The court observed that pursuant to case law, the term "great bodily harm" was not susceptible to a precise definition, but that there must be "an injury of 'graver and more serious character' " than what is involved in ordinary battery. See People v. Mays, 91 Ill. 2d 251 (1982); In re J.A., 336 Ill. App. 3d 814 (2003); People v. Costello, 95 Ill. App. 3d 680 (1981); People v. Smith, 6 Ill. App. 3d 259 (1972). The court read the parties its proposed instruction and the following conversation occurred:

`Evidence which tends to prove a fact in issue is admissible though it may be evidence showing that the accused has committed a crime other than the one for which he is being tried, and evidence which goes to show motive, intent, identity, absence of mistake or modus operandi is admissible though it may show the commission of a separate offense.' Under the exceptions, references by a defendant to his prior prison time have been admitted into evidence as relevant to the defendant's intent ( People v. Smith (1972), 6 Ill. App.3d 259, 285 N.E.2d 460) and as probative of the defendant's actions in committing the crime ( People v. Allen (1975), 27 Ill. App.3d 1054, 327 N.E.2d 387). In People v. Smith the court states:

"Evidence which tends to prove a fact in issue is admissible though it may be evidence showing that the accused has committed a crime other than the one for which he is being tried, and evidence which goes to show motive, intent, identity, absence of mistake or modus operandi is admissible though it may show the commission of a separate offense." Under the exceptions, references by a defendant to his prior prison time have been admitted into evidence as relevant to the defendant's intent ( People v. Smith (1972), 6 Ill. App.3d 259, 285 N.E.2d 460) and as probative of the defendant's actions in committing the crime ( People v. Allen (1975), 27 Ill. App.3d 1054, 327 N.E.2d 387). In People v. Smith the court states:

• 3 "In determining whether a prosecuting attorney's argument to a jury is prejudicial, reference must be made to the context of the language, its relation to the evidence and the effect of the argument on the rights of the accused to a fair and impartial trial." ( People v. Smith (1972), 6 Ill. App.3d 259, 263, 285 N.E.2d 460, 463.) It is improper for a prosecutor to state his opinion of the guilt of the accused, to state facts not in evidence or to vouch his personal or professional reputation behind the credibility of his witnesses, for the making of such statements is tantamount to putting his own testimony before a jury. ( People v. Bitakis (1972), 8 Ill. App.3d 103, 289 N.E.2d 256.)

" 335 Ill. 596, 601, 167 N.E. 786, 789. In People v. Smith (1972), 6 Ill. App.3d 259, 285 N.E.2d 460, a defendant who had been convicted of aggravated battery, attempted rape and armed robbery complained of the following question asked by the prosecutor and answered by the complaining witness: "Q. Now, did he indicate to you that he had any fear or didn't have any fear of assuming this type of activity?

Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err when, over objection, it allowed testimony that told the jury of defendant's prosecution for another offense in order that the State could impeach the five-page written statement that he gave the police. Compare People v. Simmons, 407 Ill. 417, 95 N.E.2d 477; People v. Smith, 6 Ill. App.3d 259, 285 N.E.2d 460. VI.

Thereafter, the petitioner perfected an appeal in which the aforementioned conviction was affirmed. ( People v. Smith (1972), 6 Ill. App.3d 259.) Pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, § 122-1 et seq.), the petitioner filed a post-conviction petition in which, among other issues, he alleged a substantial denial of his constitutional rights based on the incompetency of his trial counsel. On August 18, 1972, a hearing at which the petitioner was represented by counsel was held to determine whether the allegations raised in the post-conviction petition merited an evidentiary hearing.

Permanent injury is not necessarily required for there to be serious injury. People v. Smith, 6 Ill. App.3d 259, 285 N.E.2d 460 (1972). An extended stay in the hospital is similarly not required.

Whether the injury or harm is "great" or not is generally a question of fact for the jury. See Froedge v. State, 249 Ind. 438, 445, 233 N.E.2d 631 (1938); Houston v. State, ___ Ind. App. ___, 342 N.E.2d 684 (1976); and People v. Smith, 6 Ill. App.3d 259, 285 N.E.2d 460 (1972). Sanders contends that his initial custody was illegal because the officers did not comply with K.S.A. 65-4027 (now K.S.A. 1977 Supp. 65-4027).

¶ 55 As defendant acknowledges, the injury element here is a factual question. See People v. Smith, 6 Ill.App.3d 259, 264, 285 N.E.2d 460, 464 (1972) ("Whether aggravated battery is committed when the injury inflicted does not break the skin, does not injure the bones and does not leave disfigurement or permanent injury of any kind, is a question of fact to be determined by the judge or jury."). Wright testified he was shot "[i]n the lower back, in the lower abdomen."