Opinion
B220553
08-04-2011
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. EDWARD SMITH, Defendant and Appellant.
Linn Davis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Michael R. Johnsen and Eric E. Reynolds, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. NA076606)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Tomson T. Ong, Judge. Affirmed.
Linn Davis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Michael R. Johnsen and Eric E. Reynolds, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
The jury found defendant Edward Smith guilty of assaulting Marcus Benton with a deadly weapon in violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1), specially finding defendant used a knife in committing the offense (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), but found not true an allegation of infliction of great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). Defendant was found guilty of committing battery upon Laurie Ann Harvey (§ 242). The jury found defendant not guilty of attempting to murder Benton and Orlando Morton and not guilty of assault with a deadly weapon on Morton. The recidivist allegations were tried by the jury, which found defendant suffered three prior serious or violent felony convictions for purposes of the three strikes law (§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), § 667, subds. (b)-(i)) and two serious felony convictions for purposes of section 667, subdivision (a)(1).
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
The trial court imposed a sentence of 25 years to life under the three strikes law for the assault with a deadly weapon on Benton, enhanced by five years for a section 667 prior conviction (the two prior convictions having been rendered in the same trial), plus one year for the personal use of a deadly weapon enhancement for a total of 31 years to life.
In his timely appeal, defendant contends: (1) he was denied his state and federal constitutional rights to a representative and impartial jury because the trial court erroneously granted the prosecution's motion under People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 (Wheeler) and Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 (Batson) to prevent the defense from exercising a peremptory strike against a male juror; (2) the trial court's instruction on assault erroneously and prejudicially failed to inform the jury that it was the prosecution's burden to prove the assault was unlawful (that is, the absence of self-defense) in violation of defendant's due process right that the prosecution prove all elements of his offense beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) there was constitutionally insufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for assault with a deadly weapon.
We affirm.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The underlying incident took place at Tobo's Bar on Long Beach Boulevard in Long Beach on the evening of September 28, 2007. Marcus Tyrone, a banker and part-time bartender worked the bar that night. The bar's regular clientele was African-American. A security guard was posted outside the front door and another at the side entrance. A younger crowd typically congregated in the rear parking lot to drink and gamble.
Benton used to be a member of the Acacia Block Crips, a Compton street gang, but he had no gang affiliation at the time of the underlying incident. His cousin Alex Bradbury belonged to the Insane Crips, a Long Beach gang. Benton went to Tobo's Bar that night with Bradbury. They were not armed. When Bradbury parked in the bar's lot, Benton saw defendant, who was drinking from a bottle of tequila and dancing to the music from their car. Defendant complimented Benton on the music and the car (a gold 1995 Caprice Classic), and introduced himself as Ed Dog from Long Beach. They shook hands and Benton said he was from Compton. As Benton and Bradbury entered the bar, defendant asked, "Man, you really from Compton?" When Benton confirmed he was, defendant asked for his gang affiliation. Benton said he "grew up Acacia." Defendant became serious and said, "This is Long Beach" and "fuck Compton." Benton said he was there "to have a nice time" and went inside through the front door. The guard patted him and his friends down for weapons. Defendant followed.
Benton went to the bar, ordered a drink, and brought it to the table where Bradbury and their friends were sitting. Defendant approached and said in an angry tone, "Fuck Compton, this is Long Beach." Benton told him he was only there to enjoy himself. Defendant continued to harass him, so Benton walked out the front door to smoke a cigarette. He returned about six minutes later, got his drink from the table, and began talking to his female cousin, Tynisha. Defendant came up to him again and challenged him to talk or fight "man to man." They walked over toward the restrooms. Defendant again asked him about being from Compton and about his gang affiliation. As Tynisha approached them, defendant struck Benton's head with a glass bottle. The glass shattered. Benton took the glass containing his cocktail and hit defendant's forehead with it, causing the glass to break. The two fought and punched each other. Benton did not see a knife in defendant's hand, but realized defendant stabbed him when he saw the blood on his shirt.
