Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Ct.No. SWF027964 Ernest Borunda, Judge. (Retired judge of the San Diego Sup. Ct., assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6, of the Cal. Const.)
Richard Power, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Michael Murphy and Emily R. Hanks, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
MILLER J.
A jury found defendant Christopher Scott Simpson guilty of (1) possessing a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)); (2) being a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1)); (3) being a felon in possession of ammunition (Pen. Code, § 12316, subd. (b)(1)); and (4) actively participating in a criminal street gang (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (a)). Defendant admitted suffering two prior convictions that resulted in prison terms (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)), and one prior strike conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subd. (c) & (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)). The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for a term of nine years, four months.
Defendant makes three contentions. First, defendant contends there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions for possessing a controlled substance, a firearm, and ammunition. Second, defendant asserts that there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for actively participating in a criminal street gang. Third, defendant contends that his right to confront witnesses was violated when the trial court refused to limit the gang expert’s reliance on hearsay statements. We affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendant was released from prison on December 30, 2008. Approximately two weeks after being released, defendant met Daphnee. Daphnee became defendant’s “whole world, ” his “everything.” On Valentine’s Day, February 14, 2009, in the early morning hours, defendant was lying on Daphnee’s bed. Daphnee was sitting at the end of the bed, opening a safe that was stored at the foot of the bed.
At that point, Daphnee’s cell phone rang, and defendant heard her say, “[Y]eah, I got that. Come on over.” Defendant believed Daphnee was dealing drugs. Defendant told Daphnee that he was going to leave, since he was on parole and did not want to go back to prison. Daphnee “flipped out.” Daphnee grabbed a.22-caliber gun, held it to her head, and asked, “[W]hat would you do if I went like this?” Defendant told Daphnee, “Stop playing. Don’t. Don’t. Don’t play like that.” Daphnee looked at defendant, placed the gun under her chin, and asked, “[O]h, I’m playing?” Daphnee pulled the trigger, and killed herself.
Defendant ran into Daphnee’s children’s room and screamed for someone to call an ambulance and the police. When Riverside County Sheriff’s Deputy Jared Hansen arrived at the house, he spoke to defendant, who was “running around the living room.” Defendant was hysterical; Deputy Hansen tried to calm him. Riverside County Sheriff’s Deputy June Cox heard defendant say, “‘There’s another gun. It’s down in the safe.’” Riverside County Sheriff’s Deputy Oscar Ortiz looked in the unlocked safe. Inside the safe, deputies found a.32-caliber revolver wrapped in a bandanna, eight.22-caliber bullets, two.32-caliber bullets, two scales that were the type typically used by drug dealers, and four or five “mini M&M” containers of crystal methamphetamine. In the bedroom, Deputy Ortiz also found men’s clothing that appeared to belong to defendant, and several photographs of defendant displayed throughout the room. Additionally, on top of the bedroom entertainment center, Deputy Cox found a blue container, which held the majority of the crystal methamphetamine found in the bedroom. In the bedroom, Deputy Cox found 4.92 net grams of methamphetamine.
When testifying, defendant stated that approximately two weeks prior to Daphnee’s suicide, Daphnee was cleaning her bedroom and she asked defendant to put the.32-caliber gun in the safe. Defendant took the gun, which was wrapped in the bandanna, and placed it in the safe. Defendant did not know the safe’s combination, but the safe was unlocked so he was able to put the gun in the safe. Defendant stated that there was nothing else inside the safe when he placed the.32-caliber gun inside it. After placing the gun inside the safe, defendant closed the door, which locked the safe. Defendant testified that he did not know there was methamphetamine in the safe, and he had never seen the bullets that were in the safe.
Facts related to defendant’s gang participation will be presented within the “Discussion” section of this opinion.
