Opinion
H035783
08-24-2011
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JEFFERY ROBERT SIMI, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. CC964085)
1. INTRODUCTION
After his suppression motion was denied, defendant Jeffery Robert Simi agreed to plead no contest to a charge of possessing marijuana for sale. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359.) Pursuant to the negotiated disposition, imposition of sentence was suspended and defendant was placed on probation for three years with a variety of conditions, including spending 313 days in jail, the amount of time he had already spent with credit for time served.
A second charge of being under the influence of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11550, subd. (a)) was dismissed by the prosecutor at the outset of the preliminary hearing due to the insufficiency of the evidence.
On appeal defendant seeks further review of his suppression motion (Pen. Code, § 1538.5, subd. (m)), arguing: the arresting officer lacked the training to identify symptoms of drug use; his observations did not establish probable cause to arrest for being under the influence of a controlled substance; due to the lack of probable cause, the officer was not justified in searching the vehicle incident to defendant's arrest; and the search was an improper impound search. We will affirm the judgment for the reasons stated below.
2. THE EVIDENCE AT THE SUPPRESSION HEARING
A. The Standard of Review
At a suppression hearing the trial court's role is to find the facts by assessing credibility, resolving factual conflicts, and drawing reasonable inferences. In reviewing a suppression ruling on appeal, we defer to all factual findings, both express and implied by the ruling, that are supported by substantial evidence. (Cf. In re Arturo D. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 60, 77; People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 721; People v. Troyer (2011) 51 Cal.4th 599, 613; People v. Long (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 77, 82.)
B. The Officer's Training and Experience
Adam Stockelend began his police training in 2000 at a police academy for the United States Army. At that academy, he had about 40 hours of training in the detection and investigation of persons under the influence of narcotics. About eight hours was dedicated to the use of methamphetamine. He could not describe the course work exactly. In five years as a military police officer, he was involved in over 20 investigations into whether someone was under the influence of a controlled substance.
Stockelend received more instruction in early 2007 at another police academy when he became a San Jose police officer. He received another 40 hours of training in identifying persons under the influence of controlled substances. About eight hours of that class work was also devoted to the use of methamphetamine. He could not specifically describe the course work.
After the academy, he had four months of field training. During the field training there was almost a daily investigation into whether a person was under the influence of a controlled substance. After that, Stockelend had served on patrol for about three years working three or four days a week. He continued to have almost daily investigations into whether individuals were under the influence of controlled substances. He was involved as the arresting officer over 100 times and without a training officer over 50 times.
Over the course of this training and experience, Officer Stockelend has learned that symptoms of methamphetamine use include red and watery eyes, normal to slow reaction of the eye's pupils to light, fluttering of closed eyes, confusion or disorientation, a high pulse rate, and a pasty white tongue. While methamphetamine is a stimulant, a user will be lethargic and relaxed after coming down from a high. Methamphetamine users often carry the drug concealed on their persons and in their vehicles.
C. The Officer's Investigation and Arrest of Defendant
On December 11, 2009, in response to a report, Officer Stockeland drove to a residential street in San Jose around 10:46 p.m. and observed a silver SUV parked in front of a driveway with its lights on and engine running. It was parked so as to impede street traffic. He put the floodlight of his patrol car on the vehicle. When he walked up to it, he saw defendant apparently sleeping in a reclined position in the driver's seat. Stockelend succeeded in his third attempt to rouse defendant by rapping on the window.
Defendant got out of the vehicle at the officer's request and walked to its rear. Stockelend did not recall anything unusual about defendant's gait. Defendant seemed to understand his questions, and replied that he did not know where he was, but he had been heading south on the 101 freeway, which the officer knew to be five to 10 miles away. The officer conducted a pat-search after defendant consented and found nothing in defendant's clothes. Defendant declined the officer's request to do a quick check of the vehicle.
As the officer spoke with defendant, he observed that defendant "had just woken up, so he was a little out of it." His eyes were red and watery. His tongue was white and pasty. The officer began to suspect that defendant was under the influence of methamphetamine.
Defendant agreed to participate in some field sobriety tests. Stockelend noticed that defendant's eyes fluttered when his eyelids were closed. His pulse rate of 120 beats per minute was higher than the average of 60 to 100. In response to a flashlight beam, defendant's pupils constricted slowly. Defendant acknowledged that he had used methamphetamine three days earlier.
Although Stockelend recognized that red and watery eyes might result from sleeping and that a police officer's presence could elevate another person's pulse, the combination of the symptoms, defendant's admission, and where the SUV was parked all led the officer to arrest defendant for being under the influence of a stimulant.
