possess firearms." McFadden, 2016 IL 117424, ¶ 31.

¶ 29 In deciding defendant's direct appeal in this case, this court followed McFadden and the First District's opinions in Perkins, 2016 IL App (1st) 150889, ¶ 7, and Faulkner, 2017 IL App (1st) 132884, ¶ 15, stating: "Until such time as our supreme court or the United States Supreme Court holds otherwise, we find no authority to vacate defendant's conviction for being an armed habitual criminal." Smith, 2017 IL App (4th) 150003-U, ¶ 65.

¶ 30 Since this court's decision in defendant's direct appeal, our supreme court issued its opinion in N. G, which held "the state is barred from giving any legal recognition to a conviction based on a facially unconstitutional statute *** even if the underlying statute is not invalidated until after the conviction becomes final." (Emphasis in original.) N.G., 2018 IL 121939, ¶ 38. According to our supreme court, "As a matter of federal constitutional law, a judicial declaration that a criminal statute is facially invalid under the United States Constitution means that the statute was fatally infirm from the moment of its enactment and that the conduct it sanctioned was never a crime at all." N.G., 2018 IL 121939, ¶ 39. The supreme court distinguished a conviction based on a facially unconstitutional statute from "situations where a conviction was obtained through a constitutionally deficient procedure." N.G., 2018 IL 121939, ¶ 39.

¶ 31 The supreme court noted the facts in N. G. were distinguishable from the situation in McFadden. However, our supreme court overruled McFadden to the extent it conflicted with the court's holding in N. G. and controlling precedent from the United States Supreme Court. N. G, 2018 IL 121939, ¶ 84. Our supreme court explained:

"Although we reaffirmed long-standing principles that a facially unconstitutional statute is void from the moment of its enactment and unenforceable, that a declaration that a statute is facially invalid must be given full retroactive effect, and that a conviction based on such a statute cannot stand, we held, based on the language of the [unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (UUWF)] statute, that where a defendant has not taken affirmative action to have a court set aside the initial conviction and therefore still has an extant, undisturbed felony conviction on his record at the time he engaged in the conduct on which the subsequent UUWF prosecution was predicated, the elements of the UUWF statute are satisfied and the UUWF conviction may stand, regardless of whether the initial conviction might be subject to vacatur later on the grounds that it was unconstitutional. [Citation.] Underlying this conclusion was a concern that unless felons who had previously been convicted of a firearms offense were required to formally clear their prior records before obtaining firearms, they might resort to self-help and acquire firearms again in the hope that, after the fact, they could defend against any subsequent firearms charges by having their earlier conviction set aside. [Citation.] Such an outcome, in our view, would undermine the UUWF statute's purpose of
protecting the public from dangerous persons who are seeking to obtain firearms." N.G., 2018 IL 121939, ¶ 62 (citing McFadden, 2016 IL 117424, ¶¶ 27-30).
However, the supreme court noted its McFadden decision did not take into account"' [t]he same possibility of a valid result does not exist where a substantive rule has eliminated a State's power to proscribe the defendant's conduct or impose a given punishment.'" N.G., 2018 IL 121939, ¶ 73 (quoting Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 201 (2016)). According to our supreme court:
" [A] facially unconstitutional statute and any conviction based on the statute must be treated as if they never existed. Because they are nonexistent, as a matter of federal constitutional law, and must therefore be ignored by the courts, using them against a defendant in any subsequent proceeding, civil or criminal, is not only conceptually impossible (if something has no legal existence how can it be given any legal recognition?) but would subvert the very constitutional protections that resulted in the statute being found facially invalid to begin with and is incompatible with the United States Supreme Court's command that when, as under Aguilar and here, the conduct penalized by a statute is constitutionally immune from punishment, that determination must be given complete retroactive effect." N.G., 2018 IL 121939, ¶ 74.

¶ 32 Defendant's arguments on appeal rely heavily on N.G. However, the State correctly notes the record in this case does not establish defendant's aggravated unlawful use of a weapon conviction was void ab initio because the record does not reflect defendant was convicted under the facially unconstitutional provisions of the aggravated unlawful use of a weapon statute. Defendant included in the appendix to his appellant's brief purported records from Cook County case No. 07-CR-582401, specifically an order of commitment and sentence to the Illinois Department of Corrections and a grand jury record, showing defendant's conviction was pursuant to the facially unconstitutional provisions of the statute. However, these documents were not part of the record in the trial court or certified by the Cook County circuit clerk. As a result, we will not consider these documents and find defendant has not established his aggravated unlawful use of a weapon conviction was void ab initio.

33 In addition, we note defendant did not raise the specific issues that he raises on appeal in his postconviction petition. When a defendant is appealing a ruling on a postconviction petition, he may not raise issues on appeal that were not included in his petition. See 725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 2020) ("Any claim of substantial denial of constitutional rights not raised in the original or an amended petition is waived.")