DISCUSSION
A. POSSESSION
Defendant contends that the evidence supporting his convictions for possessing a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)); a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1)); and ammunition (Pen. Code, § 12316, subd. (b)(1)), does not meet the substantial evidence standard. Defendant’s contentions focus on the “possession” element of the offenses. We disagree with the contentions.
We review the record for substantial evidence. “Under this standard, we review the whole record ‘in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence-that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value-such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.] If the circumstances reasonably justify the finding, we cannot reverse merely because a contrary finding might also be reasonably deduced from the circumstances. [Citation.] We will reverse only if it ‘clearly appear[s] that upon no hypothesis... is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the judgment].’ [Citation.]” (People v. Dyke (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1377, 1381-1382.)
1. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE
It is well settled that one may be criminally liable for possession of a controlled substance, based upon either actual or constructive possession of the substance. (People v. Morante (1999) 20 Cal.4th 403, 417.) “Constructive possession exists where a defendant maintains some control or right to control contraband that is in the actual possession of another. [Citation.]” (Ibid.) An inference of control can easily be made “when the contraband is discovered in a place over which the defendant has general dominion and control: his residence [citation], his automobile [citation], or his personal effects [citation].” (People v. Jenkins (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 579, 584.) However, mere presence, or the opportunity to access a place where the contraband is found, without more, will not support a finding of unlawful possession. (People v. Redrick (1961) 55 Cal.2d 282, 285.)
There are several pieces of evidence that support a conclusion that defendant lived in Daphnee’s house. First, in the bedroom, Deputy Ortiz found men’s clothing that appeared to belong to defendant, and several photographs of defendant displayed throughout the room. Second, after Deputy Juarez spoke to Daphnee’s daughter, he concluded that defendant resided in Daphnee’s house. Third, when Deputy Hansen spoke to defendant, he recorded the conversation; during the conversation, the following exchange took place:
“[Deputy:]... [Defendant], were you living with your mom before, before coming here?
“[Defendant]: Yes.
“[Deputy]: Okay. Since you were staying here, did you get a new cell phone or home phone or anything?
“[Defendant]: No sir.
“[Deputy]: What is the, what is the phone number of the house here?
“[Defendant]: There is no phone number here sir.
“[Deputy]: Okay, so there’s no way anyone can get a hold of you?
“[Defendant]: Yes sir.
“[Deputy]: How would they get a hold of you?
“[Defendant]: 293-.... [¶]... [¶]
“[Deputy]: And what is that, is that a home phone or?
“[Defendant]: A cell number.”
A jury could reasonably infer from the foregoing conversation that defendant was living at Daphnee’s house because (1) when the deputy asked if defendant was living with his mom before staying with Daphnee, defendant did not claim that he was still living with his mom; and (2) when the deputy asked if there was a way to communicate with defendant since Daphnee did not have a home phone, defendant did not state that he could be reached at his mom’s house. This inference is further supported by the male clothing in Daphnee’s bedroom.
Next, the evidence reflects that when Daphnee received the telephone call in the early morning hours of February 14, she said “[Y]eah, I got that. Come on over.” Defendant believed Daphnee was “dealing some kind of drug.” Based upon defendant’s testimony, it appears that defendant knew there were drugs in Daphnee’s house, because he immediately concluded from a vague conversation that a drug sale would be taking place.
Further, the majority of the methamphetamine in the bedroom was on top of the entertainment center-not locked in the safe. Since it can be inferred that (1) defendant lived in the bedroom, and (2) defendant knew about the drugs, it can be inferred that defendant maintained some control or right to control the methamphetamine, because the contraband was easily accessible to defendant. In sum, there is credible and solid evidence that defendant maintained some control or right to control the drugs due to his knowledge of the drugs and his easy access to the drugs in his residence. (See People v. Haynes (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 1060, 1070 [constructive possession of drugs shown via evidence of jointly occupying the house where drugs were found]; see also People v. Saldana (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 443, 455 [constructive possession of drugs shown via evidence of jointly occupying bedroom where drugs found].) Accordingly, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the conviction for possession of a controlled substance.