The evidence was in conflict about the time of the arrest. On direct examination, Officer Stockelend first said he could not recall when he placed defendant under arrest. Referring to his booking sheet prompted him to recall that defendant was arrested at 12:05 a.m. On cross-examination, the officer could not recall how long it took before he initiated the field sobriety tests. On redirect examination, he testified that he arrested defendant after about 10 to 20 minutes of conversation and five minutes of field sobriety tests, or about 25 minutes after seeing him at 10:46 p.m.
D. The Search
After arresting defendant, the officer determined that he was not the registered owner of the SUV. The owner lived in "Orange Grove," California, and defendant lived in Santa Rosa. The officer decided to impound the vehicle after noting that the registered owner was not in town, that leaving it where it was parked would block both a driveway and street traffic, and that there was no more parking available on the full residential street that night.
As there is no California town named Orange Grove, we will assume the residence was in Orange Cove.
The policy of the San Jose Police Department calls for impounding a vehicle that is believed to be the instrument of a crime. The policy is also to bring in a vehicle if the owner cannot be located and the vehicle cannot be safely parked. The policy also allows the officer to ask the driver to have someone pick up the vehicle.
Officer Stockelund admitted that he did not ask defendant to identify someone to retrieve the vehicle, nor did he attempt to contact the registered owner. He wanted to impound the vehicle to search it for narcotics. He also was searching for methamphetamine incident to defendant's arrest.
In the rear of the vehicle behind the passenger compartment the officer found a locked black box. He removed the box from the vehicle and, without unlocking it, was able to illuminate the contents with his flashlight. Underneath a cloth-like material that he peeled away, he saw the tops of 12 airtight baggies containing 12 pounds of marijuana. In the officer's experience, this quantity as it was packaged was being transported for sale. It was a much greater quantity than carried for personal use.
3. THE TRIAL COURT RULING
The trial court ruled that the officer's observations of the symptoms of methamphetamine use provided probable cause to arrest defendant. The detention was not prolonged. "Once the officer had the probable cause for the arrest and does make the arrest, the officer can do his search pursuant to the inventory search or he can do a search of the vehicle incident to [an] arrest for a stimulant, and if the arrest is for alcohol or a stimulant, the officer can search any part of the vehicle and any areas that may contain evidence of that contraband." There was no violation of the impound policy because there was a lack of street parking and the registered owner was out of town.
4. THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST DEFENDANT.
On appeal, defendant renews his contention that Officer Stockelend arrested him without having probable cause to believe he was under the influence of a controlled substance. He argues that, just like People v. Dunkel (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 928 (Dunkel), "we have neither sufficient manifestations of drug use nor an experienced officer capable of recognizing the manifestations." (Id. at p. 932.)
It is unlawful to "use, or be under the influence of, any controlled substance" listed in other statutes. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11550, subd. (a).) "One may be guilty of being under the influence of drugs in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11550 by being in that state in any detectable manner: ' "The symptoms of being under the influence within the meaning of that statute are not confined to those commensurate with misbehavior, nor to those which demonstrate impairment of physical or mental ability." ' " (People v. Canty (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1266, 1278.)
It is also unlawful to be in a public place so far under the influence of any drug or controlled substance as to either be unable to care for anyone's safety or to be impeding the passage of others on a public way. (Pen. Code, § 647, subd. (f).) It takes more to establish a violation of Penal Code section 647, subdivision (f) than Health and Safety Code section 11550, subdivision (a). (People v. Rich (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 115, 122.)
It is also unlawful for a person who is under the under the influence of any drug or alcoholic beverage to drive a vehicle. (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a).) Similarly, it takes more, namely evidence of impairment of the ability to operate a vehicle, to establish a violation of Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (a) than Health and Safety Code section 11550, subdivision (a). (People v. Canty, supra, 32 Cal.4th 1266, 1278.)
People v. Thompson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 811 stated at page 818. " 'Probable cause exists when the facts known to the arresting officer would persuade someone of "reasonable caution" that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. [Citation.] "[P]robable cause is a fluid concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts . . . ." (Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213, 232.) It is incapable of precise definition. (Maryland v. Pringle (2003) 540 U.S. 366, 371.) " 'The substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt,' " and that belief must be "particularized with respect to the person to be . . . seized." (Ibid.)'"
