Opinion
E032156.
7-10-2003
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CHESTER LEE SMITH, Defendant and Appellant.
James L. Crowder, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Raquel M. Gonzalez, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Roberta L. Davis, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Following the denial of defendants suppression motion (Pen. Code, § 1538.5), a jury convicted him of possessing methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)). The trial court found him eligible for drug treatment under Proposition 36 and placed him on probation for 36 months.
On appeal, defendant unsuccessfully challenges the denial of his motion.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
At the hearing on defendants suppression motion, Fontana Police Officer Dorsey testified he was at 15558 San Bernardino Avenue assisting officers who were executing a search warrant at that address when defendant drove his pickup truck into a driveway at the residence. The uniformed officer contacted him and asked what he was doing at the location. He answered that he lived there, at 15560 San Bernardino Avenue. The officer, who did not know the address of the property or that it had two residences, explained the house was being searched pursuant to a warrant. Although the residence is a single-story family dwelling with one frontyard and one backyard, it had been converted into a duplex by a wall through the center of the house. The officer "first became really clear that there [were] two separate portions" when defendant said he lived on the other side. As the investigation progressed and before the officer asked defendant to step out of the truck, he knew that defendant did not live in the residence where the warrant was served.
Without drawing his weapon, the officer asked defendant to step out of the truck and defendant complied. He was cooperative and the officer had no reason to order him out of the truck. The officer asked if he had any narcotics on his person and he said he did. The officer searched him and recovered two baggies of methamphetamine from his pants pocket.
The People argued that under People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 902 P.2d 729, officers executing a search warrant may contact and briefly detain a person on the searched premises to determine his or her identity. During such an encounter, defendant in this case volunteered that he had drugs in his possession and the officer lawfully searched him. Defendants attorney argued that the pivotal issue was whether the officer requested or ordered defendant to exit the truck. Finding no evidence that the encounter was not consensual, the court denied the motion.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erroneously denied his suppression motion because his admission that he possessed drugs was the product of an unlawful detention. He does not contest the officers approach or search after he told the officer he had drugs. But, he argues the officer unlawfully detained him when the officer asked him for identification, asked what he was doing at the location, asked him to step out of the truck and asked whether he had drugs. The People respond the contact was not a detention, but merely a consensual encounter. We affirm.
In reviewing the denial of a suppression motion, we defer to the trial courts factual findings where supported by substantial evidence, but exercise independent judgment to determine whether, on the facts found, the search was reasonable under Fourth Amendment standards. (People v. Leyba (1981) 29 Cal.3d 591, 596-597, 174 Cal. Rptr. 867, 629 P.2d 961; Ornelas v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 690, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911, 116 S. Ct. 1657.)
"Police contacts with individuals may be placed into three broad categories ranging from the least to the most intrusive: consensual encounters that result in no restraint of liberty whatsoever; detentions, which are seizures of an individual that are strictly limited in duration, scope, and purpose; and formal arrests or comparable restraints on an individuals liberty. [Citations.]" (In re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 821, 941 P.2d 880.)
"Consensual encounters do not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny. [Citation.] Unlike detentions, they require no articulable suspicion that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime. [Citation.] [P] The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that a detention does not occur when a police officer merely approaches an individual on the street and asks a few questions. [Citation.] As long as a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the police and go about his or her business, the encounter is consensual and no reasonable suspicion is required on the part of the officer. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, in some manner restrains the individuals liberty, does a seizure occur. [Citations.] In order to determine whether a particular encounter constitutes a seizure, a court must consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the officers requests or otherwise terminate the encounter. [Citation.] This test assesses the coercive effect of police conduct as a whole, rather than emphasizing particular details of that conduct in isolation. [Citation.] Circumstances establishing a seizure might include any of the following: the presence of several officers, an officers display of a weapon, some physical touching of the person, or the use of language or of a tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officers request might be compelled. [Citations.] The officers uncommunicated state of mind and the individual citizens subjective belief are irrelevant in assessing whether a seizure triggering Fourth Amendment scrutiny has occurred. [Citation.]" (In re Manuel G., supra, 16 Cal.4th 805, 821; United States v. Mendenhall (1980) 446 U.S. 544, 554, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 100 S. Ct. 1870.) In the absence of some evidence, "otherwise inoffensive contact between a member of the public and the police cannot, as a matter of law, amount to a seizure of that person." (United States v. Mendenhall, supra, 446 U.S. at p. 555.)
Applying the foregoing principles, we conclude the trial court properly determined there was no evidence that the contact was anything other than a consensual encounter. The evidence establishes that only one officer approached defendant, his weapon was not unholstered, he did not touch defendant or use language or a tone of voice indicating compliance was required, he never told defendant that he was being detained or could not leave, and the encounter lasted only a few minutes. Defendant had parked his truck in the driveway serving his residence; he probably was ready to step out of the truck and he was very cooperative. The encounter was not converted into a detention requiring Fourth Amendment scrutiny merely because the officer identified himself as an officer and asked a few questions. (Florida v. Bostick (1991) 501 U.S. 429, 434, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389, 111 S. Ct. 2382; Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 U.S. 491, 497-498, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 103 S. Ct. 1319; People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 328.)
