Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. PA057189, Harvey Giss, Judge.
Vanessa Place, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Sarah J. Farhat and Catherine Okawa Kohm, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
KLEIN, P. J.
Defendant and appellant, Amy Danielle Sigala, appeals the judgment entered following her conviction, by jury trial, for sexual penetration by a foreign object and inflicting corporal injury on a child, with great bodily injury findings (Pen. Code, §§ 289, subd. (a)(1), 273d, subd. (a), 12022.7). Sigala was sentenced to state prison for a term of eight years.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
The judgment is affirmed.
BACKGROUND
Viewed in accordance with the usual rule of appellate review (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206), the evidence established the following.
1. Prosecution evidence.
In August 2006, Jennifer and Paul had an 11-month-old daughter, Hailey. Jennifer also had a five-year-old daughter, Caitlynn, from a previous marriage. Jennifer was a nursing student and Paul worked for an engineering company. Defendant Sigala had been the children’s babysitter for about four months. Sigala and her registered domestic partner, Amy Meinke, lived with their young son, Mason, at a nearby apartment complex.
All further calendar references are to the year 2006 unless otherwise specified.
On August 15, Paul dropped Hailey and Caitlynn off at Sigala’s apartment on his way to work. Later that morning, Jennifer got a telephone message from Sigala saying Hailey was bleeding and needed a doctor. Hailey had previously suffered from urinary tract and kidney infections, so Jennifer assumed this was a related problem.
Jennifer left her nursing class and drove to Sigala’s apartment at about noon. She found Hailey apparently content in a kiddie swing. While Jennifer was checking Hailey’s diaper, Sigala said, “[D]oesn’t she look larger than normal?” Hailey’s vaginal opening did look larger than usual and there was blood in her diaper.
Leaving Caitlynn with Sigala, Jennifer took Hailey to an urgent care center where she was examined by Dr. Stephen Devita. He observed a large laceration at the bottom of Hailey’s genitals. The site was cut inward and the hymen was torn. Devita characterized it as a penetrating injury consistent with forcible trauma, but not penal penetration. Devita was convinced Hailey’s bleeding had not been caused by an infection and he was concerned it might be a case of child abuse. A Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department deputy took Jennifer and Hailey to a Children’s Assault Treatment Services (CATS) center.
At the CATS center, Hailey was examined by Nurse Marilyn Stotts, a board certified sexual assault examiner. Stotts saw a one-centimeter long laceration at the bottom of Hailey’s vagina. She described the inside of Hailey’s vagina as “a big bloody mess.” Stotts referred Hailey to a hospital for treatment. The deputy sheriff took Jennifer and Hailey to a hospital emergency room, where Dr. Clay Cormier sutured a one centimeter deep laceration in Hailey’s vagina. Cormier felt the laceration had been caused by blunt trauma. Cormier did not see any injury to the hymen. At the hospital, Jennifer spoke to Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Detective Charles Ansberry.
Two days later, Ansberry spoke to Sigala and Meinke at their apartment. Sigala said that after Paul dropped the children off, she put Hailey in a playpen and went back to bed. When Sigala checked Hailey at 9:00 a.m., her diaper was very messy so she decided to give her a bath. Later, Hailey was screaming while eating breakfast, so Sigala checked her diaper again and saw blood. She called Hailey’s family and ultimately spoke to Jennifer. Sigala showed Ansberry around the apartment. Ansberry took photos of some toys in the bathtub, including a small plastic ladder.
On August 29, Sigala and Meinke came to the police station. Initially, Detective Scott Mitchell conducted a videotaped interview of Sigala alone. She signed a consent form stating she was there voluntarily and could leave at any time. Sigala said she had always gotten along with Jennifer, but that “[t]here’s always been bad feelings with [Paul].” Asked why, Sigala said, “He’s just, he doesn’t seem right in the head to me.” Sigala said she “always wanted to tell Jenny, you know? But I can’t tell her what’s going on but I’ve always wanted to ask her like is there something going on....” Mitchell asked what she was suspicious of:
“[Sigala]... I thought that foul play was going on with both the girls.
“[Mitchell] Oh with the dad?
“[Sigala] Yeah. And I’m not the only one that thinks that....
“[Mitchell] Okay so are you saying that... you think there is a possibility that it is the dad that’s....