Defendant and Benton were pulled apart. Benton was bleeding heavily. He saw defendant holding a bloody knife in his right hand. The security guard pushed Benton out the door. Once outside, Benton heard gunshots. His cousins drove him to the hospital in his car. At the hospital, he was treated for eight stab wounds. Dr. Gergis Ghobrial treated Benton's wounds to the scalp, arms, chest, and neck, repairing them with either sutures or staples.
Tyrone recalled seeing a male run into the bar area from the men's restroom. Defendant followed, holding a knife with a curved blade. He had seen defendant enter the bar alone earlier that evening, carrying a duffel bag. Defendant was walking back and forth methodically from the restroom area to the pool room and bar area, yelling that when he got paid the following week, he was "going to come back and shoot the bar up." Tyrone told the security guard at the back about defendant. When that security guard did not take immediate action, Tyrone told some patrons to get the security guard at the front.
Morton and Harvey were sitting at a table near the men's restroom. Defendant approached and punched Harvey with his left hand, while holding the knife in his right. Morton lunged at defendant to protect Harvey. Defendant punched Morton while holding his chest. Morton, in turn, tried to punch defendant. Morton slipped and fell with defendant on top of him. Harvey took a chair or bar stool and struck defendant with it. Defendant ran out the front door. Tyrone never saw Morton with a knife. The police arrived a few minutes later.
Harvey testified that she arrived at Tobo's Bar in the evening with Rebecca Flippin and Ashley Johns. She sat at a table near the restrooms. Before she was punched, her assailant (whom she could not identify at trial) was yelling, "Fuck Long Beach" and "This is Compton." His hands were bloody and he was acting strangely. Without warning, defendant punched her in the face. Harvey pushed her table onto defendant. Morton rushed over and grabbed defendant. Defendant and Morton struggled with each other on the ground. Harvey struck defendant with a bar stool in order to protect Morton. She did not see defendant's knife, but saw him attack Morton with a stabbing motion.
Flippin was a regular at Tobo's Bar. Upon arriving that night, she went directly to the women's restroom. When she came out, there was blood on a wall by the restroom door, broken glass around that area, and "the club was . . . torn apart." Harvey was yelling, "he hit me," and Morton and another man were wrestling on the floor. The other man was bleeding. Morton, who was unarmed, had been stabbed in the shoulder. Johns remembered seeing a male strike Harvey in the face. After that, Morton went to the assailant and the two men fought. She did not see that either had a knife.
Morton testified that he heard some commotion and saw defendant approaching from the restroom area, "leaking blood" and angrily muttering, "Fuck Insane, fuck 20's, fuck Long Beach." Defendant punched Harvey in the upper chest and hit Morton in the face. Morton jumped out of his seat and punched defendant. Morton never had a knife. As he and defendant struggled and fought, Morton heard someone say, "knife." A loud noise startled defendant, and Morton saw defendant had a knife with a curved blade or handle. Within seconds, defendant ran out of the bar. Morton was bleeding from a stab wound to his shoulder, but declined going to the hospital because he did not think he needed medical attention.
Myles Newborn was one of the security guards that night. He was stationed by the front door. He heard a loud noise, went inside the bar, and saw a man bleeding from his face. Defendant was standing by the restroom door with blood on his face. As Newborn called for the paramedics, he heard another disturbance and defendant ran outside and down the street. Defendant had a knife in his hands.
While en route to the bar at 11:40 p.m., Officer Daniel Arcese received a description of defendant. Officers found defendant with blood on his face, arms, and clothes, walking out of the restroom of the La Paloma Bar, nearby in Long Beach. Officer Arcese entered that restroom. There was no one else inside. The officer found a knife with a curved handle on the bloody sink.
Defense
Officer Arthur Vega interviewed Benton at the hospital. Benton did not mention hitting anyone in the face with a glass, nor did he say that he saw a knife during the fight. Tyrone told an interviewing officer that he did not see defendant with a knife at the time defendant punched Harvey. Tyrone saw him with it only when defendant and Morton were fighting or when defendant was leaving the bar.
