People v. Smart

34 Citing cases

  1. People v. Franklin

    2013 Ill. App. 103013 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013)   Cited 1 times

    Defendant concedes this court has repeatedly held that a defendant sentenced as a Class X offender receives the Class X MSR term of three years. See People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, ¶¶ 59-62; People v. Allen, 409 Ill. App. 3d 1058, 1078 (2011); People v. Rutledge, 409 Ill. App. 3d 22, 26 (2011); People v. Lee, 397 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 1072-73 (2010); People v. Watkins, 387 Ill. App. 3d 764, 766-67 (2009); People v Smart, 311 Ill. App. 3d 415, 417-18 (2000); People v. Anderson, 272 Ill. App. 3d 537, 541-42 (1995). Nevertheless, defendant claims that our supreme court's decision in People v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36 (2000), dictates that a defendant convicted of a Class 2 felony, but sentenced as a Class X offender, should receive the term of MSR for Class 2 felonies. ¶ 35 Defendant argues that Pullen stands for the proposition that Class X sentencing eligibility under section 5-5-3(c)(3) will not trump a sentencing statute written in terms of felonies committed.

  2. People v. McKinney

    399 Ill. App. 3d 77 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010)   Cited 43 times
    Finding that the reviewing court can take judicial notice of the Illinois Department of Corrections' website

    This can only mean that such a defendant "shall be sentenced as a Class X offender" and shall receive the sentence — the entire sentence — that one convicted of a Class X felony would receive. See People v. Smart, 311 Ill. App. 3d 415, 417-18 (2000). As noted, section 5-8-1(a)(3) provides, in pertinent part, that, "for a Class X felony, the sentence [of imprisonment] shall be not less than 6 years and not more than 30 years."

  3. People v. Barrett

    2017 Ill. App. 2d 140948 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017)   Cited 1 times

    The court denied defendant's motion to reduce sentence. ¶ 9 When the court entered the sentence and MSR term in 2007, it was consistent, or at least not inconsistent, with case law in this district. See People v. Hoekstra, 371 Ill. App. 3d 720, 728 (2007) (Second District) (accepting the State's concession that, under section 5-8-1(d) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d) (West 2004)), a person who committed a Class 2 felony but who, due to a criminal history, was sentenced as a Class X felon, need complete only two years of supervised release); cf. People v. Smart, 311 Ill. App. 3d 415, 417 (2000) (Fourth District); People v. Anderson, 272 Ill. App. 3d 537, 541-42 (1995) (First District). ¶ 10 Later, in People v. McKinney, 399 Ill. App. 3d 77, 81 (2010), we determined that the State's concession in Hoekstra had been made in error. We joined with the other Districts to hold that a defendant convicted of a Class 1 or Class 2 felony, who is sentenced as a Class X offender because of his criminal history, should receive a three-year MSR term applicable to Class X felonies, rather than a two-year MSR term applicable to Class 1 or Class 2 felonies.

  4. People v. Davis

    975 N.E.2d 784 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012)   Cited 9 times

    ¶ 29 In People v. Watkins, 387 Ill.App.3d 764, 327 Ill.Dec. 231, 901 N.E.2d 964 (2009), the Third District considered sections 5–5–3(c)(8) and 5–8–1(d) of the Unified Code (730 ILCS 5/5–5–3(c)(8), 5–8–1(d) (West 2004)), indicating that an MSR term attaches to a Class X sentence “as though written therein” as being three years. The court determined that the trial court had appropriately imposed a three-year MSR sentence, citing People v. Anderson, 272 Ill.App.3d 537, 208 Ill.Dec. 954, 650 N.E.2d 648 (1995), and People v. Smart, 311 Ill.App.3d 415, 243 Ill.Dec. 645, 723 N.E.2d 1246 (2000). Watkins, 387 Ill.App.3d at 766–67, 327 Ill.Dec. 231, 901 N.E.2d at 966.