Defendant contends that substantial evidence does not support his conviction for possessing methamphetamine because there was evidence that defendant did not reside in Daphnee’s home. We agree that defendant testified that he lived at his mother’s house, and only spent time visiting at Daphnee’s house. We also agree that defendant’s mother testified that defendant never moved into Daphnee’s house. Nevertheless, as set forth ante, substantial evidence supports the verdict. The fact that contrary evidence was presented does not warrant a reversal. (People v. Ceja (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1134, 1139.)
2. AMMUNITION
Defendant contends that the evidence supporting his conviction for being a felon in possession of ammunition (Pen. Code, § 12316, subd. (b)(1)) does not meet the substantial evidence standard. We disagree.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless indicated.
Similar to narcotics, criminal possession of ammunition may be established by actual possession or constructive possession. (People v. Williams (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 587, 625 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two].)
Deputy Cox testified that the safe contained firearm ammunition. Defendant testified that the safe was open when Daphnee was cleaning the house two weeks prior to her death. Defendant also testified that, on the night of Daphnee’s death, Daphnee opened the safe while defendant was in the bedroom. Based upon defendant’s testimony, the jury could infer that the safe was open on different occasions when defendant was at Daphnee’s house, which would allow defendant to have access to the ammunition. Stated differently, it does not appear from the evidence that the safe was consistently locked and secured.
As set forth ante, the evidence supports an inference that defendant lived in Daphnee’s bedroom. Since defendant lived in the bedroom and the safe was occasionally unlocked, the jury could reasonably find that defendant had some control or right to control the ammunition. Accordingly, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the finding that defendant was a felon in possession of ammunition (§ 12316, subd. (b)(1)).
3. FIREARM
Defendant contends that the evidence supporting his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)) does not meet the substantial evidence standard. We disagree.
A felon is guilty of possessing a firearm when he “owns, purchases, receives, or has in his... possession or under his... custody or control any firearm.” (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1).)
At trial, defendant testified that approximately two weeks prior to Daphnee’s suicide, Daphnee was cleaning her bedroom and she asked defendant to put the.32-caliber gun in the safe. Defendant took the gun, which was wrapped in a bandanna, and placed it in the safe. Defendant testified that after placing the gun in the safe, he “close[d] the door and made sure it was locked.” Based upon defendant’s testimony, defendant possessed the gun because he held the gun and placed it securely in the safe. Consequently, we conclude that substantial evidence supports defendant’s conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)).
Defendant contends that his possession of the firearm was transitory, or momentary, and therefore was not criminal. In support of this argument, defendant cites People v. Mijares (1971) 6 Cal.3d 415, 417, in which our high court analyzed whether “‘the act of handling a narcotic for the sole purpose of disposal constitutes ‘possession.’” In Mijares, our Supreme Court concluded that possession is not proven where a person briefly holds a narcotic for purposes of disposing of it. (Id. at p. 422.) Defendant did not hold the gun for purposes of abandoning it; rather, he held the gun for purposes of locking it away safely in the room that he shared with Daphnee. Accordingly, we find the instant case distinguishable from Mijares.
Also in support of his argument, defendant cites People v. Martin (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1180. In Martin, our Supreme Court “conclude[d] that the defense of transitory possession devised in Mijares applies only to momentary or transitory possession of contraband for the purpose of disposal.” (Martin, at p. 1191.) As set forth ante, defendant did not possess the firearm for the purpose of disposing of the gun. Therefore, we are not persuaded by defendant’s reliance on Martin.
4. CONCLUSION
In sum, substantial evidence supports defendant’s convictions for (1) possessing a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)); (2) being a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1)); and (3) being a felon in possession of ammunition (Pen. Code, § 12316, subd. (b)(1)).
B. ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN A CRIMINAL STREET GANG
1. FACTS
Elsinore Vatos Locos (EVL) is a gang located in the Lake Elsinore area. EVL has approximately 80 members and associates. EVL is referred to as Elsinore Vatos Locos, EVL, VLS, ELS, and LVL. Members of EVL have tattoos that reflect the foregoing acronyms. The primary activities of EVL are possessing firearms, selling narcotics, assaulting people, and robbing people.
Robert Anthony Ortiz (Ortiz) was a member of EVL. On December 1, 2008, Ortiz was convicted of possessing drugs for sale. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378.) Isaac Solis (Solis) was a member of EVL. On April 21, 2008, Solis was convicted of possessing drugs while armed with a firearm. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1.) Trinidad Joseph Nieves (Nieves) was a member of EVL. On July 10, 2008, Nieves was convicted of possessing drugs for sale. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378.) Riverside County Sheriff’s Deputy John Juarez opined that the foregoing convictions reflected the main activities of EVL, i.e., possessing firearms and selling narcotics.
Deputy Juarez reviewed booking photographs of defendant, field identification (F.I.) cards related to defendant, and police reports concerning defendant. Based upon the foregoing, Deputy Juarez concluded that defendant’s gang moniker was “Tiny.” A gang task force F.I. card, dated February 11, 2009, reflected that defendant admitted being a member of EVL. A second F.I. card, indicated that defendant admitted being a member of EVL on February 13, 2009.
Deputy Juarez examined defendant’s booking photograph taken on November 18, 2006. The photograph showed that defendant had three dots tattooed on his left cheek. The dots are used by Hispanic street gangs and symbolize “my crazy life.” Deputy Juarez also examined defendant’s booking photograph, taken in 2009, for the instant case. Additional tattoos were visible in the 2009 photograph. Defendant had “ELS” tattooed above his right eyebrow, “Loco” on his left eyebrow, teardrops near his right eye, and what appeared to be the word “Southerner” on the left side of his neck. Deputy Juarez opined that the “ELS” tattoo refers to the City of Lake Elsinore. Deputy Juarez explained that “Loco” is the Spanish word for “crazy.”
Next, Deputy Juarez looked at a 2006 photograph of defendant’s back. “Tiny, ” defendant’s moniker, was tattooed on defendant’s back. Deputy Juarez then reviewed a 2009 booking photograph of defendant’s back, which reflected an additional “EVL” tattoo. Deputy Juarez opined that “EVL” referred to Elsinore Vatos Locos.
Deputy Juarez went on to look at other photographs of defendant, and describe the tattoos that he saw. Defendant had the word “Elsinore” tattooed above the letters “IE, ” which referred to the Inland Empire. Another tattoo read “‘keep it gangster.’” A separate tattoo read “951.” Defendant also had a picture of a firearm tattooed on him. On the tops of defendant’s hands he had two “Ss” tattooed. Two Ss is a traditional Hispanic gang symbol that refers to southern gangs. Tattooed on the fingers of defendant’s right hand were the letters E-V-L-S, which referred to Elsinore Vatos Locos. Tattooed on the fingers of defendant’s left hand were the letters T-i-n-y, which referred to defendant’s moniker.
Deputy Juarez explained that, based on his training and experience, a non-gang member would not place the foregoing tattoos on his body, because doing so would cause the person to be assaulted by gang members. Deputy Juarez further explained that a gang member possessing a firearm benefitted the gang because it allowed the gang member to protect himself from rival gangs and to commit acts of violence against rival gangs. Deputy Juarez opined that on February 14, 2009, defendant was an active member of EVL, a criminal street gang.
During cross-examination, defendant admitted that he knew the Elsinore Vatos Locos. Defendant also admitted that he was known by the name “Tiny.” In his defense, defendant testified that the “EVL” tattoo above his eye referred to the gang Elsinore Vatos Locos, and that the letters EVLS on his fingers also referred to the Elsinore Vatos Locos gang. However, defendant testified that he was not a gang member, and that he received most of the tattoos while he was in prison for the sake of blending-in with the prison population and because he liked tattoos.