Defendant testified that on the day of the incident, he had been sleeping in the park because he was homeless. He went to Tobo's Bar at 10:00 or 10:30 that night to get out of the cold and use the restroom. Before going inside, the security guard took his back pack and searched him for weapons. When he came out of the restroom, some people, including an "old dude" named John F. Kenney, also known as Crazy John, and Bradberry came up to him. Kenney referred to defendant by his gang moniker, "Ed Dog," from the time defendant belonged to the Insane Crips. Suddenly, defendant was struck in the head with a glass and was attacked from all sides. Defendant "snatched a knife" from one of the attackers and "just started swinging." He did not know if he stabbed anyone; he "was defending [his] life." After escaping the bar, he kept the knife for self-defense purposes and went to the restroom of another bar to clean up. He left the knife on the sink because he heard the police were on their way—he did not want to incite any violence. Defendant denied hitting anyone with a bottle. He did not walk into the bar with a bottle of tequila.
It was established in the prosecution case that defendant had been convicted of a drug offense in 1989, two arson-related offenses in 1984 (both found true for purposes of the three strikes law and § 667, subd. (a)), two drug offenses in 1986, battery of a prisoner in 1993, battery on a non-prisoner in 1991, along with a sustained juvenile petition for robbery in 1981 (found true for purposes of the three strikes law).
On cross-examination, defendant stated that it was Benton who hit him in the head with a glass, and he took the knife from Morton. Tynisha was among those who "jumped" him.
DISCUSSION
Batson/Wheeler
Wheeler held that a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to strike prospective jurors on the basis of group membership violates a criminal defendant's right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community under article I, section 16 of the California Constitution. (Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 276-277.) Batson held, among other things, that such a practice violates a defendant's right to equal protection of the laws under the United States Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment. (Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 97.) "Peremptory challenges may not be used to exclude male jurors solely because of a presumed group bias. [Citation.]" (People v. Williams (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1118, 1125.) The Batson/Wheeler principles apply to defense peremptory challenges excusing jurors improperly on the basis of race, gender, or ethnic grounds. (United States v. Martinez-Salazar (2000) 528 U.S. 304, 315; People v. Willis (2002) 27 Cal.3th 811, 813-814 (Willis).)
Defendant contends he was denied his state and federal constitutional rights to a representative and impartial jury because the trial court erroneously granted the prosecution's Batson/Wheeler motion to prevent the defense from exercising a peremptory strike against a male juror, Juror No. 6. As we explain, there was no constitutional error under the Batson/Wheeler line of cases.
Our review of the record shows that during jury selection, the defense used 7 of its first 11 peremptory challenges to strike male jurors from the venire panel. Upon the strike to the seventh male juror (Juror No. 6), the prosecutor brought a Wheeler motion, arguing that defendant was systematically excluding male jurors from the panel. Outside the jury's presence, the trial court verified that defendant's eleventh peremptory challenge was against a male, having previously exercised such challenges to strike six males and four females. Accordingly, it found the prosecution made a prima facie case of discriminatory application and requested defense counsel to provide neutral explanations for the seven challenges against males.
Trial counsel explained that the first four such challenges were based on neutral considerations such as the prospective jurors' relations with law enforcement personnel, criminal history, inattentiveness, and crime victimization. The trial court accepted those neutral explanations from counsel. However, as to the remaining three males stricken, trial counsel could offer no reason other than acquiescing to his client's requests as to panel members defendant "didn't like." The trial court found that such a justification did not respond to the Wheeler inquiry in light of its prima facie finding: Defendant "could be systematically excluding males. It is not his case to try. It's yours to try." The trial court pressed counsel for a further explanation, but counsel was unable to offer one: "I don't have any legal basis, other than that the fact I don't want him to sit on my jury. I can't think of anything." The trial court granted the prosecution's motion and ordered Juror No. 6 to be reseated, having found trial counsel's explanations legally deficient under Wheeler.
