Accordingly, we cannot conclude that counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's summation constituted ineffective assistance of counsel (see People v Rudge, 185 A.D.3d 1214, 1217 [3d Dept 2020], lv denied 35 N.Y.3d 1070 [2020]; People v Stevenson, 129 A.D.3d 998, 999 [2d Dept 2015], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 960 [2015]). The other alleged deficiencies defendant raises with respect to counsel's performance, including failing to mention mitigating factors during sentencing, did not, when considering the representation as a whole, deprive him of meaningful representation (see People v Lindsey, 172 A.D.3d 1764, 1768 [3d Dept 2019]; People v Smith, 300 A.D.2d 745, 745-746 [3d Dept 2002], lv denied 99 N.Y.2d 620 [2003]). Contrary to defendant's contention, even when considering the mitigating factors reflected in the presentence report, we do not find the sentence imposed to be unduly harsh and severe (see CPL 470.15 [6] [b]).
Contrary to defendant's further contention, we conclude that defendant was not deprived of effective assistance of counsel at sentencing. "In general, a defense counsel's inability to persuade a sentencing court to impose a lighter sentence does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel" ( People v. Smith, 300 A.D.2d 745, 746, 751 N.Y.S.2d 665 [3d Dept. 2002], lv denied 99 N.Y.2d 620, 757 N.Y.S.2d 831, 787 N.E.2d 1177 [2003] ). Here, defense counsel reviewed the presentence report, reiterated defendant's position that he was innocent, asked the court to consider the allegations raised in defendant's CPL 330.30 motion in considering its sentence, and asked the court "to consider the lower end of the scale."
Contrary to defendant's further contention, we conclude that defendant was not deprived of effective assistance of counsel at sentencing. "In general, a defense counsel's inability to persuade a sentencing court to impose a lighter sentence does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel" (People v Smith, 300 AD2d 745, 746 [3d Dept 2002], lv denied 99 NY2d 620 [2003]). Here, defense counsel reviewed the presentence report, reiterated defendant's position that he was innocent, asked the court to consider the allegations raised in defendant's CPL 330.30 motion in considering its sentence, and asked the court "to consider the lower end of the scale."
The fact that the female codefendants received lesser sentences does not establish that County Court abused its discretion, particularly since it appears that they entered their pleas much earlier in the proceedings. In sum, we fail to find the existence of extraordinary circumstances warranting a reduction of the sentence in the interest of justice or that County Court abused its discretion under the circumstances presented ( see People v. Easton, 309 AD2d 1083, 1084, lv denied 1 NY3d 597; People v. Leroy, 308 AD2d 639, 640; People v. Smith, 300 AD2d 745, 746, lv denied 99 NY2d 620). Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The People are not required to call an accomplice whose testimony would be "presumptively suspect" ( People v. Rios, 184 AD2d 244, 245, lv denied 80 NY2d 908; see People v. Batson, 219 AD2d 538, 539, lv denied 87 NY2d 844). Finally, in light of defendant's criminal history, we find no abuse of discretion or any extraordinary circumstances that would warrant modification of the sentence ( see People v. Smith, 300 AD2d 745, 746, lv denied 99 NY2d 616; People v. Bell, 290 AD2d 729, 730). Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is also foreclosed by his waiver of the right to appeal as it does not bear upon the voluntariness of his plea ( see People v. Lane, 1 AD3d 801, 803, lv denied 2 NY3d 742; People v. Watkins, 304 AD2d 987, 988, lv denied 100 NY2d 588; see also People v. Perry, 4 AD3d 618, 620, lv denied 2 NY3d 804). In any event, a defense counsel's failure to persuade a sentencing court to impose a lighter sentence does not render counsel ineffective ( see People v. Howard, 1 AD3d 718, 719; People v. Smith, 300 AD2d 745, 746, lv denied 99 NY2d 620). Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, by reversing so much thereof as imposed a sentence of imprisonment of 1ยฝ to 3 years upon defendant's probation violation; said sentence vacated; and, as so modified, affirmed.