Defendant argues the contact was a detention because no reasonable person would feel free to walk away from an officer. However, that argument has been rejected by both the United States and California Supreme Courts which held the mere fact that a uniformed officer initiates contact does not transform a consensual encounter into a detention. (Florida v. Royer, supra, 460 U.S. at pp. 497-498; People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 328.) It is well settled that when an officer approaches an individual in order to initiate a consensual encounter, the individual need not answer any question, may decline to speak with the officer, and may leave. (Florida v. Royer, supra, 460 U.S. at pp. 497-498; People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 328.) These holdings apply when the encounter takes place at or near the location where a search warrant is being executed. (See, e.g., People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 328 [consensual encounter outside cordoned-off apartment while marked police cars and uniformed officers surrounded building, when officer approached defendant, spoke with him about his presence at the scene, summoned another officer to speak with him, asked if the officers could have his jacket tested for blood, and asked to handcuff and transport him to the police station for questioning]; People v. Bouser (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1280, 1287-1288 [officers warrant check over radio in Bousers presence, which is a single circumstance that must be viewed in light of the other facts presented, did not transform consensual encounter into detention].)
Defendant argues the question whether a detention occurred is not limited to whether the officer was alone, drew his weapon, touched him or used compelling language or tone of voice. He is correct; it is the totality of the circumstances that determines whether an intrusion amounts to a detention that violates an individuals Fourth Amendment rights. (Florida v. Bostick, supra, 501 U.S. 429, 439, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389, 111 S. Ct. 2382.) Thus, his argument that the officers "asking [him] to step out of his truck was an impermissible order that was a detention . . ." fails. Asking a person to exit a vehicle which arrives at a residence that is being searched pursuant to a warrant after the person claims to live at the residence is a minimal intrusion considering the totality of the circumstances: The officer was not required to accept his claim that he lived in the adjacent portion of the residence rather than the portion being searched and asking him to exit the truck to investigate the claim was not unreasonable. (See, e.g., People v. Glaser, supra, 11 Cal.4th 354, 365 [a brief detention was justified by the need to determine what connection Glaser, who appeared to be more than a stranger or casual visitor, had to the premises, and by the related need to ensure officer safety and security at the site of a search for narcotics].) Also, the fact defendant voluntarily responded that he possessed drugs before the claim was verified does not amount to a totality of circumstances which converted a consensual contact into a constitutional violation. (See, e.g., Ford v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 112, 127-128 [no detention when Ford spent hours with officers, accompanying them to police station, being interrogated, and providing blood sample].) Furthermore, defendant was very cooperative, did not decline to exit the truck and voluntarily answered he had drugs. (See, e.g., People v. Bennett (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 396, 402 ["classic consensual encounter" when Bennett agreed to speak with officer, acknowledged he was on parole, and agreed to wait in back of police vehicle while officer ran a warrant check].)
People v. Gallant (1990) 225 Cal. App. 3d 200, 275 Cal. Rptr. 50, cited by defendant is factually distinguishable. Gallant knocked on the front door of a house where officers were executing a search warrant. An officer answered the door with his gun drawn. Before Gallant said anything, the officer identified himself, explained officers were searching the house, advised Gallant that he would be detained, and ordered him to enter the house. Immediately after he entered, the officer told him to put his hands on his head and conducted a pat-down search. (Id. at pp. 203-204.) The totality of the circumstances supported a determination that Gallant had been detained. (Id. at p. 207.) In contrast in this case, as stated above, the officer did not draw his weapon, did not tell defendant he would be detained, and did not order him inside the residence being searched.
In view of the foregoing, we conclude the trial court properly determined that defendant was not unlawfully detained and denied his suppression motion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: RICHLI J., and WARD J. --------------- Notes: In People v. Glaser, supra, 11 Cal.4th 354, on a dark and stormy night, officers who arrived to execute a search warrant saw Glaser standing in an unlit spot in the driveway. He was about to pass through a gate into the backyard of the house being searched. His apparent familiarity with the premises and his entry through the backyard suggested he was not a stranger or chance visitor, but his exact connection to the house was not immediately apparent and the officers were unsuccessful in communicating with him. The officers were faced with an unidentified person who appeared to be a resident or familiar visitor of a house in which the officers had probable cause to believe criminal drug activity was occurring. In these circumstances, the Supreme Court held an officer who drew his weapon and ordered Glaser to the ground briefly for handcuffing took steps that a reasonably prudent officer could consider necessary to protect his own safety, that of the other searchers and that of the detainee himself. (Id. at p. 369.)