Opinion
2013-07344 Ind. No. 1808/11.
01-27-2016
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Ryan S. SMITH, appellant.
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Elizabeth Budnitz of counsel), for appellant. Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano, Johnnette Traill, Jeanette Lifschitz, and Antara D. Kanth of counsel), for respondent.
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Elizabeth Budnitz of counsel), for appellant.
Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano, Johnnette Traill, Jeanette Lifschitz, and Antara D. Kanth of counsel), for respondent.
Opinion
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Blumenfeld, J.), rendered July 15, 2013, convicting him of robbery in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction of robbery in the second degree because the prosecution failed to establish his identity as the perpetrator of the crime is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.052; People v. Hawkins, 11 N.Y.3d 484, 492, 872 N.Y.S.2d 395, 900 N.E.2d 946; People v. Delgado, 109 A.D.3d 483, 970 N.Y.S.2d 84). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish his identity as the perpetrator (see People v. Gilocompo, 125 A.D.3d 1000, 1001, 4 N.Y.S.3d 288; People v. Delgado, 109 A.D.3d 483, 970 N.Y.S.2d 84; People v. Jenkins, 93 A.D.3d 861, 861, 940 N.Y.S.2d 874; People v. Amico, 78 A.D.3d 1190, 913 N.Y.S.2d 675). Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.155; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348–349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053; People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902).
The defendant's claim that the trial court's Allen charge (see Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 17 S.Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed. 528) coerced the jury into returning a verdict after they had reported a deadlock is unpreserved for appellate review, as defense counsel neither requested a specific charge nor objected to the charge given by the court (see People v. Velez, 150 A.D.2d 514, 541 N.Y.S.2d 109). In any event, such instructions are proper provided they do not (1) urge a dissenting juror to abandon his or her convictions and join in the opinion of other jurors, (2) attempt to coerce or compel the jury to reach a particular verdict, or (3) shame the jury into reaching a verdict (see People v. Bastien, 180 A.D.2d 691, 692, 580 N.Y.S.2d 54; People v. Austin, 168 A.D.2d 502, 502–503, 562 N.Y.S.2d 745). In this case, the instructions to the jury were free of these errors.
Because the Allen charge was not improper, the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, based solely on his attorney's failure to object to the charge, is without merit (see People v. McKenzie, 48 A.D.3d 594, 595, 852 N.Y.S.2d 217; People v. Stover, 36 A.D.3d 837, 838, 831 N.Y.S.2d 183).