Whether the facts found by the trial court justify a warrantless arrest is ultimately a question of constitutional law to be independently answered on appeal. (Cf. People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 409.) The answer depends on an objective assessment of the facts described by the officer, not the officer's subjective appreciation of those facts. (Devenpeck v. Alford(2004) 543 U.S. 146, 153; People v. Adams (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 855, 863.) But courts do not discount the training and experience of law enforcement officers in crime detection. "Law enforcement officers may 'draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that "might well elude an untrained person." [Citations.]' (United States v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 273.)" (People v. Hernandez (2008) 45 Cal.4th 295, 299; cf. People v. Medina (1972) 7 Cal.3d 30, 37.)
A. The Officer was Adequately Trained in Recognizing Drug Use Symptoms.
Defendant asserts that Officer Stockelend's claim of 16 hours of course work focused on detecting methamphetamine use must be discounted, as "the officer could not remember what this training involved." "Given that the officer was incapable of describing what he learned in the seminars, we have no way of knowing that he actually understood the training."
Witnesses must have personal knowledge for their testimony about a subject to be admissible unless they are experts. (Evid. Code, § 702, subd. (a).) A witness qualifies as an expert on a subject by having "special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education." (§ 720, subd. (a).) " ' 'The competency of an expert is relative to the topic and fields of knowledge about which the person is asked to make a statement. In considering whether a person qualifies as an expert, the field of expertise must be carefully distinguished and limited." ' " (People v. Williams (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1112, 1136.) An expert's opinion should be limited "to a subject that is sufficiently beyond common experience" to be helpful to the trier of fact. (§ 801, subd. (a); cf. People v. Cole (1956) 47 Cal.2d 99, 103-104.) "Matters beyond common experience are not proper subjects of lay opinion testimony." (People v. Williams (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1326, 1333.) In contrast, a non-expert lay opinion is "admissible if '[rationally based on the perception of the witness' [citations] . . . ." (People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 914 (Williams).)
Unspecified section references are to the Evidence Code.
Williams, supra, 44 Cal.3d 883, stated: "Although lay opinion with regard to alcohol-induced intoxication and sobriety has been held to be admissible if '[r]ationally based on the perception of the witness' [citations], the admissibility of opinion as to drug- induced intoxication appears never to have been considered by this court. Defendant offers no basis upon which to distinguish evidence of drug-induced intoxication, however, and the Court of Appeal has held that if sufficient foundation is laid, lay opinion testimony that a person is under the influence of narcotics is admissible. (People v. Moore (1945) 70 Cal.App.2d 158, 165; see also People v. Newberry (1962) 204 Cal.App.2d 4, 9 . . . .)" (Id. at p. 914.) Williams further explained, "Lay opinion testimony is admissible where no particular scientific knowledge is required, or as 'a matter of practical necessity when the matters . . . observed are too complex or too subtle to enable [the witness] accurately to convey them to court or jury in any other manner.' [Citations]. The manifestation of drug intoxication and withdrawal are no less subtle than those of alcohol intoxication, and, unfortunately may be sufficiently common today that lay persons are capable of recognizing them." (Id. at p. 915.)
This discussion in Williams was "well-considered dictum" (People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1308), as "no 'opinion' was offered by the witnesses." (Williams, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 915.) In our view, this dictum in Williams endorsed the precedent holding that a police officer may be qualified by his or her personal experience with drug users to testify that a person is under the influence of a drug. (People v. Moore (1945) 70 Cal.App.2d 158, 165; People v. Mack (1959) 169 Cal.App.2d 825, 830-831.) Such testimony has been allowed in cases charging driving under the influence of a drug. (People v. Gurrola (1963) 218 Cal.App.2d 349, 353; People v. Smith (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 711, 714-718.)
Under the above principles, nothing precludes police officers from qualifying to offer either lay or expert opinions on drug intoxication and influence. What is important is that the opinion is grounded on and limited to the officer's actual personal experience and training. " 'We are required to uphold the trial judge's ruling on the question of an expert's qualifications absent an abuse of discretion. [Citation.] Such abuse of discretion will be found only where " 'the evidence shows that a witness clearly lacks qualification as an expert . . . .' " [Citation.]' " (People v. Wallace (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1032, 1062-1063, quoting People v. Chavez (1985) 39 Cal.3d 823, 828.) Questions regarding the degree of an officer's knowledge go to the weight of the testimony, not its admissibility. (People v. Duncan (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 75, 79; People v. Mack, supra, 169 Cal.App.2d 825, 830-831.)
In Dunkel, the majority concluded that there was no probable cause to arrest in part because they had "no testimony from the arresting officer concerning his training, experience or expertise in determining manifestations of drug usage in general — only on expertise in packaging of amphetamines." (Dunkel, supra, 71 Cal.App.3d 928, 934.) But that case was an appeal by the People after the trial court had granted a motion to suppress.