The standard for reviewing a Batson/Wheeler motion is well established. As set recently forth in People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602 (Lenix),state and federal constitutional authority imposes a three-step inquiry: "First, the trial court must determine whether the [moving party] has made a prima facie showing that the [opposing party] exercised a peremptory challenge based on race. Second, if the showing is made, the burden shifts to the [opposing party] to demonstrate that the challenges were exercised for a race-neutral reason. Third, the court determines whether the [moving party] has proven purposeful discrimination. The ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike. (Rice v. Collins (2006) 546 U.S. 333, 338.) The three-step procedure also applies to state constitutional claims. [Citations.]" (Lenix, supra, at pp. 612-613.) The reseating of improperly challenged jurors is a proper remedy where the prosecution establishes a Batson/Wheeler claim. (Willis, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 824.)
Defendant argues the trial court erred in granting the prosecution's motion under Batson/Wheeler because trial counsel's proffered explanation for attempting to strike Juror No. 6—defendant said he did not want the prospective juror on his panel—was legitimate and gender neutral, and therefore adequate to rebut the prima facie finding of discriminatory intent. In a closely related argument, defendant fastens onto the trial court's statement that defendant "could be systematically excluding males," as demonstrating the trial court never made a proper finding of purposeful discrimination, but merely speculated on the possibility of such discriminatory motivation. Both arguments fail under a fair reading of the record pursuant to the proper standard of review.
Our review of a trial court's ruling on a Wheeler/Batson motion is deferential, meaning that we examine "only whether substantial evidence supports its conclusions." (See Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 613, citing People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 341-342 (Bonilla).) We therefore exercise great restraint in reviewing a lower court's determination of the sufficiency of the moving party's reasons for making peremptory challenges. (Lenix, supra, at pp. 613-614.) "'So long as the trial court makes a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications offered, its conclusions are entitled to deference on appeal. [Citation.]'" (Id. at p. 614, citing People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 864 (Burgener).) Indeed, in assessing the lower court's findings on the question of purposeful discrimination, "we must 'rely on the good judgment of the trial courts to distinguish bona fide reasons for such peremptories from sham excuses belatedly contrived to avoid admitting acts of group discrimination.' [Citation.]" (People v. Reynoso (2003) 31 Cal.4th 903, 908 (Reynoso).) As the federal Supreme Court stated in Batson: "'[T]he trial judge's findings in the context under consideration here largely will turn on evaluation of credibility,' and for that reason 'a reviewing court ordinarily should give those findings great deference.'" (Ibid., quoting Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 98, fn. 21.)
Applying that standard, the trial court's finding of purposeful discrimination was well supported by the evidence in the record. Trial counsel offered facially neutral reasons for exercising the initial four peremptory challenges against males in the venire, and the trial court found those explanations acceptable. However, as to the final three such challenges, trial counsel could offer no basis for his challenges other than deference to his client's own unexplained dislike. "A prosecutor asked to explain his conduct must provide a '"clear and reasonably specific" explanation of his "legitimate reasons" for exercising the challenges.'" (Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 613, citing Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 98, fn. 20.) The same is true for defense counsel.
Contrary to defendant's argument on appeal, such a nonexplanation is not the legal equivalent of the kinds of trivial, arbitrary, or idiosyncratic reasons found adequate to justify a peremptory challenge. (See, e.g., Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 613 ["A prospective juror may be excused based upon facial expressions, gestures, hunches, and even for arbitrary or idiosyncratic reasons."].) In cases like Reynoso, supra, 31 Cal.4th at page 924 and Purkett v. Elem (1995) 514 U.S. 765, 767, the reviewing court deferred to trial court findings that the prosecutors' facially-nondiscriminatory challenges were sincere and legitimate. Here, in contrast, the trial court made a special effort to discover whether defense counsel had an affirmative reason for striking the jurors, but counsel conceded that he had none—or could not remember any. The trial court was not legally bound under the Batson/Wheeler line of cases to accept any facially nondiscriminatory reason, much less to speculate that defendant himself might have had a legitimate nondiscriminatory motive that he failed to communicate to his counsel.