  5. People v. Watkins

    387 Ill. App. 3d 764 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009)   Cited 39 times
    Modifying street value fine on appeal based on evidence adduced at trial

    Other districts of the appellate court that have considered this issue have held that, "it is clear that the gravity of conduct offensive to the public safety and welfare, authorizing Class X sentencing, justifiably requires" a longer period of watch after release from prison than a violation of a less serious nature. People v. Anderson, 272 Ill. App. 3d 537, 541, 650 N.E.2d 648, 651 (1995); see also People v. Smart, 311 Ill. App. 3d 415, 417, 723 N.E.2d 1246, 1248 (2000). As the Anderson court observed, when an individual commits three felonies in a period of a few years, he demonstrates the wisdom of a lengthier MSR term than one who is not a recidivist offender.

  6. People v. Hacker

    2013 Ill. App. 113425 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013)

    730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d)(1) (West 2010). ¶ 21 This court has previously held that when Class X treatment is accorded to a defendant, the MSR term applicable to such a sentence is automatically imposed (People v. Anderson, 272 Ill. App. 3d 537, 541 (1995)), i.e., a Class X offender receives both an enhanced prison term and an enhanced MSR term. People v. Smart, 311 Ill. App. 3d 415, 417-18 (2000); see also People v. Watkins, 387 Ill. App. 3d 764, 766-67 (2009). ¶ 22 Defendant argues that Anderson, Smart, and Watkins were wrongly decided in light of our supreme court's decision in People v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36 (2000).

  7. People v. Thurman

    2013 Ill. App. 110838 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013)

    ¶ 37 This court has previously held that when Class X treatment is accorded to a defendant, the MSR term applicable to such a sentence is automatically imposed (People v. Anderson, 272 Ill. App. 3d 537, 541 (1995)), i.e., a Class X offender receives both an enhanced prison term and an enhanced MSR term (People v. Smart, 311 Ill. App. 3d 415, 417-18 (2000)). See also People v. Watkins, 387 Ill. App. 3d 764, 766-67 (2009).

  8. People v. Hidalgo

    2013 Ill. App. 113791 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013)

    730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d)(1) (West 2010).¶ 31 This court has previously held that when Class X treatment is accorded to a defendant, the MSR term applicable to such a sentence is automatically imposed (People v. Anderson, 272 Ill. App. 3d 537, 541 (1995)), i.e., a Class X offender receives both an enhanced prison term and an enhanced MSR term (People v. Smart, 311 Ill. App. 3d 415, 417-18 (2000)). See also People v. Watkins, 387 Ill. App. 3d 764, 766-67 (2009).

  9. People v. Pope

    2013 Ill. App. 4th 120021 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013)

    Id. Thus, defendant's reliance on Hoekstra is misplaced because the court did not actually analyze the MSR issue. ¶ 10 Defendant next contends the plain language of section 5-8-1(d) of the Unified Code (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d) (West 2006)) uses a conviction classification, rather than a sentence classification, to determine the length of MSR. Thus, because he was only convicted of a Class 2 felony, defendant argues his MSR term should be two years according to the plain language of the statute. However, this court rejected the same argument in People v. Smart, 311 Ill. App. 3d 415, 723 N.E.2d 1246 (2000), finding the "language [of section 5-8-1(d)] clearly makes the term of [MSR] part of the entire sentence. Thus, when section 5-5-3(c)(8) states that a recidivist like defendant is to be 'sentenced as a Class X offender' (730 ILCS 5/5-3(c)(8) (West 1998)), it necessarily means that he must receive an enhanced term of imprisonment and an enhanced term of [MSR].

  10. People v. Lee

    397 Ill. App. 3d 1067 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010)   Cited 46 times

    This court has held that defendants subject to mandatory Class X sentencing under section 5-5-3(c)(8) of the Unified Code based on prior convictions are required to serve a three-year MSR term. People v. Smart, 311 Ill. App. 3d 415, 417-18, 723 N.E.2d 1246, 1248 (2000). Defendant asks this court to reconsider its holding in Smart in light of our supreme court's decision in People v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36, 733 N.E.2d 1235 (2000).