Dkt. No. 17-1 at SCR 119; see People v. Jones, 2 N.Y.3d 235, 239 (2004) (explaining that police had "probable cause to believe that defendant was the perpetrator of the robberies based on the photographic identifications by the two victims."); People v. Smith, 12 A.D.3d 781, 782 (3d Dep't. 2004) (same); Petrychenko v. Solovey, 99 A.D.3d 777, 780 (2d Dep't. 2012) (stating that "[a]s a general rule, information from an identified citizen accusing another individual of the commission of a specific crime is sufficient to provide the police with probable cause to arrest.") (emphasis in original). Based on the record, this Court cannot say that the state court's alternative decision rejecting petitioner's ineffective assistance claim was unreasonable or contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Ground One is therefore denied and dismissed.
January 19, 2005. Appeal from the 3d Dept: 12 AD3d 781 (Albany). Application in criminal case for leave to appeal denied.
This evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the People (see People v Thompson, 72 N.Y.2d 410, 413 [1988]; People v Allah, 71 N.Y.2d 830, 831 [1988]; People v Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621 [1983]), establishes that defendant entered and remained unlawfully in that part of the premises not open to the public (see Penal Law § 140.00 [5]; § 140.20). Next, defendant is correct in asserting that the trial testimony of one of the security officers improperly bolstered the prior identification testimony of the victim (see People v Buie, 86 N.Y.2d 501, 509-510 [1995]; People v Mobley, 56 N.Y.2d 584, 585 [1982]; People v Smith, 12 A.D.3d 781, 782 [2004], lv denied 4 N.Y.3d 768 [2005]). Nevertheless, defendant failed to preserve this issue by proper objection at trial (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Love, 57 N.Y.2d 1023, 1025 [1982]; People v Carter, 31 A.D.3d 1056, 1057 [2006], lv denied 7 N.Y.3d 901 [2006]; People v Kelly, 185 A.D.2d 494, 495 [1992]).
05; People v Kelly, 185 AD2d 494, 495). In any event, were we to consider the issue, we would find any such error to be harmless because Sweet's testimony, based upon two face-to-face encounters with defendant in his car, together with Quinn's corroborating statements, amply establish that defendant was the person who sold the bags of heroin ( see People v Smith, 12 AD3d 781, 782, lv denied 4 NY3d 768; People v Hawes, 298 AD2d 706, 708, lv denied 99 NY2d 582). Next, we are unpersuaded by defendant's challenges to the legal sufficiency of the People's proof of the chain of custody and that he was the seller.