2. ANALYSIS
Defendant contends that the evidence supporting his conviction for actively participating in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a)) does not meet the substantial evidence standard. We disagree.
Section 186.22, subdivision (a), provides: “Any person who actively participates in any criminal street gang with knowledge that its members engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity, and who willfully promotes, furthers, or assists in any felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang, shall be punished by imprisonment....” The foregoing statute has three elements: “‘[1] Active participation in a criminal street gang, in the sense of participation that is more than nominal or passive... [, (2) “K]nowledge that [the gang’s] members engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity, ” and [3]... that the person “willfully promotes, furthers, or assists in any felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang.” (§ 186.22[, subd. ](a).)’ [Citation.]” (People v. Rodriguez (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 722, 733.)
a) Active Participation
In regard to active participation, defendant admitted within the week prior to February 14, 2009, that he was a member of EVL. Defendant had multiple tattoos, which he admitted referred to the EVL gang. Additionally, defendant possessed a firearm, ammunition, and methamphetamine, which were described as the primary activities of EVL. Based upon the foregoing evidence, the jury could reasonably infer that defendant was actively participating in the EVL gang, because he was taking part in the gang’s primary activities.
b) Knowledge
In regard to defendant’s knowledge, evidence was presented that three members of the EVL gang were convicted of narcotics related offenses during 2008. Defendant testified that he knew the Elsinore Vatos Locos. It can be inferred that defendant was aware of EVL’s criminal activity since defendant knew the Elsinore Vatos Locos, and the primary activities of the gang were weapon and drug offenses.
c) Promoting Felonious Conduct
Next, we look at the evidence that defendant willfully promoted, furthered, or assisted in felonious criminal conduct by members of EVL. As set forth ante, substantial evidence supports defendant’s convictions for possessing methamphetamine, ammunition, and a firearm. Deputy Juarez explained that a gang member possessing a firearm benefits the gang because the firearm allows the gang member to protect himself from rival gangs and to commit acts of violence against rival gangs. The firearm also allows the gang member to commit assaults and/or robberies to obtain money for the gang.
The jury could reasonably infer from the foregoing evidence that defendant possessed the gun and ammunition for the purposes of protecting EVL members and/or committing acts of violence on behalf of EVL members. Accordingly, the jury could reasonably infer that defendant was willfully promoting or furthering the felonious criminal conduct of EVL members by possessing the gun and ammunition.
Defendant asserts that there was no evidence that he was seen in the company of an EVL member since he was released from prison in December 2008, or that he committed a crime with an EVL member. The substantial evidence test requires that we draw all reasonable inferences in support of the judgment. (People v. Misa (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 837, 842.) As set forth ante, a reasonable inference can be drawn that defendant possessed the gun and ammunition to promote the criminal conduct of EVL members. Accordingly, we are not persuaded by defendant’s argument.
Next, defendant asserts that Deputy Juarez’s expert gang testimony was not supported by the facts. For example, Deputy Juarez opined that possessing a gun would benefit a gang; defendant asserts that this is inadequate evidence because it is merely an opinion. “California law permits a person with ‘special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education’ in a particular field to qualify as an expert witness [citation] and to give testimony in the form of an opinion [citation].” (People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 617.) “The subject matter of the culture and habits of criminal street gangs... meets this criterion. [Citations.]” (Ibid.) “Evidence Code section 801 limits expert opinion testimony to an opinion that is ‘[b]ased on matter... perceived by or personally known to the witness or made known to [the witness] at or before the hearing.” (Ibid.)
