Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. SA049590 Cynthia Rayvis, Judge.
Andrew J. Fishkin for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taruyle and Charles S. Lee, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
BIGELOW, P. J.
Rajnesh Singh pleaded no contest to making a criminal threat, and the trial court placed him on probation for three years. More than six years later, Singh filed a motion to vacate the judgment on the ground that he had not been properly advised of the immigration consequences of his conviction. The trial court denied Singh’s motion, and he filed the current appeal. We affirm the court’s order denying Singh’s motion to vacate the judgment.
FACTS
On August 1, 2003, Singh and Salvador Gonzalez were involved in some type of incident. However, the facts surrounding Singh’s acts cannot be ascertained with any detail from the record. On October 15, 2003, the People filed an information charging Singh with one count of making a criminal threat against Gonzalez, and one count of dissuading a witness, Gonzalez, by force or threat. (Pen. Code, §§ 422, 136.1.) On December 8, 2003, Singh waived his constitutional trial rights, and agreed to plead no contest to making a criminal threat. Prior to Singh’s plea, the prosecutor advised him: “[I]f you’re not a citizen of the United States, this plea would cause you to be deported from the country, denied re-entry, and denied naturalization as a citizen.” Singh stated that he understood. Upon Singh’s plea, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed him on formal probation for three years on condition he serve 270 days in the county jail.
On March 12, 2010, Singh filed a motion to vacate the judgment. Singh’s motion acknowledged that he had been advised of the “possibility of deportation” at the time of his plea, but not that he would “certainly be deported, ” and not that he would be subject to “exclusion” from the country. He also argued that the advisement of the immigration consequences of his conviction was invalid because it was uttered by the prosecutor, not the trial court. (See Pen. Code, § 1016.5, subd. (a) [prior to accepting a plea of guilty or no contest, “the court shall administer” an advisement about the immigration consequences of the conviction].)
On March 19, 2010, the trial court denied Singh’s motion to vacate the judgment.
DISCUSSION
Singh contends the trial court’s order denying his motion to vacate his conviction must be reversed because the record demonstrates that he was not properly advised of the adverse immigration consequences of his conviction at the time of his plea. According to Singh, the advisement that he might be deported and “denied re-entry” to the country is not the same thing as an advisement that he would be deported and subject to “exclusion from admission” to the country. We disagree.
Singh’s argument cites People v. Gutierrez (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 169 (Gutierrez), from our own court. In Gutierrez, just as in Singh’s case, the prosecutor used the phrase “denied re-entry to the country” instead of the language specified in Penal Code section 1016.5, subdivision (a), to wit, “exclusion from admission” to the country. (Gutierrez, at p. 173.) We found the variance in language to be immaterial, concluding that section 1016.5 requires an advisement of immigration consequences, but does not require exact faithfulness to the statutory language set forth in section 1016.5, subdivision (a). (Gutierrez, at pp. 173-176.)
We understand Singh’s opening brief to argue that Gutierrez is distinguishable because defendant Gutierrez was not a lawful permanent resident, whereas he is a lawful permanent resident. According to Singh, “in immigration re-entry and exclusion are two completely different terms [when applied to a lawful or unlawful resident].” No authority is cited by Singh to support his proposition. Even assuming he is correct that there is a difference –– under immigration law –– between an immigration order denying a person re-entry to the United States and an immigration order subjecting the person to exclusion from the country, our state’s law on advisements of immigration consequences defeats his argument for vacating his plea. As we explained in Gutierrez, a warning about the denial of re-entry to the country is the linguistic equivalent to a warning about exclusion from the country. (Gutierrez, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 174, fn. 4.) And as our Supreme Court stated in People v. Superior Court (Zamudio) (2000) 23 Cal.4th 183, “ ‘Exclusion’ is ‘being barred from entry to the United States.’ [Citation.]” (Zamudio, at p. 207.)
Singh next argues that the advisement regarding immigration consequences was invalid because it was stated by the prosecutor, rather than the trial court. For the reasons explained in People v. Quesada (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 525, 536, we disagree. As the Court of Appeal explained in Quesada, the term “the court” as used in Penal Code section 1016.5, subdivision (a), means that an advisement must be given in the tribunal in which the defendant enters his plea, either by the trial judge or some other person designated by the trial judge; it does not impose a jurisdictional requirement that the trial judge himself or herself utter the advisement. (Quesada, at p. 536.)
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed.
We concur: RUBIN, J., GRIMES, J