Opinion
E065969
02-16-2017
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JODI LYNN SMITH, Defendant and Appellant.
John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal and Christine Y. Friedman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. SWF1500353) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. W. Charles Morgan, Judge. (Retired Judge of the Riverside Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed. John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal and Christine Y. Friedman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury found defendant and appellant Jodi Lynn Smith guilty of one count of felony vandalism causing damage in excess of $400 (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (b)(1)). The jury acquitted defendant of a separate count of vandalism causing damage in excess of $400. After the trial court denied defendant's motion to reduce her conviction to a misdemeanor pursuant to section 17, subdivision (b), defendant was sentenced to 36 months of formal probation on various terms and conditions. Defendant's sole contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying her motion to reduce her conviction to a misdemeanor. We reject this contention and affirm the judgment.
All future statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
I
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Christian Hallam and defendant began dating in 2012. It was an on-again, off-again relationship. In September 2013, Hallam owned a ranch house in Sage, California, and lived in the ranch house three to four days a week.
On September 27, 2013, Hallam's friend was visiting from out of town and was staying at the ranch house. In the morning, as Hallam drove away from his house, he saw defendant's Corvette driving toward the property. When Hallam returned to his home later that day, he found broken glass, mirrors, and television parts scattered all over the floor. He also discovered that numerous items were damaged, including televisions, a VCR/DVD player, stereo equipment, a heater, mirrors, windows, an acoustic guitar, a propane stove, lamps, and light fixtures. The personal property of Hallam's friend was also missing. Hallam called the police.
Riverside Sheriff's Deputy Jeremy Parsons responded to the scene. Deputy Parsons saw several large broken mirrors, broken light fixtures, televisions knocked over, broken windows, broken glass in an oven door, a broken microwave door, and a broken guitar. He spoke to Hallam and Hallam's friend, and photographed the damage. Hallam provided an itemized list of the damaged items to the police, and valued the damage at $8,100.
Deputy Parsons called defendant and left a voicemail message. Defendant returned his call a few days later and spoke with him. She initially denied causing any damage to Hallam's house or property. She later told Deputy Parsons that she went to the ranch house to surprise Hallam with a romantic weekend and discovered another woman's clothing in the house. Defendant was angry, "saw red," and took Hallam's property. Defendant called Hallam's neighbor after the incident and told him she "fucked up" Hallam's house because he was "going out on her."
Defendant eventually returned Hallam's friend's belongings.
The prosecution also presented evidence of damage that was done inside Hallam's house on November 10, 2013, the second count of vandalism. However, since the jury found defendant not guilty on that count, we will not recount the details of that vandalism offense.
Defendant testified on her own behalf. She stated that she and Hallam began dating in 2010 and that she went to Hallam's ranch house on September 27, 2013, to surprise Hallam for a romantic weekend. When she arrived at the house, she saw another woman's suitcase, the woman's clothing in the master bedroom, intimate items, alcohol bottles, fast food bags, and the woman's makeup in the bathroom. Defendant believed Hallam was cheating on her and she became hysterical and everything went blurry. She explained that she began crying hysterically and remembered glass breaking around her and falling to the floor sobbing. She admitted causing some damage in the house, but not everything claimed by Hallam. She admitted to damaging the mirrors and televisions, but denied damaging the windows, the DVD/VCR player, the light fixtures, the heater, the lamp, or the guitar. She also denied that the value of the damage she caused was in excess of $400. Defendant did not believe that she committed vandalism.
II
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court erred by denying her motion to reduce her felony vandalism conviction to a misdemeanor pursuant to section 17, subdivision (b). She argues the trial court incorrectly denied the motion on the ground that defendant failed to make an " 'absolute showing that this conviction was going to prohibit her from obtaining any type of employment.' " She asserts that she was not required to make such a showing and that all of the facts and circumstances suggest her conviction should have been reduced to a misdemeanor.
Section 17, subdivision (b), provides: "When a crime is punishable, in the discretion of the court, either by imprisonment in the state prison or imprisonment in a county jail under the provisions of subdivision (h) of Section 1170, or by fine or imprisonment in the county jail, it is a misdemeanor for all purposes under the following circumstances: [¶] . . . [¶] (3) When the court grants probation to a defendant without imposition of sentence and at the time of granting probation, or on application of the defendant or probation officer thereafter, the court declares the offense to be a misdemeanor."