“[Sigala] Oh I have the greatest of feelings that it’s him. [¶]... [¶] Like I have no doubt in my mind it’s him.”
Mitchell asked if there was anything Sigala might have done that could have caused Hailey’s bleeding. Sigala said “the only way it could have happened at my house would be the bathtub because there’s toys in there but I don’t... [¶]... [¶] [t]hink it happened there.” Then she acknowledged Hailey “could have... sat on something....”
Asked what she would say if Jennifer accused her of hurting Hailey, Sigala replied: “I’d say you’re cracked cause you’re looking in the wrong direction,” and that Jennifer “needs to look in her own home.” Sigala mentioned the fact Caitlynn had been molested. When Mitchell pointed out Caitlynn had apparently been molested by her grandfather, Sigala replied: “A grandfather or something. But I know from what Jennifer tells me that Paul was around there at the same time.”
Sigala told Mitchell she had once seen Caitlynn, in her stroller, rubbing her vagina and “saying ‘[D]addy come on, come on let’s go.’ ” Sigala said Paul “makes me sick” and that she had been suspicious of him since they first met. She described another incident when she went to pick up the children. Jennifer was out and Paul went to wake Caitlynn: “He’s in the room with his boxers on... it’s pitch dark... and [Caitlynn] walks out buck naked and I’m just like... what in the hell is going on.”
Detective Mitchell subsequently told Sigala he absolutely believed she had caused Hailey’s injury. After initially denying it, Sigala said she felt bad about what she had done and indicated that if the clock could be turned back she wouldn’t want to make the same mistake again. When Mitchell asked, “What do you feel bad about?”, Sigala replied, “For hurting Hailey.” Mitchell said, “Here’s the thing. You’ve got to be able to talk about what you did otherwise all the studies, all the statistics show you’re going to repeat it.” Sigala replied, “I didn’t do it on purpose.”
Sigala then explained Hailey “sat on a ladder” in the bathtub, but Sigala did not realize it had happened until later. Asked how she knew the ladder had gotten into Hailey’s vagina, Sigala said, “Cause I saw it when I pulled it out.” Informed the medical evidence showed an object had been inserted into Hailey’s vagina, Sigala said, “I didn’t do that part.” Asked, “How far do you think the ladder went into her vagina?”, the following colloquy occurred:
“A Not in it, on the outside.
“D Okay trust me on this though. It went deeper than the outside.
“A No.
“D Because you’re just going to have injuries on the outside of the vagina.
“A I didn’t do anything that went up her. I didn’t do anything on purpose. She sat on it.
“D No, no, that’s not true.
“A Then I want a lawyer.
“D Okay.
“A I want out.”
Sigala’s first interview ended at this point.
Detectives Mitchell and Ansberry then spoke to Meinke. They told her Sigala was afraid to admit what she’d done and they asked Meinke to encourage her to continue the interview. Meinke went to talk to Sigala in the parking lot. They returned 20 minutes later and Sigala asked to be interviewed in a room without recording devices. She was taken to a different interview room where she was recorded without her knowledge.
Mitchell sat down with Sigala and Meinke. He said that if Sigala inserted the ladder into Hailey it was a mistake, but it didn’t make her a bad person or a bad mother. Sigala admitted having inserted the ladder. When Mitchell asked why, Sigala explained she had been hoping it would lead to Paul’s arrest for having molested his daughters.
Detective Ansberry then replaced Detective Mitchell in the interview room. He asked Sigala to clarify her motivation. She replied, “It was... not to hurt [Hailey]. But, to find some way so that she can go to the doctor and that, they would... find something in both girls.” Sigala explained she was hoping she could get the authorities to investigate Paul and that he would be arrested or maybe confess “he had done something” to the girls. When Ansberry asked why she returned for the second interview, Sigala replied, “Because I felt bad and I wanted to tell you and I didn’t wanna waste your guys’ time anymore.”
The jury saw the videotapes of both interviews.
2. Defense evidence.
a. Davidson’s testimony.
Stephanie Davidson lived in the same apartment complex as Sigala and Meinke. On August 15, Sigala called Davidson because Hailey was bleeding. Davidson went to Sigala’s apartment and checked Hailey’s diaper. There was a dark purple clot in the diaper and another clot coming out of Hailey’s vagina. Meinke was not there when Davidson arrived and she did not return before Davidson left.
b. Meinke’s testimony.
