Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. SA062965, Elden S. Fox, Judge.
Jolene Larimore, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Michael C. Keller and E. Carlos Dominguez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
EPSTEIN, P.J.
Brian Singletary appeals from his conviction of two counts of second degree robbery. His sole contention is that the court erred in denying his motion to exclude his confession. We find no error and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
Appellant was a suspect in the robbery of Nicholas Stoolman and Leslie Herrera in January 2007. He was arrested for a parole violation and interviewed by Detectives Marc Jackson and Don Reynolds of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department. During the videotaped interview, appellant admitted involvement in the robbery. He was charged with three counts of second degree robbery, two arising from the January 2007 incident, and the third occurring in December 2006.
Appellant moved to exclude his confession on the ground that it was involuntary. At the hearing, Dr. Richard Leo testified on behalf of the defense regarding interrogation techniques and coercive interrogation. Detective Jackson also testified about the interview, and the court watched the video recording of the interview. The court concluded appellant’s statement was not involuntary, and denied the motion.
The video recording was played during trial. The jury found appellant guilty on counts 1 and 2 involving the 2007 incident, and not guilty on count 3. This is a timely appeal from the judgment of conviction.
DISCUSSION
“The federal and state Constitutions both bar the use of involuntary confessions against a criminal defendant.” (People v. Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 501.) “A statement is involuntary when ‘among other circumstances, it “was ‘“extracted by any sort of threats..., [or] obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight....”’” [Citations.] Voluntariness does not turn on any one fact, no matter how apparently significant, but rather on the “totality of [the] circumstances.”’ (People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 79.)” (People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 813-814.)
“In reviewing the trial court’s determination of voluntariness, we apply an independent standard of review,” based on a consideration of the record as a whole, including surrounding circumstances such as the characteristics of the accused and the details of the encounter. (People v. Neal, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 80.) We have had the same opportunity given to the trial court to view the video recording of appellant’s police interview, and to review a written transcript of that interview. Having done so, we reject appellant’s claim that his statement was involuntary.
Appellant claims that Detectives Jackson and Reynolds “clearly expressed and implied that appellant would suffer dire consequences if he did not talk, but that he would benefit with lenient treatment and lesser charges and a chance to walk away if he gave answers satisfactory to the officers.” “‘[M]ere advice or exhortation by the police that it would be better for the accused to tell the truth when unaccompanied by either a threat or a promise does not render a subsequent confession involuntary....’” (People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 115.) If the benefit pointed out by the officers is that which would naturally follow from a truthful and honest course of conduct, a suspect’s subsequent statement will not be considered involuntarily made. (Ibid.) But if the officers lead the suspect to believe he or she might reasonably expect more lenient treatment as a result of making a statement, that motivation will render the statement involuntary and inadmissible, even if it is truthful. (Ibid.)
In People v. Holloway, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pages 115-116, police detectives informed the defendant being questioned that they were talking about a death penalty case. The Supreme Court considered the detectives’ statements “nothing beyond the obvious” for the murder of two young women with signs of sexual assault. (Id. at p. 115.) The further suggestion by one of the detectives that the killings might have been accidental, or the result of an uncontrollable rage during a drunken blackout, and that such circumstances could make a lot of difference “fall far short of being promises of lenient treatment in exchange for cooperation. The detectives did not represent that they, the prosecutor or the court would grant defendant any particular benefit if he told them how the killings happened.” (Id. at p. 116.) The court held the detectives “did not cross the line from proper exhortations to tell the truth into impermissible threats of punishment or promises of leniency.” (People v. Holloway, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 115.)
The detectives in our case did not “cross the line” either. Appellant initially denied being at the location where the crime occurred. Detective Jackson reminded him that the basic questions they were asking him were to test if he was lying to them: “[T]he first questions we ask are the questions we know the answers to.” After more questions about his and his friend’s whereabouts on the Saturday evening before Martin Luther King day, appellant said he and his friend went back to his girlfriend’s house that evening around 9:15 p.m. or 9:30 p.m., and did not go back out. The detective said, “This is where we run into a bit of a problem. I can place you here in this city after midnight.” He told appellant he had witnesses, license plate, vehicle description, and people who had looked at his picture and said he was there. Appellant said that was impossible. After more questions, Detective Jackson explained he had been wrong about the date, that it was the Sunday before Martin Luther King day that he was asking about. Appellant still denied being there, and said he did not remember being in West Hollywood that night.
