Opinion
C087878
01-08-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ERIN LYNN SLOSS, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 62-157968)
Following the denial of her motion to suppress evidence, defendant Erin Lynn Sloss pleaded no contest to possession of ammunition by a person prohibited from possessing a firearm. On appeal, defendant challenges the denial of the motion to suppress, contending the trial court erred in ruling that she was not detained when an officer parked behind her car to prevent her from driving away. We agree with the trial court's conclusion that there was no seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes. We therefore affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Around 7:00 p.m., a Roseville police officer responded to a call from a Chevron gas station attendant who was concerned that someone parked in a gold Toyota in front of the station was in need of medical attention.
As the officer approached the scene in his patrol car, there was still plenty of sunlight outside, and the officer observed defendant sitting in the front driver's seat. Defendant's head was positioned in such a way that it appeared she may have been "sleeping [or] nodding off." The officer parked "[d]irectly behind" defendant's car, because that was the fastest way to get to defendant and help her if necessary, and because "if it was, in fact, a DUI, [he] didn't want" defendant to be able to drive away.
The officer left his patrol car and walked up to the driver's side of the Toyota, where the window was partly rolled down. Defendant was "slumped over" and her eyes were closed, but she was breathing. The engine wasn't running, but a key in the ignition was in the "on" position. The officer observed defendant for "20 to 30 seconds" before he said anything.
"Are you all right?" he asked defendant, who immediately awoke, and "acted like she was sending a text" although the phone in her hand was "blank and off" and the "screen was dark." "What are you doing?" the officer asked. "I'm sending a text to a friend," defendant answered.
Defendant's speech was "slow and lethargic" when she responded to the officer's questions. She denied that she had been drinking or using drugs and denied having any medical issues or difficulty sleeping the previous night. Defendant theorized to the officer that she was in deep thought when texting her friend and had fallen asleep. Defendant's denial of any medical issues, her "speech, her mannerisms, [and] the objective signs" led the officer to suspect that she was "under the influence of some sort of drug," so he asked her to get out of her car so that he could conduct field sobriety tests.
Ultimately, during a warrantless search of defendant's car, the officer found illegal narcotics and live ammunition.
In argument on the motion to suppress, defense counsel claimed the officer impermissibly detained defendant when he blocked her car without any articulable facts supporting a detention.
The magistrate made sure he understood defendant's claim, "So your argument, [counsel], is that the blocking of the car constitutes a detention?" Counsel replied, "yes." The magistrate denied the motion to suppress, saying: "I disagree. I don't think it did at all."
Later, a judge denied defendant's renewed motion to suppress, brought pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5, subdivision (i) and defendant pleaded no contest to a charge of possession of ammunition by a person prohibited from possessing a firearm. (Pen. Code, § 30305, subd. (a)(1).)
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court erred by not suppressing the items found in her car, because they were found as a result of an unconstitutional seizure. Specifically, she argues that the officer detained her when he parked behind her car to prevent her from driving away, but that he lacked constitutional grounds to detain her, whether under a theory that he had reasonable suspicion that she had committed a crime or under a "community caretaker" theory. Defendant does not challenge any subsequent conduct by the officer.
Not every encounter between the police and a citizen is protected by the Fourth Amendment. (In re Christopher B. (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 455, 460.) Police contacts with individuals fall into three broad categories: (1) consensual encounters; (2) detentions; and (3) formal arrests. (In re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 821.)
"[C]onsensual encounters present no constitutional concerns and do not require justification. [Citation.] However, 'when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen,' the officer effects a seizure of that person, which must be justified under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. [Citations.] In situations involving a show of authority, a person is seized 'if "in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he [or she] was not free to leave," ' or ' "otherwise terminate the encounter" ' [citation], and if the person actually submits to the show of authority [citation]." (People v. Brown (2015) 61 Cal.4th 968, 974 (Brown), italics added.)
"Examples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even where the person did not attempt to leave, would be the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled." (United States v. Mendenhall (1980) 446 U.S. 544, 554 [64 L.Ed.2d 497, 509].) "[O]ther relevant factors include the time and place of the encounter, whether the police indicated the defendant was suspected of a crime, whether the police retained the defendant's documents, and whether the police exhibited other threatening behavior." (People v. Linn (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 46, 58.)
"In ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court must find the historical facts, select the rule of law, and apply it to the facts in order to determine whether the law as applied has been violated. We review the court's resolution of the factual inquiry under the deferential substantial-evidence standard. The ruling on whether the applicable law applies to the facts is a mixed question of law and fact that is subject to independent review." (People v. Saunders (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1129, 1133-1134.)
Where there are no express findings of fact, " ' "it is implied that the trial court . . . made whatever findings were necessary to support" ' " the suppression ruling. (People v. Molina (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1038, 1041.)
Defendant relies on Brown as authority for the proposition that she was detained when the officer parked behind her car to prevent her from leaving the parking space. She claims Brown is directly on point. It is not. In Brown, the officer responding to a call about a fight followed the defendant after the defendant failed to respond to the deputy's initial attempt to contact him. He then pulled up behind the defendant's parked car, activated his overhead emergency lights and approached the defendant on foot. The Supreme Court held that the officer's actions of following the defendant's car, pulling up behind it, and activating his lights were a show of authority to which the defendant submitted by staying in his car. (Brown, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 972-973, 975-980.)
Here, defendant was unconscious in her car when the officer parked his vehicle behind her, and—to the extent the officer's conduct amounted to a show of authority—the show of authority did not prevent her departure. She slept as the officer approached the car, and remained asleep as he observed her for 20 to 30 seconds. She awoke when the officer asked her if she was "all right," and, with lethargic speech (suggesting that she was "under the influence of some sort of drug") indicated to the officer that she fell asleep while in deep thought and texting a friend.
In the absence of express findings of fact by the magistrate, we imply the findings necessary to support the suppression ruling: defendant was asleep in her car before the officer parked his vehicle behind her, she remained asleep until the officer asked her if she was "all right," and did not submit to a show of authority. (See People v. Molina, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 1041.)
This is substantial evidence that defendant was not seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment until after the timeframe challenged by defendant, because when the officer parked his vehicle behind her, defendant did not "submit" to a show of authority, because, being asleep, she objectively could not make that conscious choice. (See Brendlin v. California (2007) 551 U.S. 249, 254 [168 L.Ed.2d 132, 137, 138]; Brown, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 976-977 & fn. 2 [discussing both the possibility that a defendant's submission to a show of authority may take the form of " 'passive acquiescence' " and the importance of a defendant's actual submission to a show of authority (quoting Brendlin, at p. 255)]; cf. United States v. Karim Hussein Al Nasser (9th Cir. 2009) 555 F.3d 722, 725-726 [defendant's contention that he was unreasonably seized "skips a step," because "[b]efore asking whether a reasonable person would have thought he was being stopped, a court must ask whether the police in fact stopped him"; "[u]sually the objective circumstances would prove a stop, but not always"].) As defendant was not seized, the magistrate correctly denied the suppression motion.
Given this conclusion, we need not address the parties' additional arguments.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
Butz, J. We concur: /s/_________
Blease, Acting P. J. /s/_________
Hoch, J.