Meinke and Sigala started dating in 2003 and moved in together the following year. Sigala gave birth to Mason in November 2004. By the time of trial, Meinke’s relationship with Sigala had ended.
On August 15, Paul dropped Caitlynn and Hailey off for Sigala to babysit. Hailey was fussy at first. Sigala gave her a bottle and put her into the playpen in Mason’s room. Sigala went back to sleep with Mason. When Hailey awoke, she had a dirty diaper. While Sigala changed her, Meinke ran a bath for Mason. Sigala put Hailey into the tub with Mason. There were a lot of toys in the tub, including a ladder. Hailey was happy and playful in the tub. Meinke watched the children for a while, and then Sigala took over so Meinke could call her office about a missing paycheck. When Meinke returned, Sigala left the bathroom. Hailey was still smiling and playing. Meinke did not notice any blood in the bathtub.
Sigala returned and they took the children out of the tub. Hailey got upset because she wasn’t ready to come out. In Mason’s room, Sigala dried and dressed Hailey while Meinke did the same for Mason. The towels were a light color and Meinke did not see any blood. They took the children into the kitchen for breakfast. Hailey was very fussy and upset, but this was not unusual for her. Meinke left the apartment to meet someone who was bringing her paycheck; she was only gone for about five minutes.
When Meinke returned, Hailey was still upset. Sigala said she had tried everything except changing Hailey’s diaper. Sigala removed Hailey’s diaper. There was a dark clot of blood in the diaper, but no urine or feces. Meinke had Sigala call Jennifer, who did not answer her cell phone. Sigala called Davidson and Meinke left to cash her paycheck. Ten minutes after Meinke returned, Jennifer arrived. Jennifer went away with Hailey, leaving Caitlynn with Sigala.
On August 29, Sigala and Meinke went to the police station. Sigala was interviewed first. Two hours later, Detectives Ansberry and Mitchell came out and spoke to Meinke. They said Sigala was very close to confessing, but had asked for a lawyer. They wanted Meinke to talk to her. Meinke felt she had to bring Sigala back into the station “[b]ecause I wanted her to... go in there and tell them that she didn’t do it, if she didn’t do it.” The detectives told Meinke that whether or not Sigala continued the interview, they would “have to report their suspicions to Department of Children and Family Services and that we would be under investigation.”
In the parking lot, Meinke asked Sigala if she had injured Hailey. Sigala denied it, but said “[t]hey’re making me think maybe I did when I sat her down in the bathtub. Maybe I accidentally hurt her.” Meinke replied, “[T]hen you get your ass back in there and you tell them you didn’t do it. This is going to... affect your son.” Meinke described Sigala as “[h]ysterical,” “[c]rying, and shaking.” She and Meinke went back into the station.
At the second interview, Meinke was shocked and confused when Sigala confessed. Meinke thought Sigala was going to tell them she hadn’t done anything on purpose. Meinke felt the detectives were spoon-feeding Sigala information and would not stop the interview until she confessed.
Asked if Sigala ever told Meinke she thought Paul had been molesting Caitlynn, Meinke testified: “She never used the word molesting. She thought that there was inappropriate boundaries.” “[T]here was a couple incidents... that happened, and she found them to be very wrong. [¶] Like, for instance, she went to go pick Caitlynn up one morning because the kids hadn’t been dropped off. And when she walked into their home, Hailey was in... her room in a crib. And Caitlynn five minutes later came out of the bedroom with Paul. And Caitlynn was completely naked and Paul was in his underwear.”
Once they left the police station after the interviews, Sigala immediately denied hurting Hailey and said she did not understand why she had said those things during the second interview. Meinke did not believe Sigala had purposely hurt Hailey.
c. Sigala’s testimony.
Sigala testified she began to be suspicious of Paul before August 15. In fact, her bad feelings about Paul began the first day she met him. Even though she had never seen him molest Hailey or Caitlynn, she had seen him act inappropriately.
