Opinion
A148930
03-29-2018
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JAMES D. SIMPSON, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
[PUBLIC - READACTS MATERIAL FROM SEALED RECORD]
(San Francisco City & County Super. Ct. No. 15018865)
A jury convicted defendant James D. Simpson of receiving stolen property in connection with a residential burglary. Following his arrest, defendant provided a written statement and a subsequent taped statement to police, in which he confessed to entering the residence and taking various items. On appeal, defendant contends the judgment must be reversed because his taped statement, in which he admitted stealing property from the residence, was the tainted fruit of his earlier written statement that was found to have been involuntary and obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda). Defendant also contends the evidence was insufficient to prove the stolen property had a value in excess of $950. We affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
In an amended information filed on February 23, 2016, defendant was charged with first degree residential burglary (Pen. Code, § 459; count I) and receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a); count II). The information also alleged that, at the time of the offense, defendant was on parole for a serious or violent felony and had one prior felony conviction. (Pen. Code, §§ 1203.085, subd. (b), 667.5, subd. (b).)
On August 21, 2015, Edward P. and Kari C. left their residence (the Sussex residence) to attend a wedding. While they were gone, defendant and his girlfriend, Diana Gage, entered the Sussex residence through a window and took various items without permission, including two MacBook laptop computers, a digital camera, an inoperable iPhone, and cufflinks. Edward testified he paid approximately $1,000 for his laptop and $200 or $300 for the digital camera, both of which were approximately five years old at the time of trial. Edward also testified he paid approximately $300 or $400 for the iPhone, but it was three or four years old and nonfunctional. Kari testified she paid $1,300 for her laptop, which was new. Upon returning home and discovering the missing property, Edward and Kari contacted the police and reported the burglary.
The following day, defendant and Gage returned to the Sussex residence. Kari confronted Gage on the front steps of the residence. Defendant and Gage proceeded to leave the premises, and Edward followed them. While following them, Edward saw Gage dump a bag over a fence. Edward then followed defendant to the Glen Park BART station, where defendant was detained by BART police. The police subsequently recovered the bag Gage tossed over a fence, as well as another bag which contained Edward's and Kari's laptops. Kari's laptop contained pictures of defendant and Gage.
Defendant testified in his defense. He stated Gage claimed she owned various properties in San Francisco, and she had previously taken him to some of those properties. On the day of the burglary, Gage suggested they go to one of her houses, which was actually the Sussex residence. Defendant testified he had been smoking methamphetamine and marijuana and been awake for a few days. Upon arriving at the Sussex residence, Gage told him she lost her key, so they entered through the side window. While inside the house, defendant took various items believing they belonged to Gage. They then returned to his house, and Gage showed him the laptops. They both used Kari's laptop and took pictures on it. Defendant testified he believed the Sussex residence belonged to Gage because he was high. In retrospect, however, defendant conceded it was "dumb" to believe so.
The jury found defendant guilty of receiving stolen property, but were deadlocked on the burglary count. The court suspended execution of the sentence and placed defendant on three years' probation. Defendant timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Sufficiency of Market Value Evidence
Defendant contends the prosecution evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to prove the stolen property had a value in excess of $950. We disagree.
When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, "we review the whole record to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime . . . beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] The record must disclose substantial evidence to support the verdict—i.e., evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] In applying this test, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably have deduced from the evidence. [Citation.] . . . A reversal for insufficient evidence 'is unwarranted unless it appears "that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support" ' the jury's verdict." (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.) "We 'must accept logical inferences that the jury might have drawn from the circumstantial evidence. [Citation.]' [Citation.] '. . . [I]t is the jury, not the appellate court that must be convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' " (Id. at pp. 357-358.)
The standard for determining the value of stolen property is its "reasonable and fair market value." (Pen. Code, § 484, subd. (a); People v. Cook (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 435, 438.) Fair market value has been defined as the highest price agreed upon by a willing buyer and willing seller at the time and place of the theft. (People v. Pena (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 100, 103-104.) An owner of property is qualified to opine as to the value of the property he or she owns. (People v. More (1935) 10 Cal.App.2d 144, 145.) "The weight to be given the owner's testimony as to value is for the trier of the fact." (People v. Henderson (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 566, 567.) For example, in People v. Henderson, the only evidence of value was the owner's testimony that he had purchased the stolen watch for $1,800 and the stolen ring for $1,200. (Id. at p. 566.) At trial, the "[d]efendant did not cross-examine as to value, offered no evidence regarding it, and never suggested a lesser valuation." (Ibid.) On appeal, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of this testimony to support the grand theft conviction, which required proof the property taken had a value of more than $200. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal rejected the defendant's argument and affirmed the conviction. (Id. at p. 567.)