Deputy Juarez testified that he had been assigned to the gang task force in the Lake Elsinore area for approximately two years. As part of his job, Deputy Juarez talks to gang members. Deputy Juarez speaks to the gang members about the gangs, their tattoos, and their families. Deputy Juarez estimated that he had been the primary investigator on over 20 gang-related crimes. Deputy Juarez said that he was familiar with EVL due to his patrols in the Lake Elsinore area. Deputy Juarez had contacted members of EVL, reviewed police reports related to EVL, and investigated crimes committed by EVL members. Based upon Deputy Juarez’s personal experience with Lake Elsinore gangs, and specifically EVL, it appears that his testimony was based upon matters perceived by Deputy Juarez or personally known to him. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that Deputy Juarez’s testimony consisted of speculative opinions.
d) Conclusion
In sum, substantial evidence supports defendant’s conviction for actively participating in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a)).
C. CONFIRMATION
Defendant contends that the trial court’s refusal to limit Deputy Juarez’s expert gang testimony resulted in defendant being denied his right to confront witnesses against him, because Deputy Juarez’s testimony contained hearsay. We disagree.
The People assert that defendant has forfeited this contention by failing to raise it at the trial court. We disagree. Defendant’s trial counsel cited defendant’s right to confrontation when arguing that the expert gang testimony should be limited. Accordingly, the issue was raised at the trial court. (See People v. Gerold (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 781, 786 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two] [forfeiture exists when issue not raised during trial].)
Since defendant’s contention implicates his constitutional right to confront witnesses, we will apply the independent standard of review. (People v. Sweeney (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 210, 221 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two].)
In Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 68-69, the Supreme Court held that testimonial out-of-court statements are inadmissible, as a violation of the Sixth Amendment, unless the declarant is unavailable and the accused has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Nevertheless, California “appellate courts have repeatedly found” that “‘[h]earsay in support of expert opinion is simply not the sort of testimonial hearsay the use of which Crawford condemned.’ [Citations.] (People v. Sisneros (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 142, 153.) As previously explained by this court, expert testimony based on hearsay will typically not violate the Confrontation Clause “because an expert is subject to cross-examination about his or her opinions and... the materials on which the expert bases his or her opinion are not elicited for the truth of their contents; they are examined to assess the weight of the expert’s opinion.” (People v. Thomas (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1210.)
Defendant’s argument primarily focuses on the F.I. cards discussed during Deputy Juarez’s expert testimony. Deputy Juarez explained that F.I. cards contain general information about people that officers meet while in the field; the cards have a space for a physical descriptions and aliases. The cards are used to help officers in writing their reports. Deputy Juarez opined that defendant was an active member of EVL on February 14, 2009, based, in part, upon the F.I. cards. It appears from the record that the F.I. cards were not offered for the truth of their contents, rather, they were offered to explain the bases of Deputy Juarez’s opinion. Accordingly, while the F.I. cards may have been hearsay, based upon the legal precedent set forth ante, we conclude that they did not violate defendant’s confrontation rights because (1) they were not offered for their truth, and (2) Deputy Juarez was available for cross-examination.
Defendant argues that the information taken from the F.I. cards and booking photographs were often presented as facts. Defendant contends that the jurors could not be expected to understand the difference between expert hearsay evidence and evidence offered for the truth of the matter asserted, which resulted in a violation of his right to confront witnesses.
We presume that the jury followed the instructions given to it. (People v. Cruz (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 69, 73-74.) In the instant case, the jury was instructed as follows: “Deputy Juarez testified that in reaching his conclusions as an expert witness, he considered statements made by [t]hird [p]arties. You may consider those statements only to evaluate the expert’s opinion. Do not consider those statements as proof that the information contained in the statements is true.” (CALCRIM No. 360.)
Additionally, the jury was instructed, “You must decide whether information on which the expert relied was true and accurate. You may disregard any opinion that you find unbelievable, unreasonable, or unsupported by the evidence.” (CALCRIM No. 332.) Since the jury was instructed on how to properly handle the expert testimony, we presume that the jury did so. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that defendant’s right to confront witnesses was violated.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: McKINSTER, Acting P. J., RICHLI J.