On August 15, Paul dropped the children off and went to work. As they usually did, everyone went back to sleep. When Sigala checked on Hailey later, the room smelled and she had a messy diaper. Hailey still smelled after Sigala changed her, so she put her into the bathtub with Mason. Sigala stayed with the children while Meinke got ready for work, except for one minute while Meinke watched them. Hailey was happy in the bath. When Sigala and Meinke took the children out of the tub they were mad because they weren’t ready to come out. Sigala did not notice any blood in the bathtub or on Hailey when she dressed her.
Sigala prepared breakfast while Meinke went out to get her paycheck. Sigala denied having injured Hailey while Meinke was gone. When Meinke returned, Hailey was still crying. Sigala decided to check Hailey’s diaper. There was a blood clot in the diaper and another one coming out of Hailey’s vagina. Sigala was shocked and confused because she had no idea what could have caused this bleeding.
Sigala left messages for Jennifer and Paul. She also called Stephanie Davidson, who came over and stayed for 30 minutes. During this time, Hailey was fine. About an hour after Sigala first saw the blood in Hailey’s diaper, Jennifer arrived at the apartment. Jennifer opened Hailey’s diaper and gasped when she saw a blood clot. Sigala denied having said Hailey’s vagina looked big for a baby. Jennifer took Hailey to the hospital.
Sigala testified she did not insert anything into Hailey’s vagina.
On August 29, Sigala was shocked and confused when Detective Mitchell said he had no doubt she had injured Hailey: “Q Why did you feel shocked? [¶] A Because I went in there trying to help him out with... the investigation, and knowing I didn’t do anything, I have an expert tell me that – [¶] Q What expert? [¶] A Or detective. He’s expert detective, telling me that he has zero doubt... that I did this. I was shocked.” Asked why she hadn’t just walked out “if you felt like he... was misrepresenting things to you?”, Sigala testified: “[I]t was like I have this... expert telling me I did this. And he goes there is zero doubt in my mind. I started doubting myself at that point. I don’t know why I didn’t leave. I... guess I still wanted to tell him I didn’t do it.”
In the face of Mitchell’s professed certainty, Sigala began doubting herself “and like trying to scramble things up in my head, figure out... if anything could have possibly happened at my house. [¶] And the only thing I could come up with was like I could have sat her on it [i.e., the toy ladder] in the bathtub and I felt bad that I did it.” “Q Now,... you didn’t have any reason in your mind to think that, in fact, you had sat her down on the ladder or anything else in the bathtub when you were giving her a bath. [¶] Why would you begin to think that way if... you know it couldn’t have happened? [¶] A Because he’s telling me that he has zero doubt in [his] mind that I did this. I’m just trying to figure out what possible way, if any way, it could have happened.”
Asked why she told Detective Mitchell she thought Paul was “fucking with those little girls,” Sigala testified: “I can’t really recall saying it that much. It’s kind of still fuzzy.” However, “All of our neighbors had... little stories or little stuff that all... matched up. And it... all just seemed like Paul was messing with those little girls.” Asked why she told Mitchell the ladder went into Hailey’s vagina if that had not actually happened, Sigala testified: “I can’t even recall. Besides reading it, I can’t even – I don’t know. I can’t even remember right.” “Even watching it and reading it, it’s like... reading it for like the first time in a way.”
When Sigala asked for an attorney, Detective Mitchell terminated the interview and told her to stay in a waiting room. Then she spoke to Meinke, who told her the detectives said they knew Sigala had done it and asked Meinke to bring Sigala back inside. Sigala smoked a cigarette in the parking lot and told Meinke she had not injured Hailey, but maybe when she was putting Hailey into the bath she accidentally put her down on the ladder. Meinke told Sigala to go back in and tell the detectives she had not done anything wrong.
Sigala testified her memory of everything that happened at the second interview was hazy: “I don’t even recall going in there. [¶] The Court: Do you have any memory whatsoever of tape number 2? [¶] The Witness: The only memory I have is of the video. [¶] The Court: By that you mean you saw yourself in it? [¶] The Witness: Yeah. But it’s still hard for me to believe.” Her statements about inserting the ladder into Hailey, in order to get the authorities to investigate Paul, were false. Asked to explain why she would say those things if they were untrue, Sigala testified: “Only thing I can think of... why I would even say that is I lost my mind. I don’t know what’s going on. I have no idea what he’s asking me. I have no idea what he’s saying to me. I don’t even know why [sic] I’m saying. I didn’t have control. I didn’t even know what’s going on.”