" 'Wobbler' " offenses are those offenses that, in the discretion of the trial court, can be punished as either a felony or a misdemeanor. (Robert L. v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894, 902.) Vandalism causing damage of $400 or more in violation of section 594, subdivision (b)(1), is a " 'wobbler,' " meaning it may be punished as a felony or misdemeanor under section 17, subdivision (b). (People v. Municipal Court (Kong) (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 176, 179, fn. 3.) Section 17, subdivision (b), authorizes the trial court to reduce "wobbler" offenses to misdemeanors on application of the defendant. (People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977 (Alvarez), superseded by statute on other grounds as indicated in People v. Lynall (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1108.)
The trial court possesses broad discretion to reduce a wobbler to a misdemeanor pursuant to section 17, subdivision (b). (Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 977.) In exercising this discretion, the court should examine the nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant's attitude toward the offense, the defendant's behavior and demeanor in court, and the general sentencing objectives set forth in California Rules of Court, rule 4.410. (Id. at p. 978.) When the trial court has denied a defendant's section 17, subdivision (b) motion, we presume the trial court considered the relevant sentencing criteria unless the record affirmatively demonstrates otherwise. (Id. at p. 977-978.) In addition, we will not disturb the trial court's decision on appeal unless the party attacking the decision clearly shows the decision was irrational or arbitrary. (Ibid.) Absent such a showing, we presume the court acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives. (Id. at pp. 977-978; People v. Sy (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 44, 66.) A sentence will not be reversed just because reasonable people might disagree with the trial court's decision. (Alvarez, supra, at pp. 977-978.)
Defense counsel filed a motion to reduce defendant's felony conviction to a misdemeanor based on numerous mitigating factors pursuant to section 17, subdivision (b). At sentencing, defense counsel stated: "I just want to highlight that we are stressing the fact that with [defendant's] age, this is the first time she's been in trouble with the law, and she does have several professional licenses that may be affected by a felony conviction. I think she's extremely remorseful as was expressed in the probation report to the probation officer. I think this is a one-time situation where emotions got the best of her and she—this is not something that is of her character or of her nature. I think she's taken strides and steps to be able to address issues, as proved to the Court through therapy and counseling. She has a lot of support from family and friends to attest to . . . her true character. And, therefore, I ask the Court to take that all into consideration when weighing it against the circumstances of the offense in reducing this to a misdemeanor."
In denying the motion, the court asserted: "As to the first request to 17(b) . . . I shall deny the request at the present time. There is no absolute showing that this conviction is going to prohibit her from obtaining any type of employment. That's always a consideration. I agree with you, especially with someone who has a clean record. If that were to occur in the future, that could be addressed in the future as well. So for the time being, that request is denied."
Defendant argues the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to reduce her conviction to a misdemeanor because the factors favoring reduction "overwhelmingly outweighed the factors against that remedy." Defendant further asserts the trial court ignored the numerous mitigating factors and only considered the lack of proof defendant's conviction would bar her from obtaining employment. We reject these contentions. Although the mitigating factors in this case outweighed the aggravating factors as noted by defendant, there is no evidence to suggest the trial court ignored the mitigating factors or that it solely considered defendant's employment prospect in denying the motion. Indeed, the trial court was aware of the aggravating and mitigating factors in this case before it denied the motion. Deciding to rely on one set of appropriate factors rather than another is not an abuse of discretion. Moreover, in denying the motion, the trial court considered the general objectives of sentencing set forth in California Rules of Court, rule 4.410 as directed by our Supreme Court in Alvarez. (Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 978.)
California Rules of Court, rule 4.410 provides: "(a) General objectives of sentencing include: [¶] (1) Protecting society; [¶] (2) Punishing the defendant; [¶] (3) Encouraging the defendant to lead a law-abiding life in the future and deterring him or her from future offenses; [¶] (4) Deterring others from criminal conduct by demonstrating its consequences; [¶] (5) Preventing the defendant from committing new crimes by isolating him or her for the period of incarceration; [¶] (6) Securing restitution for the victims of crime; and [¶] (7) Achieving uniformity in sentencing. . . . [¶] (b) Because in some instances these objectives may suggest inconsistent dispositions, the sentencing judge must consider which objectives are of primary importance in the particular case. The sentencing judge should be guided by statutory statements of policy, the criteria in these rules, and the facts and circumstances of the case."
