Opinion
2012-03-16
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Onondaga County (John J. Brunetti, A.J.), rendered June 3, 2011. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree.Meggesto, Crossett & Valerino, LLP, Syracuse (James A. Meggesto of Counsel), for defendant-appellant. William J. Fitzpatrick, District Attorney, Syracuse (James P. Maxwell of Counsel), for respondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Onondaga County (John J. Brunetti, A.J.), rendered June 3, 2011. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree.Meggesto, Crossett & Valerino, LLP, Syracuse (James A. Meggesto of Counsel), for defendant-appellant. William J. Fitzpatrick, District Attorney, Syracuse (James P. Maxwell of Counsel), for respondent.
MEMORANDUM:
On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of criminal *900 possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law § 265.03[3] ), defendant contends that he was entitled to specific performance of the original plea agreement. “The remedy of specific performance in the context of plea agreements applies where a defendant has been placed in a no-return position in reliance on the plea agreement ..., such that specific performance is warranted as a matter of essential fairness” ( People v. Sierra, 85 A.D.3d 1659, 1659, 925 N.Y.S.2d 749, lv. denied 17 N.Y.3d 905, 933 N.Y.S.2d 660, 957 N.E.2d 1164 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see generally People v. McConnell, 49 N.Y.2d 340, 348–349, 425 N.Y.S.2d 794, 402 N.E.2d 133). Here, Supreme Court properly determined that specific performance of the original plea agreement was not warranted.
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed and the matter is remitted to Supreme Court, Onondaga County, for proceedings pursuant to CPL 460.50(5).