Sigala also testified, “Well, the second tape, I believe they did put words in my mouth. [¶] The Court: But you don’t remember what happened. [¶] The Witness: I don’t know. But I believe in my heart that’s what they did. Only way they can make me say things that I didn’t do.” The following colloquy then occurred:
“The Witness: I don’t remember.
“The Court: Then how do you know they were pressuring you?
“The Witness: They were pressuring me in the first interview.
“The Court: How do you know they were pressuring you in the second?
“The Witness: Because – well, they continued. They pressured me. In the interview, they continued to [pressure] me in the second interview. You saw it in the tape.
“The Court: And you are assuming that.
“The Witness: I’m not assuming it. I saw it in the tape.
“The Court: Okay. But you don’t remember anything, do you?
“The Witness: I don’t remember. But I can see it.
“The Court: [A]re you able to say now you felt pressure in the second tape even though you... don’t remember it?
“The Witness: No. I felt pressure in the first tape. Continuing on through the whole time I got home.
“.................................................................................................................
“.................................................................................................................
“The Court: All right. So you can’t honestly say you felt pressure.
“The Witness: I felt pressure before the second interview.
“The Court: Right.
“The Witness: So that at that point, I felt pressured.
“The Court: But not during the second interview.
“The Witness: I don’t remember anything in the second interview.”
d. Dr. Miller’s testimony.
Dr. Ronald Miller, a practicing gynecologist, reviewed the medical records of Hailey’s injury, her medical history going back six or seven months, and photographs of her genital area. In reviewing the photographs, Miller did not see the injury described by the doctors and nurses who had examined and treated Hailey, but that did not mean the injury was not present. He did see a straight laceration about one centimeter long. Based on Hailey’s medical history, there were other possible causes besides trauma, but he could not rule out trauma.
CONTENTIONS
1. The trial court erred when it excluded expert testimony about false confessions.
2. There was insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction for sexual penetration by a foreign object.
DISCUSSION
1. Trial court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded expert testimony about false confessions.
Sigala contends the trial court erred by refusing to let a defense expert testify about false confessions. This claim is meritless.
a. Background.
Before trial started, the defense indicated it wanted to call an expert to testify about the phenomenon of false confessions. The trial court said a prerequisite for such evidence would be Sigala’s testimony “there was some type of coercive atmosphere.” Asked for an offer of proof, defense counsel said the expert would explain how “undue influence and pressure and the like by authority figures can result in a person” confessing to something that did not happen: “I go into an interview with a police officer... and they say to me something I know is false and I maintain that it’s false; and the [officer] presses and presses and presses, and eventually that reaches a point in one’s own mind where there is such a conflict that you begin to doubt your own senses and eventually... go along and adopt that which the law enforcement officer... wants you to adopt.” The trial court said it would consider allowing the proffered evidence “if the defendant testified in such a manner that it played into some scenario that [the expert] might be testifying to.”
After Sigala testified she could not explain her answers at the second interview because she felt as if that interview had never taken place, the trial court excluded the expert testimony because Sigala never testified her confession had been coerced: “She did not state that anybody used pressure on her. She did not state she responded because pressure was used on her, that it’s involuntary in any way. She has just put it out of mind and said she can’t remember anything. [¶] There is no foundation whatsoever to establish that this is a false confession.”
Defense counsel later filed a written motion to admit the expert testimony and the trial court again refused: “I’m finding that the defendant deliberately became evasive in this case, that she very conveniently had a case of amnesia as it related to statements that there was no way... she could explain away.” “I think the defendant has intentionally attempted to deprive the prosecution of meaningful cross-examination in connection with her confession. And I think it would be unfair to the prosecution to let her slip out of her statements. [¶] She doesn’t even remember making the statements or uttering the very words which were the heart of the confession.” “She didn’t lay a foundation for the confession being coerced or the result of insinuation or suggestion, innuendo....”
b. Standard of review.
A trial court has broad discretion in determining whether to admit expert testimony and its ruling will be reversed on appeal only where the record reveals an abuse of discretion. (People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1299 [“the decision of a trial court to admit expert testimony ‘will not be disturbed on appeal unless a manifest abuse of discretion is shown’ ”]; People v. Ramos (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1205 [trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit expert testimony regarding police interrogation techniques and false confessions].)
c. Discussion.