¶ 34 This leads us to defendant's argument his postconviction counsel "provided an unreasonable level of assistance and failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 651(c), where counsel filed a certificate pursuant to Rule 604(d), and failed to amend the petition to adequately present [defendant's] claims." A defendant's postconviction counsel must provide the defendant with a reasonable level of assistance. People v. Turner, 187 Ill.2d 406, 410, 719 N.E.2d 725, 728 (1999).

¶ 35 The role of appointed counsel in a postconviction proceeding is to "insure that if the petitioner has any constitutional claims of merit they will be properly recognized, developed, and articulated in the post-conviction proceedings." People v. King, 39 Ill.2d 295, 297, 235 N.E.2d 585, 586 (1968). Unless appointed counsel provides appropriate representation, the appointment of counsel to represent a postconviction petitioner is a mere formality. People v. Garrison, 43 Ill.2d 121, 123, 251 N.E.2d 200, 201 (1969).

¶ 36 Filing a certificate of compliance pursuant to Rule 651(c) creates a rebuttable presumption that the certifying attorney complied with the requirements of Rule 651(c) and provided reasonable assistance of counsel to the petitioner. People v. Perkins, 229 Ill.2d 34, 52, 890 N.E.2d 398, 408 (2007); People v. Schlosser, 2012 IL App (1st) 092523, 33, 973 N.E.2d 960. Rule 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017) provides the record

"shall contain a showing, which may be made by the certificate of petitioner's attorney, that the attorney has consulted with petitioner by phone, mail, electronic means or in person to ascertain his or her contentions of deprivation of constitutional rights, has examined the record of the proceedings at the trial, and has made any amendments to the petitions filed pro se that are necessary for an adequate presentation of petitioner's contentions."

¶ 37 In this case, defendant's appointed postconviction counsel did not file an amended postconviction petition on behalf of defendant and failed to file a certificate of compliance pursuant to Rule 651(c). Counsel did file a certificate of compliance pursuant to Rule 604(d). However, the Rule 604(d) certificate was filed with a motion to reconsider defendant's sentence. A certificate pursuant to Rule 604(d) is more narrow in scope than a Rule 651(c) certificate. In a Rule 604(d) certificate, the attorney is stating he or she

"has consulted with the defendant either by phone, mail, electronic means or in person to ascertain defendant's contentions of error in the sentence and the entry of the plea of guilty, has examined the trial court file and both the report of proceedings of the plea of guilty and the report of proceedings in the sentencing hearing, and has made any amendments to the motion necessary for adequate presentation of any defects in those proceedings." Ill. S.Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017).

¶ 38 With regard to defendant's appointed postconviction counsel, this case is similar to this court's decision in People v. Mason, 2016 IL App (4th) 140517, ¶ 10, 56 N.E.3d 1141. In Mason, the defendant's court appointed postconviction counsel also filed a certificate of compliance pursuant to Rule 604(d) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013) instead of a certificate of compliance pursuant to Rule 651(c) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013). In Mason, counsel indicated he had reviewed the defendant's pro se motion, consulted with the defendant "to ascertain his contentions of error in the plea and sentencing hearings, and ascertained no amendments to defendant's pro se motion were necessary to present [the] defendant's contentions of error at the plea and sentencing proceedings." Mason, 2016 IL App (4th) 140517, ¶ 10. This court reversed the dismissal of the defendant's postconviction petition and remanded the case for further second-stage proceedings under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Postconviction Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2020)), stating:

"Without assurances from the record that postconviction counsel fulfilled his duty under Rule 651(c) rather than under Rule 604(d), we conclude postconviction counsel's certificate failed to substantially comply with Rule 651(c). Where a certificate is deficient, the appropriate remedy is to reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this cause for compliance with Rule 651(c)." Mason, 2016 IL App (4th) 140517, ¶ 25.

Based on this court's reasoning in Mason, we reverse the trial court's dismissal of defendant's postconviction petition in this case and remand for new second-stage proceedings with new postconviction counsel.

¶ 39 We recognize the State argues postconviction counsel's billing records show counsel complied with Rule 651(c). However, counsel's billing records are too vague to establish compliance with Rule 651(c).

¶ 40 Because we are remanding this case for compliance with Rule 651 (c), we need not address defendant's remaining contentions of error.

¶ 41 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 42 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court's dismissal of defendant's postconviction petition and remand for new second-stage proceedings under the Postconviction Act with the appointment of new counsel to represent defendant pursuant to the requirements of Rule 651(c).

¶ 43 Reversed and remanded with directions.


Summaries of

People v. Smith

Illinois Appellate Court, Fourth District
Nov 2, 2022
2022 Ill. App. 4th 210634 (Ill. App. Ct. 2022)
Case details for

People v. Smith

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KEITH SMITH…

Court:Illinois Appellate Court, Fourth District

Date published: Nov 2, 2022

Citations

2022 Ill. App. 4th 210634 (Ill. App. Ct. 2022)