Finally, read in context, the trial court's statement that defendant "could be systematically excluding males" did not mean that it was merely guessing at the possibility of an improper motive for the challenges. Rather, in light of the fact that the trial court continued to press counsel for an affirmative reason for exercising the strikes, it is apparent the trial court found counsel had failed to rebut the prima facie inference that the challenges had been improperly based on group membership.
From the foregoing analysis, it is clear the trial court made "'a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications offered'" and its conclusions are therefore "'entitled to deference on appeal.'" (Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 614, quoting Burgener, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 864.)
Self-Defense Instructions
Defendant contends the trial court's instruction on assault erroneously and prejudicially failed to inform the jury that it was the prosecution's burden to prove the assault was unlawful—that defendant had failed to establish self-defense—in violation of defendant's due process right that the prosecution prove all elements of his offense beyond a reasonable doubt. As we explain, the instructions as a whole made it clear the prosecution bore the burden of establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on all elements of the charged offenses and that it was the prosecution's burden to prove both the attempted murder and the assaults were unlawful. It was therefore implicit that the burden as to self-defense was the same as to both attempted murder and assault.
There is no indication in the record that defendant objected to the missing part of the assault instruction; however, because defendant argues the instruction was legally incorrect and therefore violated his right to due process of law, we do not find the constitutional claim was forfeited. Such a claim "is not of the type that must be preserved by objection. (§ 1259 ['The appellate court may . . . review any instruction given, . . . even though no objection was made thereto in the lower court, if the substantial rights of the defendant were affected thereby.']; People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 482, fn. 7.)" (People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 976, fn. 7.)
"On review, we examine the jury instructions as a whole, in light of the trial record, to determine whether it is reasonably likely the jury understood the challenged instruction in a way that undermined the presumption of innocence or tended to relieve the prosecution of the burden to prove defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (See People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 958.)" (People v. Paysinger (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 26, 30 (Paysinger).) The jury was instructed not to "single out any particular sentence or any individual point or instruction and ignore the others," but to "[c]onsider the instructions as a whole and each in light of all the others."
In order to understand the instructions in this case, it is critical to understand that, pursuant to CALJIC No. 17.03, the jury was instructed that where two counts arose out of the same occurrence, there could be only one crime. That is, the attempted murder allegations and the assault allegations were alternative theories of guilt as to both victims, Benton and Morton: the charges of attempted murder and those of assault with a deadly weapon "are made in the alternative and in effect allege that the defendant committed an act or acts which constitute[s] either the crime of attempted murder or the crime of assault with a deadly weapon. If you find that the defendant committed an act or acts constituting one of the charged crimes, you then must determine which of the crimes so charged was thereby committed. [¶] In order to find the defendant guilty you must all agree as to the particular crime committed, and, if you find the defendant guilty of one, you must find him not guilty of the other." The instruction proceeded to explain in detail how a finding of guilt as to each charged offense required a not guilty finding as to the alternative offense.
The jury was also instructed, pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.01, "each fact which is essential to complete a set of circumstances necessary to establish the defendant's guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In other words, before an inference essential to establish guilt may be found to have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, each fact or circumstance on which the inference necessarily rests must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Under CALJIC No. 2.90, the jury was instructed: "A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to a verdict of not guilty. This presumption places upon the People the burden of proving him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."
As defendant points out, with regard to the alternative charge of attempted murder, the trial court instructed pursuant to CALJIC No. 5.15 that an attempted "killing is lawful if it was justifiable. The burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the homicide was unlawful, that is, not justifiable. If you have a reasonable doubt that the homicide was unlawful, you must find the defendant not guilty." The following instruction, CALJIC No. 5.30 ("Self-Defense Against Assault"), responded to the defense theory: "It is lawful for a person who is being assaulted to defend himself from attack if, as a reasonable person, he has grounds for believing and does believe that bodily injury is about to be inflicted upon him. In doing so, that person may use all force and means which he believes to be reasonably necessary and which would appear to a reasonable person, in the same or similar circumstances, to be necessary to prevent the injury which appears to be imminent." The next eight instructions elaborated on the availability of self-defense in terms of an assault.
