Indeed, "[a] judge's irritation or exasperation . . ., criticism . . . for perceived delays or failures to follow rules, friction occurring during litigation, or even sanctions and contempt charges do not establish the objective personal bias that would prevent a fair assessment of the merits of the case." Id. at *5 (citing Rhodes v. McDannel, 945 F.2d 117, 120 (6th Cir.1991); People v. Smith, 410 N.E.2d 973, 978-79 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Blacknell v. State, 502 N.E.2d 899, 904 (Ind.1987); McKinley v. Iowa Dist. Court for Polk Cnty., 542 N.W.2d 822, 827 (Iowa 1996)). Accordingly, even if we were to consider the merits of this argument, we conclude that Ms. Watkins has failed to establish a ground for Judge Binkley's recusal in this matter.
A judge's irritation or exasperation with counsel, criticism of counsel for perceived delays or failures to follow rules, friction occurring during litigation, or even sanctions and contempt charges do not establish the objective personal bias that would prevent a fair assessment of the merits of the case. See, e.g., Rhodes v McDannel, 945 F.2d 117, 120 (6th Cir. 1991); People v. Smith, 410 N.E.2d 973, 978-79 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Blacknell v State, 502 N.E.2d 899, 904 (Ind. 1987); McKinley v. Iowa Dist. Court for Polk Cnty., 542 N.W.2d 822, 827 (Iowa 1996). A number of jurisdictions have acknowledged that a judge may, in some circumstances, be disqualified for prejudice against counsel but have denied disqualification because the facts were insufficient to demonstrate bias. Judicial antipathy and irritation with counsel, rebuke of the attorney by the judge, the judge's holding the attorney in contempt, and adverse legal rulings by the judge have all been considered legally insufficient reasons to disqualify a judge.
• 12 Defendant's final claim concerning other crimes evidence is that he was prejudiced by the trial court's denial of his pretrial motion to exclude his 1981 armed robbery conviction as impeachment evidence and the subsequent admission of the conviction at trial. Only crimes punishable in excess of one year or involving dishonesty or false statement may be used for impeachment purposes if the trial judge determines that the probative value of the prior conviction outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice ( People v. Tribett (1981), 98 Ill. App.3d 663, 424 N.E.2d 688; People v. Smith (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 897, 410 N.E.2d 973.) A trial court is given wide latitude in determining whether the probative value outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice. Tribett, 98 Ill. App.3d at 678.
The prosecutor is permitted to refer to defendant's prior conviction in regard to defendant's credibility. People v. Smith (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 897, 410 N.E.2d 973. In regard to the characterization of defendant as a liar, we have held that it is improper to charge a defendant with lying only where there is no basis for that charge in the record.
As noted by the State, in order to prevail on a motion for substitution of judge for cause, the defendant bears the burden of showing actual prejudice, animosity, hostility, ill will or distrust directed toward the defendant. ( People v. Matlock (1981), 97 Ill. App.3d 842; People v. Smith (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 897.) The continuance of the matter for further report from the probation department suggests that the court's "wrath" was not directed toward the defendant, but was expressed against defendant's counsel personally.
In the instant case the errors arising from the prosecutor's improper comments were cured. Furthermore, we do not believe they were a material factor in the defendant's conviction since the evidence against the defendant was overwhelming. ( People v. Smith (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 897, 410 N.E.2d 973; People v. Eagle (1979), 76 Ill. App.3d 427, 395 N.E.2d 155.) Therefore, we will not reverse the defendant's conviction and remand his case for a new trial.
Generally, crimes punishable by imprisonment in excess of one year or involving dishonesty may be used for impeachment purposes if the trial court determines that the probative value of the prior convictions is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. ( People v. Montgomery (1971), 47 Ill.2d 510, 268 N.E.2d 695; People v. Smith (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 897, 410 N.E.2d 973.) In determining whether a conviction's prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value, the trial court must consider four factors set forth in Montgomery: (1) the nature of the crime, i.e., whether the prior conviction is veracity-related; (2) the nearness or remoteness in time of the conviction to the present trial, as it relates to the degree of defendant's rehabilitation; (3) the subsequent career of the defendant, as it also relates to the degree of defendant's rehabilitation; and (4) the similarity of the prior conviction to the present charge because such similarity often invites an improper inference of guilt rather than directing attention to the defendant's credibility.
( People v. Flynn (1956), 8 Ill.2d 116, 133 N.E.2d 257; People v. White (1980), 84 Ill. App.3d 1044, 406 N.E.2d 7.) However, only crimes punishable in excess of one year or involving dishonesty or false statement may be used for impeachment purposes if the trial judge determines that the probative value of the prior conviction outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice. ( People v. Smith (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 897, 410 N.E.2d 973; see also People v. Montgomery (1971), 47 Ill.2d 510, 268 N.E.2d 695.) In determining whether the probative value of the conviction outweighs the prejudicial effect, the trial court must examine several factors: (1) the nature of the prior crime; (2) the nearness or remoteness in time of the conviction to the present time; and (3) whether the prior crime was similar to the one charged.
• 9 Granting a continuance to permit the preparation of a case rests within the trial court's discretion and will not be disturbed on review unless this discretion is abused. ( People v. Hayes (1972), 52 Ill.2d 170, 287 N.E.2d 465; People v. Smith (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 897, 410 N.E.2d 973.) In making this determination, the trial court may review the history of the case (see People v. Hobbs (1975), 35 Ill. App.3d 29, 340 N.E.2d 601) and consider the diligence shown by the moving party.