Security guard Peterson called Robinson to the store on October 30, 1986, for the purpose of an identification. Although Peterson initiated the identification and not the police (see People v. Smith (1972), 8 Ill. App.3d 270, 273, 290 N.E.2d 261), the police waited and allowed Robinson to view defendant while defendant sat in the squad car. There was also a police officer in the car.
• 6 The Montgomery test, which prohibits the introduction into evidence of convictions over 10 years old except for purposes of impeachment, is only applicable to trial proceedings and has no bearing on the matters to be considered in hearings in aggravation and mitigation. It is well settled that prior convictions are relevant and pertinent in determining the appropriate sentence to be imposed. ( People v. Heise (1966), 35 Ill.2d 214, 220 N.E.2d 438.) In People v. Smith (1972), 8 Ill. App.3d 270, 290 N.E.2d 261, this court, in affirming the conviction and sentence of a 63-year-old defendant for armed robbery and aggravated battery, noted: "The defendant's prior convictions, armed robbery in 1927, robbery in 1930 and receiving stolen property in 1952, although long past, were properly considered in aggravation and mitigation."
When two or more persons have a common design to commit an unlawful act, the act of one is the act of all and all are equally guilty of whatever crime is committed. People v. Smith (1972), 8 Ill. App.3d 270, 290 N.E.2d 261. Gregory's contention that the trial court caused his in-court identification is based upon the court's directing Polisky to look around the courtroom after he had said he could not see the man who robbed him, and upon the court's denial of his pretrial motion to be seated elsewhere than at the counsel table.
We find this argument unpersuasive. • 3 Where two or more persons have a common design to accomplish an unlawful purpose, the act of one is the act of all, and all are equally guilty of whatever crime is committed. ( People v. Nowak (1970), 45 Ill.2d 158, 258 N.E.2d 313; People v. Smith (1972), 8 Ill. App.3d 270, 290 N.E.2d 261.) As stated in People v. Hubbard (1972), 4 Ill. App.3d 729, 281 N.E.2d 767, "proof of a common purpose need not be supported by words of agreement or direct evidence, but can be drawn from circumstances surrounding the commission of an act by a group."
• 6, 7 The defendant's final contention is that his convictions for battery and attempt theft rested on the same conduct and therefore the battery conviction must be reversed. Only one sentence can be imposed when different offenses arise from the same act. ( People v. Smith (1972), 8 Ill. App.3d 270, 290 N.E.2d 261.) Whether an act or series of acts are part of the same conduct depends on the circumstances of each case. The testimony showed that the defendant and his accomplice knocked their victim down, stabbed and pummeled him, and demanded his money.
In such a case, "* * * the act of one is the act of all and all are equally guilty of whatever crime is committed." People v. Smith (1972), 8 Ill. App.3d 270, 273, 290 N.E.2d 261; People v. Nowak (1970), 45 Ill.2d 158, 258 N.E.2d 313. • 4 The final contention is that because the co-defendant was found not guilty on the same facts and in the same trial, the defendant's conviction should be reversed.