In any event, Kolek's reliance on Perez's estimated purchase price and his own personal experience with the valuation of items sold to pawnshops establishes that there was probable cause to believe the items stolen in the July 12 Burglary and sold to the Pawnshop were over $3,000 in value. See People v. Sloan, 552 N.Y.S.2d 579, 579-80 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (finding that the victim's statement that the "items stolen from the car were purchased for approximately $1,500 . . . was sufficient to support the jury's finding that the value of the property stolen exceeded the one thousand dollars threshold . . . ."). Importantly, "[p]robable cause . . . demands much less certainty than that required for a criminal conviction."
20 (1) provides that value means "the market value of the property at the time and place of the crime," or "the cost of replacement of the property within a reasonable time after the crime." As noted above, the price paid for property is some proof of value and under certain circumstances can even furnish conclusive proof (see, People v. Sloan, 159 A.D.2d 301, lv. denied 76 N.Y.2d 743). But, in any event, there was substantial proof here and "where the cost of the automobile is substantially above the monetary value prescribed by the applicable penal statute and other facts adduced at trial, such as the description of the condition of the property at the time of the theft and the period of time which elapsed between the date of purchase and the date of the theft, negate the possibility that the vehicle's market value has significantly depreciated, there exists sufficient evidence from which the jury could infer, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the market value of the car at the time and place of the theft was in excess of the statutory minimum" (People v. James, 111 A.D.2d 254, 255-256).