After instructing the jury on the elements of attempted murder, the trial court set forth the elements of assault pursuant to CALJIC No. 9.00. That instruction contained all the elements of assault, including that "[a] person willfully and unlawfully committed an act which by its nature would probably and directly result in the application of physical force on another person." (Emphasis added.) However, as defendant points out, the trial court did not include the following bracketed text, recommended for use in conjunction with CALJIC 5.30 where there is a defense of self-defense: "A willful application of physical force upon the person of another is not unlawful when done in lawful self-defense. The People have the burden to prove that the application of physical force was not in lawful self-defense. If you have a reasonable doubt that the application of physical force was unlawful, you must find the defendant not guilty." (CALJIC No. 9.00.)
From this summary of the relevant instructions, there is no reason to think the jury would have understood the burden regarding proof of lawfulness (or the nonexistence of self-defense) rested with the prosecution as to attempted murder, but shifted or failed to apply as to assault. Not only was the jury plainly instructed that the two offenses must be considered alternatively, but the instructions concerning self-defense were set forth with regard to an underlying "assault." Additionally, the elements of both attempted murder and assault were defined after the self-defense instructions. Moreover, it was never argued that self-defense applied differently as to attempted murder and assault. Both counsel referred to self-defense as applying to the alternative offenses in the same manner.
Defendant is correct that concerns of due process require that "the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of justification, herein self-defense, when the issue is properly presented in a homicide case." (People v. Banks (1976) 67 Cal.App.3d 379, 384.) However, this was not a case in which the trial court's extemporaneous instruction affirmatively "shifted to the defendant the burden of proof that the homicide had been committed in self-defense." (Id. at p. 383.) Rather, examination of the jury instructions as a whole, in light of the trial record, dispels any reasonable likelihood the jury would have understood the challenged assault instruction as shifting or eliminating the prosecution's burden as to self-defense. (See Paysinger, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 30.)
Sufficiency of Evidence
Finally, defendant contends there was constitutionally insufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for assault with a deadly weapon against Benton. In essence, defendant asserts there was no substantial evidence to support the conviction because the prosecution's case depended on acceptance of Benton's testimony that defendant instigated the assault by striking Benton with a tequila bottle—testimony defendant argues is inherently implausible. We disagree.
Applying the standard for federal constitutional error, "the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319.) Accordingly, we review the record "in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence" supporting each element of the crime. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 562.) "[S]ubstantial evidence" is "evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." (Id. at p. 578; People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 504.) "Reversal on this ground is unwarranted unless it appears 'that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].'" (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331, quoting People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755; People v. Majors (2004) 33 Cal.4th 321, 331 [the reviewing court does not resolve evidentiary conflicts, but views the evidence in a light most favorable to the People, and presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence].) The standard of review is the same in cases where the prosecution relies primarily on circumstantial evidence. (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11.)
For purposes of this appeal, we emphasize that "'[r]esolution of conflicts and inconsistencies in the testimony is the exclusive province of the trier of fact. [Citation.] Moreover, unless the testimony is physically impossible or inherently improbable, testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a conviction. [Citation.]' (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181.)" (People v. Dominguez (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1356.)
Contrary to defendant's argument, the consistent testimony that the security guards frisked all patrons entering the bar for weapons did not eliminate the possibility that defendant brought weapons into the bar. Defendant could have evaded the pat-down search. Tyrone saw defendant enter the bar alone earlier that evening, carrying a duffel bag. Indeed, there was strong evidence that defendant possessed and used the knife inside the bar. Given the evidence that Benton was unarmed, defendant's knife use could have supported the assault conviction, regardless of whether defendant initiated the confrontation by striking Benton with a bottle.
Defendant's constitutional challenge therefore fails. "Even if the evidence could be reconciled with a different finding, that does not justify a conclusion that the jury's verdict was not supported by the evidence, nor does it warrant a reversal." (People v. Romero (2008) 44 Cal.4th 386, 400; People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793 [where substantial evidence supports the jury's finding, and other circumstances support a contrary finding, the jury's finding will not be reversed].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
KRIEGLER, J. We concur:
ARMSTRONG, Acting P. J.
Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.