Jurors also are permitted to draw inferences based on their general knowledge, experience, and common sense. (See, e.g., People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 950 ["Jurors bring to their deliberations knowledge and beliefs about general matters of . . . fact that find their source in everyday life and experience."]; People v. Vigil (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1487 [jurors could apply "their own common sense and life experience" to witness testimony].) Specifically, jurors may rely on their common knowledge regarding the value of consumer goods. (People v. Ortiz (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1365-1366.)
In People v. Ortiz, the court concluded a jury could reasonably find the defendants carjacked a 2007 530i BMW with the intent to hold or sell it in partial payment of a drug debt of $70,000 to $100,000. (People v. Ortiz, supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1365-1366.) Rejecting the defendants' argument that this would be "mere speculation" because the prosecution presented no evidence regarding the current market value of the car, the court recognized "the jurors could rely on their common knowledge that late-model BMW's have a substantial market value." (Id. at p. 1366.)
Here, Kari testified she paid $1,300 for her MacBook laptop computer. Edward testified this laptop computer was new when it was taken. Defendant testified he used the computer, and police found pictures of defendant on the laptop after it was recovered—evidence from which the jury could infer the laptop was in working order at the time of the theft. Defense counsel did not cross-examine on the value of the laptop and made no argument at all about it. The jury was correctly instructed that the "fair market value" of property is the highest price the property would have reasonably sold for in the open market at the time and location of the theft. (People v. Pena, supra, 68 Cal.App.3d at p. 104.) Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we believe reasonable jurors—applying their experience and general knowledge of common consumer electronic goods and taking into account depreciation in value over time—could infer that Kari's "new" MacBook laptop computer would not depreciate to such an extent that it would be worth only $950 or less shortly after it was purchased for $1,300. In other words, a jury reasonably could determine Kari's laptop had a value of more than $950 at the time it was stolen.
In support of his claim of insufficient evidence, defendant argues, "the fair market value of laptop computers drops dramatically as soon as they are taken out of the store and put to use." But the general proposition that electronic equipment tends to lose value over time does not mean the evidence in this case was insufficient to support the jury's finding. The jury was not required to find that Kari's laptop was still worth the purchase price of $1,300 at the time it was stolen; it only needed to, and did, find her laptop had a value of more than $950. The inference that Kari's laptop would not lose over 26 percent of its value immediately upon being purchased and used is within the bounds of reason.
In summary, we reject defendant's contention the evidence presented was insufficient to support the jury's finding the stolen property had a value exceeding $950. Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to a reduction of his felony conviction to a misdemeanor. B. Admission of Defendant's Statements to Police
Prior to trial, defendant filed "Omnibus Motions in Limine," which included, in part, a request to exclude any of defendant's postarrest statements under Miranda. The hearing on this motion was sealed by the trial court because the issues raised therein overlapped with certain Brady issues.
Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 (Brady).
Defendant has raised issues on appeal arising from sealed hearings on February 23, 2016 related to Brady issues. These materials were subject to a protective order entered by the trial court under Evidence Code section 1045, subdivision (e). To maintain this protection for the police officer's statutory privacy right in his personnel file, this opinion will be released in two versions: a sealed version that will be released only to the parties, and a public version that contains redactions.
There exists an overriding interest that overcomes the right of the public to access the sealed portion of the opinion. That interest supports the partial sealing of the opinion. A substantial probability exists that the overriding interest will be prejudiced if the opinion is not partially sealed. The sealing is narrowly tailored and no less restrictive means exist to achieve that overriding interest. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.45, 8.46(d)(6), (f)(1) and (2).)
Accordingly, the taped statement was properly admitted.
[REDACTED]
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
/s/_________
Margulies, J. We concur: /s/_________
Humes, P.J. /s/_________
Dondero, J.