Sigala correctly points out there are two different issues that can arise in connection with confessions: voluntariness and reliability. The former is a legal question for the trial court and the latter is a factual question for the jury. Citing Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 683 [90 L.Ed.2d 636], Sigala contends the trial court erred by refusing to allow the proffered expert testimony about false confessions as it related to the issue of reliability. We disagree.
In Crane, after the trial court refused to suppress an allegedly involuntary confession, the defendant tried to introduce the same evidence in order to persuade the jury his confession was unreliable. The trial court concluded the evidence was inadmissible because it pertained solely to voluntariness. Crane ruled: “The holding below rests on the apparent assumption that evidence bearing on the voluntariness of a confession and evidence bearing on its credibility fall in conceptually distinct and mutually exclusive categories. Once a confession has been found voluntary, the Supreme Court of Kentucky believed, the evidence that supported that finding may not be presented to the jury for any other purpose. This analysis finds no support in our cases, is premised on a misconception about the role of confessions in a criminal trial, and, under the circumstances of this case, contributed to an evidentiary ruling that deprived petitioner of his fundamental constitutional right to a fair opportunity to present a defense.” (Crane v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 687.)
Crane reasoned “evidence about the manner in which a confession was secured will often be germane to its probative weight, a matter that is exclusively for the jury to assess.” (Crane v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 688.) “[T]he circumstances surrounding the taking of a confession can be highly relevant to two separate inquiries, one legal and one factual. The manner in which a statement was extracted is, of course, relevant to the purely legal question of its voluntariness, a question most, but not all, States assign to the trial judge alone to resolve. [Citation.] But the physical and psychological environment that yielded the confession can also be of substantial relevance to the ultimate factual issue of the defendant’s guilt or innocence. Confessions, even those that have been found to be voluntary, are not conclusive of guilt. And, as with any other part of the prosecutor’s case, a confession may be shown to be ‘insufficiently corroborated or otherwise... unworthy of belief.’ [Citation.] Indeed, stripped of the power to describe to the jury the circumstances that prompted his confession, the defendant is effectively disabled from answering the one question every rational juror needs answered: If the defendant is innocent, why did he previously admit his guilt? Accordingly,... a defendant’s case may stand or fall on his ability to convince the jury that the manner in which the confession was obtained casts doubt on its credibility.” (Id. at pp. 688-689.)
Sigala’s reliance on Crane, however, is misplaced. First, there was no attempt to introduce expert testimony in Crane. All the defendant sought to do was put on evidence that “included testimony from two police officers about the size and other physical characteristics of the interrogation room, the length of the interview, and various other details about the taking of the confession.” (Crane v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 686.) Sigala was allowed to put all such evidence before the jury in her case. Second, the defendant in Crane would have been able to provide the necessary foundation for a false confession defense because, at the hearing on his motion to suppress the confession, he testified “he had been detained in a windowless room for a protracted period of time, that he had been surrounded by as many as six police officers during the interrogation, that he had repeatedly requested and been denied permission to telephone his mother, and that he had been badgered into making a false confession.” (Id. at p. 685.) Sigala did not provide a similar foundation.
Sigala also cites cases from foreign jurisdictions in which expert testimony about false confessions was admitted. But those cases are inapposite because there was evidence each defendant was suffering from some type of disability, either permanent or temporary, that could have enabled or facilitated a false confession. (See United States v. Hall (7th Cir. 1996) 93 F.3d 1337, 1341 [defendant claimed “a personality disorder that makes him susceptible to suggestion and pathologically eager to please” caused him to confess “to a crime that he did not really commit, in order to gain approval from the law enforcement officers who were interrogating him”]; U.S. v. Shay (1st Cir. 1995) 57 F.3d 126, 129-130 [psychiatrist would testify defendant “suffered from a recognized mental disorder known as ‘pseudologia fantastica,’ ”which caused him “to spin out webs of lies which are ordinarily self-aggrandizing and serve to place him in the center of attention”]; Scott v. State (Tex.App. 2005) 165 S.W.3d 27, 44 [defendant had been using pain medication during intense and exhausting interrogation]; Boyer v. State (Fla.App. 2002) 825 So.2d 418, 419 [defendant claimed he confessed “when he was mentally and physically debilitated from an extended bout of drinking”]; Miller v. State (Ind. 2002) 770 N.E.2d 763, 774 [mentally retarded defendant had IQ of 67].)