At that point, appellant questioned why he had been arrested, indicating he thought it was for leaving the county. Detective Jackson said that was what alerted them to him, but “[w]hy would we focus on you and do all of this stuff for you? What do you think made us focus in on you?” Detective Reynolds then tried to “slow things down a little bit. Okay?... First of all, I don’t want you to be afraid that--” Appellant interrupted: “I’m terrified because I don’t, I can’t remember, I really can’t remember.”
Appellant’s use of the word “terrified” in this context indicated his concern that he was unable to remember his whereabouts at a precise time. Neither his demeanor nor the circumstances of the interview suggest that he was in fear for his safety.
Reynolds told appellant not to interrupt because “you’re not going to hear what I’m saying. Okay? So I’m going to back up. Like my partner was saying, okay, a lot of what we do, a lot of what we know, before we even start we know the answers to, and a lot of what we’re doing right now, Bryan, is we’re evaluating your integrity.” He explained they were evaluating whether appellant was “a victim, maybe you were led along, maybe you were like party number two and we got the bad guy who’s out here someplace else doing this shit and you can help us get to him and maybe you bounce. We don’t know. But what we do know so far is Brian has been completely dishonest with us.” The detective told appellant they would start over and give him another opportunity to tell the truth; that they had no incentive to send appellant to prison. He urged appellant to tell them exactly what happened because, after they finished talking with him, they would prepare a report which would say “one of two things: Brian is an asshole” or “Brian was either manipulated by some other cat, some drunk, whatever, or Brian just went along with the program because he was tight on money, he was down on his luck or whatever the case may be....” The bottom line, according to Detective Reynolds, was that “if you don’t allow us to be thorough by simply telling us the truth then you are the one that’s going to suffer not us.”
Reynolds again urged appellant to tell his version of the truth, and explained: “You can either get out of here by going to state penitentiary bro or you can get out of here by walking out. But if this, if the answers right here that you gave my partner, if this is what’re [sic] going to stick by, then we’re not going to waste too much time with you man.” He continued, “And I want you to be honest because, again, we’re not going to spend—we’re not going to spend another half hour, 45 minutes in here begging you to be honest. We’re not going to beg you, bro. But when you go back to that jail cell tonight and you stare at the ceiling and you think I could have went this route and this or this route, I could have been honest, or I could just go back to prison because that’s pretty much where it is. Honest or go back to prison. One of the two.”
The detectives repeatedly urged appellant to tell the truth, not to tell some particular version of the incident. They suggested that if it were true that he had lesser involvement in the crime, he might have a better outcome: “We’ve been doing this enough to know that there’s different levels of involvement in everything. Okay? Sometimes guys are out with buddies, one of the buddies and then he stops the car right here. The next thing you know his buddies are jumping out jacking somebody.” They told appellant they were trying to figure out what happened inside the car. “What was going on? What’s your role? What you did. Drive the car, is that all you did?” This was not improper. The detectives were essentially explaining to appellant that if he was driving the vehicle and did not know what his companion was going to do when he stopped, he might not be liable for his companion’s conduct. Knowledge of the perpetrator’s unlawful purpose is a necessary element of aiding and abetting. (See People v. Leon (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 149, 157.) The detectives did not promise any particular outcome, nor did they try to obtain an admission to particular facts. They repeatedly asked appellant to tell them the truth.
More importantly, there was no promise of leniency in exchange for appellant’s statement. Soon after appellant started to describe what happened when his companion told him to turn into the driveway in front of the two robbery victims, he stopped and asked: “Now what exactly does this get me?” Before the detectives could complete an answer, he continued: “You going to send me to jail, I’m going to jail whether I talk to ya’ll or not.” Detective Jackson explained that the police gather the facts, and the district attorney “decides these things.” He expressly told appellant, “I’m not going to lie to you.... You ain’t walking out of here tomorrow.” “You won’t be walking out of here the next day. Okay?” Appellant indicated he understood: “Ya’ll ain’t lying, I ain’t going to be up out of there next four months.” Detective Jackson explained, “That’s not our call. We have to do our job, we have to do, we have to do our job.” Despite appellant’s effort to obtain a benefit in exchange for his statement, the detectives disclaimed any control over the charges in the case or the punishment.
