Opinion
935 KA 21-01628
12-23-2022
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Daquan SINGLETARY, Defendant-Appellant.
FRANK H. HISCOCK LEGAL AID SOCIETY, SYRACUSE (J. SCOTT PORTER OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. WILLIAM J. FITZPATRICK, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, SYRACUSE (JED S. HUDSON OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
FRANK H. HISCOCK LEGAL AID SOCIETY, SYRACUSE (J. SCOTT PORTER OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
WILLIAM J. FITZPATRICK, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, SYRACUSE (JED S. HUDSON OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
PRESENT: PERADOTTO, J.P., LINDLEY, CURRAN, BANNISTER, AND MONTOUR, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law, the plea is vacated, those parts of the omnibus motion seeking to suppress physical evidence and statements are granted, the indictment is dismissed, and the matter is remitted to Onondaga County Court for proceedings pursuant to CPL 470.45.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree ( Penal Law § 265.03 [3] ) and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree (§ 265.02 [3]). We agree with defendant that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the initial seizure of the vehicle in which he was a passenger (defendant's vehicle), and therefore County Court erred in refusing to suppress the physical evidence seized—i.e., a firearm—and defendant's subsequent statements to the police.
Here, the police officers effectively seized defendant's vehicle when they pulled into the gas station parking lot and stopped their patrol vehicle directly behind defendant's parked vehicle in such a manner as to prevent it from driving away (see People v. Jennings , 45 N.Y.2d 998, 999, 413 N.Y.S.2d 117, 385 N.E.2d 1045 [1978] ; People v. Jennings , 202 A.D.3d 1439, 1440, 158 N.Y.S.3d 903 [4th Dept. 2022] ; People v. Williams , 177 A.D.3d 1312, 1312, 112 N.Y.S.3d 836 [4th Dept. 2019] ; People v. Suttles , 171 A.D.3d 1454, 1455, 98 N.Y.S.3d 682 [4th Dept. 2019] ).
Furthermore, we conclude that the police did not have " ‘reasonable suspicion that defendant had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime’ " to justify their seizure of the vehicle ( Jennings , 202 A.D.3d at 1440, 158 N.Y.S.3d 903 ). Police officer testimony at the suppression hearing established that, at the time the officers made the initial stop, they were responding to the sound of multiple gunshots that had originated at or near the gas station, which was known to be a high crime area. The officers also testified, however, that at no time did they visually observe the source of the gunshots, and they did not see any shots emanating from the area where defendant's vehicle was parked. The officers’ attention was drawn to defendant's vehicle because, at the time they arrived on the scene, it had collided with another vehicle as it tried to leave the area. Defendant's vehicle was one of a number of vehicles and pedestrians that the police saw trying to leave the gas station due to the ongoing gunfire. Under those circumstances—i.e., where the police are unable to pinpoint the source of the gunfire, and the individuals in defendant's vehicle are not the only potential suspects present at the scene—the evidence does not provide a reasonable suspicion that the individuals in defendant's vehicle had committed, were committing, or were about to commit a crime (see People v. King , 206 A.D.3d 1576, 1577, 167 N.Y.S.3d 869 [4th Dept. 2022] ; cf. People v. Floyd , 158 A.D.3d 1146, 1147, 70 N.Y.S.3d 649 [4th Dept. 2018], lv denied 31 N.Y.3d 1081, 79 N.Y.S.3d 103, 103 N.E.3d 1250 [2018] ; People v. Jones , 148 A.D.3d 1666, 1667, 50 N.Y.S.3d 647 [4th Dept. 2017], lv denied 29 N.Y.3d 1082, 64 N.Y.S.3d 171, 86 N.E.3d 258 [2017] ). On the record before us, defendant's vehicle was, at most, "simply a vehicle that was in the general vicinity of the area where the shots were heard," which is insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion ( People v. Fitts , 188 A.D.3d 1676, 1678, 135 N.Y.S.3d 731 [4th Dept. 2020] ).
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the seizure of defendant and his vehicle was unlawful and that, as a result, the physical evidence seized by the police and the statements made by defendant to the police following the unlawful seizure should have been suppressed. Consequently, the judgment must be reversed and, "because our determination results in the suppression of all evidence in support of the crimes charged, the indictment must be dismissed" ( Suttles , 171 A.D.3d at 1455, 98 N.Y.S.3d 682 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Jennings , 202 A.D.3d at 1440, 158 N.Y.S.3d 903 ). In light of our determination, we do not address defendant's remaining contention.