Following the McGuire decision, the opinions of the appellate court have likewise evidenced a concern for the observance of the significant rights of the accused rather than compliance with rigid formalities for proof of corporate existence. ( People v. Watts (1979), 76 Ill. App.3d 791; People v. Sims (1975), 29 Ill. App.3d 815, 817-18; People v. Nelson (1970), 124 Ill. App.2d 280, 285-87; cf. People v. Whittaker (1970), 45 Ill.2d 491, 495 (designation of a burglary victim as a "company" in an indictment is sufficient to apprise the accused of the fact that the victim is a corporation).) Consistent with this liberalization of the standards of proof of corporate existence, we held in People v. Berland (1978), 74 Ill.2d 286, 312, a prosecution for arson with intent to defraud an insurance company, that the State's failure to produce evidence on the question of corporate existence is not fatal to its case and that corporate existence, a matter of public record, is a fact which is properly before a court by way of judicial notice.
During the trial herein the defendant did not raise this issue and, as a matter of fact, she not only made a personal bond for her release from custody under the name of Rose Marie Ferraro but her attorney entered her appearance as Rose Marie Ferraro. Under these facts the argument is specious that she was not sufficiently apprised by the complaint to effectively prepare and present her defense. • 5 The third contention of the defendant is somewhat two-fold in nature, alleging first that the State failed to properly charge ownership of the property in question and, secondly, that the corporate existence of J.C. Penney Co. was not proven. This issue was raised in People v. Sims (1975), 29 Ill. App.3d 815, 331 N.E.2d 178, where the court stated that if the ownership of the property is alleged to be in a corporation, then the legal existence of the corporation is a material fact that must be proven. However, in that case, the court went on to state, "However, the prescriptions formerly associated with the proof of a corporation's existence are no longer required" ( 29 Ill. App.3d 815, 817, 331 N.E.2d 178, 180), and, citing People v. McGuire (1966), 35 Ill.2d 219, 220 N.E.2d 447, went on to say:
We noted that defendants had recourse to the record and the testimony contained therein to establish a defense of prior jeopardy in any subsequent prosecution for the same offense. ( 6 Ill. App.3d 1066, 1071, 286 N.E.2d 613, 617.) Similarly in People v. Sims (1975), 29 Ill. App.3d 815, 331 N.E.2d 178, we stated that defendant: "[H]as the complaint, the transcript of the trial and the opinion of this court to shield him from a second prosecution for the same offense * * * to reverse his conviction for an unprejudicial failure of proof would be elevating form over substance and would be promoting a minor irregularity into a major defect affecting a substantial right."
The significant inquiry is whether the defendant was prejudiced by the State's failure to supplement the language of the stipulation with additional evidence establishing the corporate existence of Jupiter Discount Store. Where the protections intended for a defendant in a theft case have been satisfied, the conviction should not be overturned because of this technical omission. Two recent decisions of this court — People v. Sims (1975), 29 Ill. App.3d 815, 331 N.E.2d 178, and People v. Kaprelian (1972), 6 Ill. App.3d 1066, 286 N.E.2d 613 — affirming shoplifting convictions presented facts similar to those in this case. The charge in each case was theft from a Jewel store, but the prosecutor failed to offer any evidence establishing that Jewel was a corporation or any stipulation of the type introduced in this case.
[Citation omitted.]" ( People v. Sims, 29 Ill. App.3d 815, 817, 331 N.E.2d 178.) See, also, People v. McAllister, 31 Ill. App.3d 825, 334 N.E.2d 885, and cases cited therein.
"Theft is the taking of property without the owner's consent." People v. Sims, 29 Ill. App. 3d 815, 817 (1975). When the theft is by an employee, whether it was unauthorized depends on the scope of the employee's authority.
"Theft," considered as it was used in Susco in 1959, well before "theft" became a statutory crime in 1977, see the Florida Anti-Fencing Act, Ch. 77-342, §§ 3-4, Laws of Fla. (§§ 812.012, 812.014, Fla. Stat. (1989)); see also Thompson v. State, 585 So.2d 492 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991), is primarily defined as the equivalent of common law larceny, that is, the taking of property without the consent of the owner. People v. Sims, 29 Ill. App.3d 815, 331 N.E.2d 178 (1975). Common law larceny, in turn, as its very definition suggests, does not include either of the traditionally separate crimes of embezzlement and false pretenses — which respectively involve a taking after property had initially lawfully come into one's possession, and the obtaining of title by consent through the perpetration of a fraud.
(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 16-1(a)(1).) Second, he argues proof that one other than the accused either owned or has a superior possessory interest in the property allegedly stolen is an essential element of the offense of theft, relying on People v. Cowan (1977), 49 Ill. App.3d 367, 368, 364 N.E.2d 362, 363; People v. Mick (1980), 86 Ill. App.3d 1022, 1025, 408 N.E.2d 1079, 1083; People v. Sims (1975), 29 Ill. App.3d 815, 817, 331 N.E.2d 178, 179; People v. Traylor (1975), 26 Ill. App.3d 687, 325 N.E.2d 383 (abstract of opinion). He contends the State's ownership of the battery was not proved. Third, plaintiff points to the hearing officer's first finding: "At the outset of the case the State stipulated that it does not have receipts for any of the State's property allegedly misappropriated by [Lyles]."
The requisite intent can be deduced by the trier of fact from the facts and circumstances surrounding the alleged criminal act. People v. Brown (1977), 56 Ill. App.3d 348, 371 N.E.2d 982; People v. Sims (1975), 29 Ill. App.3d 815, 331 N.E.2d 178. • 4 That defendant exerted unauthorized control and his intent to deprive can be established by Carlson's testimony that two people were loading the car, defendant's testimony that he was present at the scene, and defendant's presence in the car with the stolen property when the car was stopped by the police.
He first contends that Warnick's testimony concerning ownership of the burglarized premises was insufficient to prove the existence of the alleged corporate owner, Motel 6. The law in Illinois is well established that corporate existence may be demonstrated by various kinds of proof, including, for example, oral statements ( People v. Nelson (1970), 124 Ill. App.2d 280, 260 N.E.2d 251), judicial notice ( People v. Whittaker (1970), 45 Ill.2d 491, 259 N.E.2d 787), or even references from the corporation's properties ( Nelson) or products ( People v. Childress (1971), 2 Ill. App.3d 319, 276 N.E.2d 360). The proof, offered in whatever form, must establish the existence of an owner who had an interest in the burglarized premises superior to that of the defendant and must sufficiently inform the accused of the charges to protect him from possible double jeopardy. ( People v. Sims (1975), 29 Ill. App.3d 815, 331 N.E.2d 178.) In the case at bar, Warnick, as well as the arresting officer, made several references to the premises as belonging to Motel 6, a corporate entity.