Opinion
297 KA 12-02135.
04-29-2016
Timothy P. Donaher, Public Defender, Rochester (Jon P. Getz of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant. Sandra Doorley, District Attorney, Rochester (Robert Shoemaker of Counsel), for Respondent.
Timothy P. Donaher, Public Defender, Rochester (Jon P. Getz of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant.
Sandra Doorley, District Attorney, Rochester (Robert Shoemaker of Counsel), for Respondent.
PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, NEMOYER, AND SCUDDER, JJ.
MEMORANDUM: Defendant appeals from an order denying, without a hearing, his CPL article 440 motion to vacate the 2007 judgment convicting him following a jury trial of manslaughter in the first degree (Penal Law § 125.20[1] ) and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (§ 265.03 [former (2) ] ) in connection with the shooting death of a man in Rochester (People v. Smith, 93 A.D.3d 1345, 940 N.Y.S.2d 768, lv. denied 19 N.Y.3d 967, 950 N.Y.S.2d 119, 973 N.E.2d 217 ). Defendant contends that County Court erred in denying his motion because the People violated their Brady obligations by failing to disclose the status of a prosecution witness as a paid informant. We reject that contention.
It is well established that “[t]he Due Process Clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions both guarantee a criminal defendant the right to discover favorable evidence in the People's possession material to guilt or punishment,” and that “[i]mpeachment evidence falls within the ambit of a prosecutor's Brady obligation” (People v. Fuentes, 12 N.Y.3d 259, 263, 879 N.Y.S.2d 373, 907 N.E.2d 286, rearg. denied 13 N.Y.3d 766, 886 N.Y.S.2d 866, 915 N.E.2d 1163 ). To make out a successful Brady claim, “a defendant must show that (1) the evidence is favorable to the defendant because it is either exculpatory or impeaching in nature; (2) the evidence was suppressed by the prosecution; and (3) prejudice arose because the suppressed evidence was material ... In New York, where a defendant makes a specific request for [an item of discovery], the materiality element is established provided there exists a ‘reasonable possibility’ that it would have changed the result of the proceedings” (id .; see People v. Garrett, 23 N.Y.3d 878, 885, 994 N.Y.S.2d 22, 18 N.E.3d 722, rearg. denied 25 N.Y.3d 1215, 16 N.Y.S.3d 508, 37 N.E.3d 1151 ).
Here, there is no dispute that defendant established the first and second elements of the Fuentes test inasmuch as the People concede that evidence of the witness's status as a paid informant is favorable to defendant, and that such evidence was suppressed by the prosecution. With respect to the third element, even assuming, arguendo, that defendant made specific requests for information encompassing the witness's status as a paid informant in unrelated cases as well as any compensation that she received in exchange for evidence implicating defendant in the present case, we conclude that, “ although [such] information ... may have provided the defense with additional impeachment material, it cannot be said that there is a reasonable possibility that the result at trial would have been different had the information been disclosed” (People v. Phillips, 55 A.D.3d 1145, 1149, 865 N.Y.S.2d 787, lv. denied 11 N.Y.3d 899, 873 N.Y.S.2d 275, 901 N.E.2d 769 ; see People v. Sibadan, 240 A.D.2d 30, 35–36, 671 N.Y.S.2d 1, lv. denied 92 N.Y.2d 861, 677 N.Y.S.2d 91, 699 N.E.2d 451 ). Indeed, the verdict did not turn solely or predominantly on the witness's testimony inasmuch as other evidence established defendant's responsibility for the shooting (see People v. Johnson, 107 A.D.3d 1161, 1165–1166, 967 N.Y.S.2d 217, lv. denied 21 N.Y.3d 1075, 974 N.Y.S.2d 324, 997 N.E.2d 149 ; cf. People v. Gayden [Appeal No. 2], 111 A.D.3d 1388, 1389–1390, 975 N.Y.S.2d 295 ). Even assuming, arguendo, that the witness's testimony was important, we note that her credibility was strongly impeached on far more critical issues, including her ongoing relationship with the only other suspect who reasonably could have been implicated in the shooting (see Phillips, 55 A.D.3d at 1149, 865 N.Y.S.2d 787 ; Sibadan, 240 A.D.2d at 35, 671 N.Y.S.2d 1 ).
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.