Sigala did not testify, nor does she now argue, that she had any special disability which might have made her unusually susceptible to routine police questioning. Instead, the trial court here properly analyzed the issue by relying on two more relevant cases: People v. Son (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 224, and People v. Ramos, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th 1194.
In Ramos, an evidentiary hearing was held on defendant’s motion to suppress his confession. Ramos testified a detective “promised he would serve no more than one year in the county jail if he made a written statement, threatened he would serve life in prison if he did not make a statement and ignored Ramos’s repeated requests to speak with an attorney.” (People v. Ramos, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 1201.)
After finding the confession voluntary, the trial court refused to let the defense call an expert to testify about false confessions on the ground a proper foundation had not been laid. On appeal, we held the trial court had not abused its discretion: “We agree with the principles underlying Crane but find the trial court made no similar blanket exclusion in this case. Rather, the record reveals defense counsel cross-examined [the detective] extensively regarding his interrogation techniques used in the interview of Ramos as well as the interrogation techniques used in his questioning of other witnesses. Defense counsel also called witnesses who testified [the detective] threatened them and attempted to coerce statements from them and from Ramos. The jury also was aware of the circumstances of the interrogation based on the videotape of Ramos’s statement. Thus, this is not a case like Crane where the defense was not permitted to attack the reliability of the defendant’s statement.” (People v. Ramos, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 1206.)
Here, too, there was much evidence presented at trial regarding the circumstances of Sigala’s questioning. Detective Ansberry, Meinke and Sigala all testified about the interviews. Both of the interviews had been videotaped and the tapes were shown to the jury.
In People v. Son, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th 224, the People put into evidence Son’s taped interviews with police and the transcripts of those interviews. The defendant asserted an alibi defense and “testified his inculpatory statements to Detective Gallivan were false and made only because Gallivan assertedly promised that Son would be incarcerated for no more than one year. [¶] After Son testified, the defense sought to present the expert testimony of sociologist Richard of she on the subject of false confessions. Son asserted Of she could testify about police tactics in wearing down suspects into making false admissions. The court declined to admit Of she’s testimony.” (Id. at p. 240.)
Son affirmed: “[T]here was no evidence that police engaged in tactics wearing down Son into making false admissions. Hence, the proffered expert testimony on police tactics was irrelevant. Further, given Son’s testimonial admission that his confession to Gallivan was false and made only because Gallivan assertedly promised that Son would serve no more than one year in custody – a matter easily understood by a layperson without expertise [citation] – expert evidence bearing on other potential reasons for false confessions was unnecessary. Accordingly, on this record the trial court acted within its discretion in declining to admit Of she’s testimony. [Citations.]” (People v. Son, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 241.)
Here, too, there was no evidence the detectives engaged in tactics designed to wear Sigala down and elicit a false confession. Sigala testified she could not remember anything at all about the second interview, but that she knew her confession must have been coerced because: (1) the pressure she did remember from the first interview must have continued during the second interview, and (2) she could tell she had been pressured during the second interview when she watched the videotape. But we have watched the videotapes from both interviews and they clearly demonstrate Sigala’s questioning was temperate, non-aggressive, and even gentle throughout. In fact, Sigala gave Detective Ansberry a hug at the end of the second interview.
Thus, there was no evidentiary foundation warranting admission of expert testimony about false confessions. The jury, which also saw the videotapes, was able to judge for itself whether Sigala might have confessed to a crime she did not commit because the detectives were using coercive interrogation techniques.
The trial court did not err by excluding the expert testimony.
2. Sufficient evidence to sustain conviction for sexual penetration with a foreign object.
Sigala contends there was insufficient evidence to sustain her conviction for sexual penetration with a foreign object (§ 289) because there was no showing she had been motivated by a sexual intent. This claim is meritless.
Section 289, subdivision (a)(1), provides: “Any person who commits an act of sexual penetration when the act is accomplished against the victim’s will by means of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for three, six, or eight years.” Subdivision (k)(1) of section 289 provides: “As used in this section: [¶] ‘Sexual penetration’ is the act of causing the penetration, however slight, of the genital or anal opening of any person or causing another person to so penetrate the defendant’s or another person’s genital or anal opening for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse by any foreign object, substance, instrument, or device, or by any unknown object.” (Italics added.)
