Opinion
Argued June 21, 2001.
July 16, 2001.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Eng, J.), rendered April 26, 2000, convicting him of murder in the second degree, criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree, criminal impersonation in the second degree, and leaving the scene of an incident (two counts), after a nonjury trial, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing (Hanophy, J.), of those branches of the defendant's omnibus motion which were to suppress physical evidence and his statement to law enforcement authorities.
Spiros A. Tsimbinos, Kew Gardens, N.Y., for appellant.
Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano, Johnnette Traill, and Keith Kalmus of counsel), for respondent.
Before: GABRIEL M. KRAUSMAN, J.P., LEO F. McGINITY, ROBERT W. SCHMIDT, THOMAS A. ADAMS, JJ.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
There is no merit to the defendant's contention that his arrest was made without probable cause. Information provided by an identified citizen accusing another individual of a specific crime is legally sufficient to provide the police with probable cause for an arrest (see, People v. Jean-Charles, 226 A.D.2d 395).
The defendant's further contention that the hearing court should have found that he did not effectively waive his constitutional rights because of his limited command of the English language is also without merit. An individual may validly waive his Miranda rights (see, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436) "so long as the immediate import of those warnings is comprehended" (People v. Vanegas, 237 A.D.2d 469; see, People v. Zadorozhnyi, 267 A.D.2d 263; People v. Alexandre, 215 A.D.2d 488). Contrary to the defendant's claim, the evidence presented at the hearing supports the hearing court's determination that the defendant understood his Miranda rights and knowingly and voluntarily waived them (see, People v. Vanegas, supra; People v. Alexandre, supra).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15).
The sentence imposed was not excessive (see, People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80).
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.
KRAUSMAN, J.P., McGINITY, SCHMIDT and ADAMS, JJ., concur.