Unlike Dunkel, Officer Stockelend described both 16 hours of class work and years of on-the-job training in recognizing the symptoms of methamphetamine use, including prior encounters with persons under the influence of controlled substances. His inability to recall the details of courses he took three and 10 years before the suppression hearing does not require a court to disregard his subsequent personal experiences with drug users. Although defendant's motion to suppress questioned the officer's education, the trial court obviously gave credit to the officer's expertise in recognizing a combination of red and watery eyes, normal to slow reaction of the eye's pupils to light, fluttering of closed eyes, confusion or disorientation, a high pulse rate, and a pasty white tongue as symptoms of defendant being under the influence of methamphetamine. We find no abuse of discretion in this implied finding.
B. The Manifestations of Drug Use Justified Defendant's Arrest.
Defendant asserts that "[t]o legally arrest a person for drug use, the officer must observe numerous signs of intoxication."
As different drugs have different effects, the courts have upheld different combinations of symptoms as justifying warrantless arrests for being under their influence. (People v. Rich, supra, 72 Cal.App.3d at p. 121 [the defendant appeared to be under the influence of an opiate when he swayed while standing, moved slowly and deliberately, spoke softly and slowly, his eye-lids were half-closed, and there was no odor of alcohol]; People v. Knutson (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 856, 861-863 (Knutson) [the defendant appeared to be under the influence of PCP when he swayed while walking stiff-legged, he claimed to have been drinking beer but did not smell of alcohol, his pupils were constricted and did not react to light, his speech was slurred, he appeared very nervous, and he failed one field sobriety test]; People v. Beal (1968) 268 Cal.App.2d 481, 483 [men appeared to be under the influence of marijuana when their pupils were dilated, their eyelids appeared heavy, their faces appeared relaxed and one denied that he had been drinking]; People v. Gregg (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 567, 569 ["Gregg's dazed demeanor, profuse sweating, constricted eye pupils and lack of pupillary reaction support the conclusion reached by the officers, who were experienced in dealing with narcotic users, that Gregg was under the influence of a narcotic."]; People v. Alcala (1959) 169 Cal.App.2d 468, 470-471 [the defendant appeared to be under the influence of a narcotic when his speech was loud, rapid, and slightly incoherent, his eyes were dilated, his attention wandered, and there was no odor of alcohol].)
The Attorney General cites six cases that discussed symptoms of being intoxicated or under the influence of drugs. Defendant accurately points out that in four of them (In re Brown (1998) 17 Cal.4th 873, 905; People v. Crowder (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1365, 1367; People v. Sanchez (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 42, 48; People v. Jones (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 398, 406) there was no question of probable cause to arrest, while another case (Johanson v. D. M. V. (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1209, 1217-1218) involved symptoms of alcohol intoxication. In Ramirez v. City of Buena Park (9th Cir. 2009) 560 F.3d 1012, the issue was whether the facts supported a reasonable suspicion that the subject was under the influence of illegal stimulants when he was breathing rapidly while sleeping in his car outside of a drugstore around 8:00 p.m. with his lights on. (Id. at p. 1021.)
Defendant contrasts the facts in Knutson with this case, asserting that Knutson was arrested in an area known for narcotics sales, he was unresponsive, and he exhibited symptoms specific to drug use. We do not read Knutson either as attempting to establish a minimum threshold for probable cause or as requiring symptoms explicable only by drug use.
Defendant relies on Dunkel, supra, 71 Cal.App.3d 928 to establish that his symptoms did not supply probable cause for his arrest. In that case, according to the majority, "[t]he only manifestations" were "the facts that defendant was walking in an unsteady manner and seemed to have problems in maintaining his balance and his eyes did not react to light, and he had no odor of alcohol on his breath. [¶] The officer testified that defendant's speech was rapid and thick. Many normal persons talk rapidly and with a thick speech or accent. There is no testimony by any expert in this case that, based upon his expertise, rapid speech and thick speech are manifestations of drug use." (Id. at p. 933.)
We reiterate that Dunkel involved a People's appeal from the grant of a suppression motion. A major problem for that court in understanding the objective manifestations was that there was "no testimony of the instant case that the police officer was experienced in what constitute manifestations of drug use." (Dunkel, supra, 71 Cal.App.3d at p. 933.) Thus, the trial and appellate courts were unable to filter these indicia through the officer's expertise. That is not our case, as we have explained above.
Defendant argues that he "never displayed any specific manifestations of drug use . . . because all of the symptoms are easily explained by the context of the observations. Appellant's grogginess after being woken up accounts for appellant's fluttering eyelids and his 'normal to slow' pupil dilation. Appellant's tongue looked white and pasty because he was dehydrated from sleeping. As the officer admitted, a person's pulse usually rises when being detained by the police . . . ." "The officer also conceded that appellant's eyes could look red and watery because appellant woke up moments earlier."