Sigala argues the italicized language means the statute proscribes sexual abuse because “it is not [just the] act of penetrating a particular set of body parts that is proscribed, but... doing so with sexual intent.” Sigala is wrong.
In People v. White (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 193, the defendant argued on appeal he could not be convicted of violating section 289 without proof his conduct had been sexually motivated. This claim was rejected:
“In response to appellant’s argument, respondent asserts: ‘While appellant’s interpretation of subdivision (a) [of section 289] is grammatically correct, the conclusion he reaches on the basis of this interpretation is flawed. Under subdivision (a) the penetration... must be for sexual arousal, sexual gratification or sexual abuse. The People’s theory in this case was that appellant’s purpose in assaulting Nicole was the latter. To “abuse” someone is to hurt them by treating them badly, or to cause pain or injury through mistreatment. When such mistreatment is directed to a victim’s sexual or “private” parts, the resulting conduct would certainly be considered sexual abuse.
“ ‘Appellant’s argument that a “sexually motivated intent” is required under subdivision (a) interprets the section too narrowly. The meaning appellant implies is covered by the two other purposes mentioned in the statute, sexual arousal and sexual gratification. Indeed, appellant may not have had either of these “sexually motivated intents” and he still would have violated the subdivision if his intent was to hurt Nicole sexually, i.e., in a sexual or “private” area of her body. The evidence of the forcefulness of the penetration, and its location, certainly provides ample support for the jury’s verdict.
“ ‘Respondent’s position is, essentially, that abuse or mistreatment in the manner described in subdivision (a) is, by definition, sexual abuse simply because of the body parts effected [sic], where the intent is in fact to “abuse,” i.e., to hurt, cause pain to or injure. Surely there are many examples of sexual penetration of others, even of small children, which would not violate the statute because they are not done to arouse, gratify or abuse. These would include insertion of a thermometer or a suppository or other medicine. Since these penetrations are not for any proscribed purpose they are not in violation of subdivision (a). But when a penetration is accomplished for the purpose of causing pain, injury or discomfort, it becomes sexual abuse, even though the perpetrator may not necessarily achieve any sexual arousal or gratification whatsoever.’ (Fn. omitted.)
“We are persuaded that respondent’s view of the law is correct and that it is the only interpretation of ‘sexual abuse’ that is reasonable. Appellant has been unable both in briefs and at oral argument to suggest what kind of sexual passion, lust or lascivious intent could conceivably be involved in sexual abuse other than that encompassed in the terms ‘sexual arousal’ and ‘sexual gratification.’ By using the disjunctive or to separate ‘sexual abuse’ from ‘sexual arousal’ or ‘sexual gratification,’ the Legislature clearly did not intend a redundancy. The term ‘abuse’ imports an intent to injure or hurt badly, not lewdness. As contended by respondent, it is the nature of the act that renders the abuse ‘sexual’ and not the motivations of the perpetrator.” (People v. White,supra, 179 Cal.App.3d at pp. 205-206.)
A similar result was reached in In re Shannon T. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 618, where the minor had been accused of committing sexual battery by violating section 243.4, subdivision (e)(1), which prohibits touching “an intimate part of another person, if the touching is against the will of the person touched, and is for the specific purpose of sexual arousal, sexual gratification, or sexual abuse....” Citing various dictionary definitions of “abuse,” the Court of Appeal concluded “ ‘sexual abuse’ includes the touching of a woman’s breast, without consent, for the purpose of insulting, humiliating, or intimidating the woman, even if the touching does not result in actual physical injury.” (In re Shannon T., supra, at p. 622, fn. omitted.)
We believe White was correctly decided. (See also CALCRIM No. 1045 [regarding elements of section 289: “Penetration for sexual abuse means penetration for the purpose of causing pain, injury, or discomfort.”].) The evidence showed Sigala penetrated Hailey’s vagina with a toy ladder, intending to cause an injury that would trigger a sexual abuse investigation of Hailey’s father. That conduct is proscribed by section 289.
There was sufficient evidence to sustain Sigala’s conviction.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: KITCHING, J., ALDRICH, J.