The detectives told appellant they had evidence against him which they did not have. Police deception may be a factor in determining whether a confession was voluntary. (People v. Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1240-1241.) But appellant makes no claim that the detectives’ false statement that they had videotape of the incident caused him to confess. In the absence of a proximate causal connection between the deception and the confession, the deception does not establish that the confession was involuntary. (Ibid.)
Appellant’s expert testified at the suppression hearing about various police tactics used to obtain confessions. While his testimony was informative, it did not—and could not—resolve the ultimate issue of voluntariness. The trial court watched the video recording of the interview, and this court did, too. This is the most direct evidence of the conduct of the interview. Viewing the evidence (literally) as a whole, we conclude, as did the trial court, that appellant’s choice to confess was not the result of his will being overborne by coercive police tactics, and that it therefore was voluntarily made.
Appellant also argues the trial court applied the wrong standard in its determination that appellant’s confession was not coerced. He points to statements by the court indicating its concern with the truthfulness of the confession as an indication of coercion.
The first claimed instance occurred during cross-examination of appellant’s expert, Dr. Leo. Dr. Leo testified that during the interview the detectives used negotiation and persuasion to convince appellant to make an incriminating statement, implying that if he told them he was not more involved, he could walk out. Defense counsel objected, arguing that “Dr. Leo’s testimony wasn’t about whether [appellant] was more involved or less involved. The whole point of this admission or the confession was to the fact that it placed him there. They didn’t have anything that—any kind of evidence that placed him there.” The court disagreed with that characterization of Dr. Leo’s testimony, explaining: “The point of the testimony is that they violated some precept, and/or there is a question based on this psychological coercion either implicit or explicit that may impact on the veracity of his statements.”
This statement does not show that the court was using veracity as the standard for judging the voluntariness of the confession. Instead, it reflects the court’s understanding of the expert’s testimony that the detectives’ tactics may have suggested to appellant that he would receive better treatment if he made an admission which showed that he was less involved. The court’s mention of veracity involved the possibility of appellant being coerced to tell the detectives something untruthful—that he was less involved in the incident.
Immediately following this colloquy, defense counsel reminded the court of pertinent case law (People v. Cahill (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 296) addressing the evaluation of voluntariness where there are “implicit inducement and promises and threats....” The court affirmed its familiarity with the standards set out in Cahill, and at the conclusion of the day’s proceedings, indicated it would review that case and view the video recording of appellant’s confession before proceedings resumed.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court noted its review of the video and of the case law, and observed that appellant’s sophistication was to be considered in evaluating whether implied or express promises of better treatment would have an overpowering effect on the truthfulness of any statements he made. The court believed the atmosphere of the interrogation and appellant’s demeanor did not demonstrate the use of oppressive tactics which would “overcome a person’s likelihood of providing truthful or credible information.”
“We must presume that the trial court knew and applied the correct law in the exercise of its official duties.” (People v. Sangani (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1120, 1138.) The court expressly noted its familiarity with the factors for evaluating voluntariness set out in People v. Cahill, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th 296, 310-317. Particularly pertinent in Cahill is the discussion of police conduct coercing a suspect to admit to specific facts: “The clear implication of [the officers’] remarks is that defendant would be tried for first degree murder unless he admitted that he was inside the house and denied that he had premeditated the killing.” (22 Cal.App.4th at p. 314.) This tactic goes beyond merely pointing out to a suspect that which flows naturally from a truthful and honest course of conduct. (People v. Holloway, supra, 33 Cal.4th 96, 115.) The trial court’s statement in this case reflects the concern that improper police coercion to give a particular version of events could lead to an untruthful confession, made in the hope of leniency. That concern does not demonstrate that the court applied an incorrect standard in concluding that the confession was voluntarily made.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: WILLHITE, J., SUZUKAWA, J.