Defendant is asserting some facts that were not established at the hearing. There was no testimony that sleep is dehydrating or that common after-effects of recent waking are slow pupil dilation or fluttering eyelids.
Defendant's argument commits the logical fallacy of division, overlooking the cumulative impact by focusing on isolated parts of the whole. (Engel, With Good Reason (4th ed. 1990) pp. 103-105.) The probable cause standard "deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances." (Maryland v. Pringle, supra, 540 U.S. 366, 371.) Even if not every symptom described by the officer was consistent only with the use of methamphetamine, their combination tended to narrow the range of alternative explanations. Defendant offers no innocent explanation for his admitted recent use of methamphetamine or for how he came to be sleeping in a running vehicle parked in the middle of a residential street unknown to him blocking a driveway. Coupling those circumstances with the officer's trained observations of symptoms of methamphetamine use, we conclude that the officer had probable cause to arrest defendant for being under the influence of methamphetamine.
5. THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH THE VEHICLE FOR METHAMPHETAMINE.
Defendant contends that "the officer did not have probable cause to search the trunk of the car incident to the arrest," as he "had little reason to believe that there was evidence of the offense inside the vehicle." (Capitalization and emphasis omitted.) We must point out that the vehicle, an SUV, had no trunk. What the officer searched was the rear of the vehicle behind the passenger compartment.
In Arizona v. Gant (2009) 556 U.S. 332 [129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485] (Gant), the high court limited New York v. Belton (1981) 453 U.S. 454 (Belton)to be consistent with Chimel v. California (1969) 395 U.S. 752 (Chimel)by holding that the police may "search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search." (Gant, supra, 129 S.Ct. at p. 1714.) While recognizing that it did not follow from Chimel, the court also concluded "that circumstances unique to the vehicle context justify a search incident to a lawful arrest when it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle." (Gant, supra, 129 S.Ct. at p. 1714.) The court cited Belton and Thornton v. United States (2004) 541 U.S. 615 as examples of when "the offense of arrest will supply a basis for searching the passenger compartment of an arrestee's vehicle and any containers therein." (Gant, supra, 129 S.Ct. at p. 1719.)
Unlike People v. Osborne (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1065, we attach no significance to the "reasonable to believe" language used in Gant. As indicated above, probable cause is sometimes defined as a reasonable belief in guilt. To the extent a difference was intended by Gant, we conclude that the evidence here qualifies under the higher threshold.
Finally, whether or not incident to an arrest, Gant explained that, "If there is probable cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity, United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-821, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982), authorizes a search of any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found. Unlike the searches permitted by Justice SCALIA's opinion concurring in the judgment in Thornton, which we conclude today are reasonable for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, Ross allows searches for evidence relevant to offenses other than the offense of arrest, and the scope of the search authorized is broader." (Gant, supra, 129 S.Ct. at p. 1721.)
Officer Stockelend testified that methamphetamine users often carry the drug concealed on their persons or in their vehicles. This court has considered "it reasonable to suspect that a person under the influence of a drug may be in possession of it." (People v. Long, supra, 189 Cal.3d 77, 85.)
Probable cause to believe that the driver or occupant of a vehicle is under the influence of a controlled substance authorizes searching the interior of the vehicle for the controlled substance. (People v. Guy (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 593, 598; see People v. Superior Court (Fuller) (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 935, 943; People v. Superior Court (Kiefer)(1970) 3 Cal.3d 807, 813, fn. 2.) We conclude that the officer's search of the interior of the vehicle and the locked box found inside it were supported by probable cause to believe that evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be in the vehicle.
In view of this conclusion, we need not and do not consider whether the search might also have been justified as an inventory search. As People v. Torres (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 775 explained, "courts invalidate inventory searches when the police impound vehicles without serving a community caretaking function, suggesting the impoundings were pretexts for conducting investigatory searches without probable cause." (Id. at p. 788.) "Just as inventory searches are exceptions to the probable cause requirement, they are also exceptions to the usual rule that the police officers' '[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.'" (Id. at p. 787.)
Defendant asserts that "the officer admitted numerous times that his motivation for impounding the vehicle was to conduct an investigatory search." The Attorney General responds that "the decision to impound the vehicle and resulting inventory search were reasonable" and that "an officer's desire to search a vehicle does not invalidate an impound conducted to proper statutory or departmental authority."
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
LUCERO, J. WE CONCUR: RUSHING, P.J. DUFFY, J.
Judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.