Aggravating and mitigating circumstances may assist a trial court " 'in selecting from among the options of punishment' the conviction has made available." (People v. Tran (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 877, 888 (Tran), quoting People v. Hernandez (1988) 46 Cal.3d 194, 205.) However, as discussed above, aggravating and mitigating circumstances are not the only factors that can be considered by a court in exercising its discretion under section 17, subdivision (b). We find defendant's showing does not suffice to prove an abuse of discretion, much less constitutional error, as it fails to account for the other factors discussed in Alvarez, i.e., the nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant's appreciation of and attitude toward the offense, or her traits of character as evidenced by her behavior and demeanor at the trial, weighing in favor of the trial court's discretionary decision. Considering these factors, the trial court's decision to deny defendant's motion was not arbitrary or irrational such that it constitutes a manifest abuse of discretion. The record affirmatively shows the court had read defendant's sentencing memorandum, which included defendant's statement in mitigation as well as her application to reduce her conviction to a misdemeanor, and the probation report. The court also heard a statement from defendant at the time of sentencing and was well aware of the nature of defendant's offense from the trial evidence. The offense involved defendant flying into an uncontrollable jealous rage and destroying thousands of dollars of personal property. She claimed that everything was "a blur" at the time she was committing the crime and she did not believe she destroyed property greater than $400. Although defendant claimed she was remorseful, she initially lied to the police about what she had done and, at trial, denied that she had committed vandalism.
Defendant, in passing, also argues that she had a federal due process right to the correct application of section 17, subdivision (b).
Furthermore, it appears the trial court had reason to question defendant's traits of character based on her behavior and demeanor at trial. At one point during Hallam's testimony, the court reprimanded defendant outside of the jury's presence. The court stated: "[Defendant], I don't know what's so funny about this case to you right now. You're the defendant in this case, and I wouldn't think it would be funny at all. If you want to express yourself at all, you're going to take the witness stand and answer questions, otherwise don't." In addition, during closing argument, the prosecutor also made reference to defendant's demeanor at trial, stating: "You saw her demeanor during this trial the way she acted when he took the stand. This is two years later and she's still this angry at Christian Hallam, and just the sight of him makes her this enraged."
Although the trial court did not specifically address the Alvarez factors in denying defendant's motion to reduce her conviction to a misdemeanor, the trial court is presumed to have considered all relevant sentencing factors unless the record demonstrates otherwise. (People v. Kelley (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 568, 582.) In other words, that the trial court did not mention all of the factors discussed by defendant in her appellate briefing does not establish an abuse of discretion because the court is presumed to have considered all relevant factors, as well as the correct statutory and case law, unless the record affirmatively shows otherwise. (Evid. Code, § 664; People v. Nance (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1456; People v. Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495, 567; People v. Superior Court (Du) (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 822, 836-837.) The trial court's individualized consideration of all of the circumstances is demonstrated by its consideration of the trial evidence, the probation report, the statements in mitigation, and arguments of counsel. The trial court ultimately decided to grant defendant probation, and its decision not to extend further lenity by reducing the wobbler to a misdemeanor fell well within its broad sentencing discretion. We cannot say its decision was irrational or arbitrary.
As the court in Tran aptly noted, "[a] convicted defendant is not entitled to the benefits of section 17[, subdivision] (b) as a matter of right. Rather, a reduction under section 17[, subdivision] (b) is an act of leniency by the trial court, one that 'may be granted by the court to a seemingly deserving defendant, whereby he [or she] may escape the extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law for the offense of which he [or she] stands convicted.' [Citation.]" (Tran, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 892, italics omitted.) In this case, the trial court had valid grounds to decline to afford defendant such further leniency.
Having applied "the extremely deferential and restrained standard by which appellate courts are bound in these matters" (Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 981), we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when denying defendant's motion.
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAMIREZ
P. J. We concur: HOLLENHORST
J. McKINSTER
J.