Defendant appeals, contending that he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel and his sentence is harsh and excessive. Initially, we note that although defendant's waiver of his right to appeal does not preclude his challenge to the effectiveness of his counsel insofar as his claims implicate the voluntariness of his plea ( see People v. Seaberg, 74 NY2d 1, 10; People v. Lee, 272 AD2d 785, 785, lv denied 95 NY2d 867; cf. People v. Almonte, 288 AD2d 632, 633, lvs denied 97 NY2d 726, 727), defendant's failure to move to vacate the judgment of conviction or to withdraw his guilty plea renders this argument unpreserved for our review ( see People v. Smith, 300 AD2d 745, 745, lvs denied 99 NY2d 616, 620; People v. Soto, 259 AD2d 904, 905). Moreover, we find no circumstances that would warrant the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction.
We find that defendant's plea was knowing, intelligent and voluntary, that her responses were adequate to establish the elements of the crime and that nothing in the allocution negated any element of that crime (see People v. Lopez, 71 N.Y.2d 662, 668, supra; People v. Kalenak,supra). Defendant's challenge to her trial counsel's effectiveness at sentencing has not been preserved for our review (see People v. Smith, 300 A.D.2d 745, 745, lvs denied 99 N.Y.2d 616, 620; People v. Newell, 271 A.D.2d 873, 874, lv denied 95 N.Y.2d 837) and her challenge to the imposition of the agreed-upon sentence is precluded by her appeal waiver (see People v. Hidalgo, 91 N.Y.2d 733, 737; People v. Kalenak,supra). Moreover, both claims lack merit (see People v. Smith, supra at 745-746). Finally, defendant's pro se challenge to appellate counsel's legal representation is not properly before this Court and, instead, can only be entertained in a common-law coram nobis proceeding (see People v. Bachert, 69 N.Y.2d 593, 595-596; People v. La Mountain, 288 A.D.2d 503, 504, lv denied 98 N.Y.2d 731).
Next, many of the alleged failings defendant points to as supporting his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel relate to sentencing, not to the voluntariness of the plea, and are precluded by his waiver of appeal (see People v. De Berardinis, supra at 915; People v. Camp, supra at 630). Further, failure of defendant's attorney to persuade County Court to impose a lighter sentence (particularly in view of defendant's abandonment of the drug treatment program and his disappearance prior to sentencing) does not constitute ineffectiveness (see People v. Smith, 300 A.D.2d 745, 746, lvs denied 99 N.Y.2d 616, 620). Finally, any challenge to the sentence as excessive is precluded by defendant's waiver of appeal (see People v. Rea, 305 A.D.2d 802). He waived his right to be considered for youthful offender treatment by failing to request it and, given the totality of defendant's conduct, no basis exists upon which to exercise our interest of justice powers to consider the issue now (see People v. McGowen, 42 N.Y.2d 905, 906; People v. Richardson, 295 A.D.2d 704, 704, lvs denied 98 N.Y.2d 709, 713; People v. Chaplin, 178 A.D.2d 685, lv denied 79 N.Y.2d 945).
Defendant appeals, seeking a reduction in the length of his sentence on the ground that it is harsh and excessive. We disagree. Defendant stands convicted of two class C violent felonies and, in the absence of the advantageous plea agreement, would have been exposed to consecutive prison terms of 15 years (see Penal Law ยง 70.02 [b]; [3] [b]; see generally People v. French, 302 A.D.2d 751). Our review of the record discloses no abuse of County Court's discretion in imposing this sentence nor any extraordinary circumstances that would warrant a reduction thereof in the interest of justice (see People v. Smith, 300 A.D.2d 745, 746, lvs denied 99 N.Y.2d 616, 620). Mercure, J.P., Peters, Mugglin, Rose and Kane, JJ., concur.