Opinion
No. 2012QN046173.
2012-10-19
The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Terri SIDELL, Defendant.
Michael J. Connolly, Attorney at Law, for defendant. Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Queens County, (Rachel Drucker of counsel), for the People.
Michael J. Connolly, Attorney at Law, for defendant. Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Queens County, (Rachel Drucker of counsel), for the People.
GIA L. MORRIS, J.
In an accusatory instrument filed on August 25, 2012, the defendant, Terri Sidell, is charged with violating PL § 260.10(1), endangering the welfare of a child. The People now move, pursuant to CPLR 2221(d)(2), for leave to reargue the decision of this Court, which, in its exercise of judicial discretion, found a change of circumstances which warranted the release of defendant Terri Sidell.
In determining the instant motion, this Court has considered the People's moving papers dated September 28, 2012, the defendant's opposition papers dated October 3, 2012, transcripts from the relevant court dates, and papers on file with the Court.
Pursuant to CPLR 2221(d)(2), a motion for reargument may only be granted upon “a showing that the court overlooked or misapprehended the facts or law or for some reason mistakenly arrived at its decision.” People v. D'Alessandro, 13 NY3d 216, 219, 889 N.Y.S.2d 536, 537 (2009). Further, a motion for reargument must be submitted to the court that heard the original motion and a decision to hear reargument is in the sole discretion of the hearing court. Mazzei v. Licciardi, 47 AD3d 774, 774, 849 N.Y.S.2d 180, 180 (2d Dept 2008). Lastly, a decision to deny a motion for reargument is not appealable. Fishman v. County of Nassau, 84 A.D.2d 806, 444 N.Y.S.2d 146 (2d Dept 1981).
In the instant case, while the People move for reargument, their moving papers completely fail to articulate any law or fact that the Court has overlooked. Instead, the People simply argue that bail could not be reconsidered because their speedy trial time pursuant to CPL 30.30(b)(2) had not elapsed, and that the Court has no discretion in re-examining bail once it has been set by a court of concurrent jurisdiction. Such arguments are misplaced.
To begin, the Court did not release the defendant pursuant to CPL 30.30(b)(2), but rather made a determination, based upon the additional factors provided to the Court that were not readily available at the time of the defendant's arraignment, that a review of the defendant's bail status was warranted.
Upon such review, and applying the principles enunciated in CPL 510.30(2), the Court determined that the defendant's release on her own recognizance pending trial on this matter was now appropriate. See Transcript of September 20, 2012 court appearance. This determination is an appropriate use of the Court's judicial authority. See People of the State of New York ex rel Gilbert S. Rosenthal v. Wolfson, 48 N.Y.2d 230, 233, 397 N.E.2d 745, 746 (1979)(“Changes in relevant facts, of course, may require reconsideration of a bail determination. If there be pertinent evidence which was not submitted to the bail-fixing court in the first instance, principles of orderly process dictate that a renewal of the application for the setting or reduction of bail be made on return to the trial court.”).
It should be noted that this Court arraigned the defendant and has presided over two of the four calendar appearances in AP5.
Further, contrary to the People's contentions, courts have routinely recognized the important role of reviewing bail, even where it is a review from a judge of concurrent jurisdiction, during the pendency of a criminal action. Specifically, courts have held:
[w]hile judges of concurrent jurisdiction may not overrule each other, it is wholly within their judicial power and duty to make new orders in ambulatory interlocutory situations where new matter is presented to them in the regular course of their judicial duties requiring them to so act.... Judges of concurrent jurisdiction may increase or lower bail “when required pursuant to a showing new facts mandating such changes in the interests of justice.... A bail order is ambulatory. It is dynamic until the question of bail becomes moot.”
People v. Gruttola, 72 Misc.2d 295, 296, 339 N.Y.S.2d 178, 180 (Crim Ct N.Y. Co 1972)(citing People ex rel Manceri v. Doherty, 192 N.Y.S.2d 140, 142 (Sup Ct Kings Co 1959)); see also Wolfson, 48 N.Y.2d at 233, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 56;People v. Miranda, 24 Misc.3d 1223A, 899 N.Y.S.2d 62 (Bronx Co Crim ct 2009); People v. Mohammed, 171 Misc.2d 130, 137, 653 N.Y.S.2d 492, 498 (Sup Ct Kings Co 1996); People v. Torres, 112 Misc.2d 145, 446 N.Y.S.2d 969 (Crim Ct N.Y. Co 1981).
Lastly, contrary to the People's contention, see People's motion at 2, a change of circumstances warranting a review of a defendant's bail does not need to be found in the four corners of the complaint. Indeed, courts routinely increase bail upon motion of the People based upon circumstances not within the four corners of the complaint. See e.g. Gruttola, 72 Misc.2d 295, 339 N.Y.S.2d 178 (court revoked bail and issued a bench warrant when People made a showing that the defendant had allegedly threatened the complaining witness' life); Torres, 112 Misc.2d 145, 446 N.Y .S.2d 969 (same).
In the instant case, the Court made a determination that there was a significant change of circumstances after bail was initially set at arraignments which warranted a review of the defendant's bail status. And, applying the standards enunciated in CPL 510.30(2), the Court exercised proper judicial discretion and determined that it was now appropriate to release the defendant on her own recognizance pending trial on this matter. Wolfson, 48 N.Y.2d at 233, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 56;Gruttola, 72 Misc.2d at 296, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 180;Miranda, 24 Misc.3d 1223A, 899 N.Y.S.2d 62;Mohammed, 171 Misc.2d at 137, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 498;Torres, 112 Misc.2d 145, N.Y.S.2d 969.
Accordingly, the People's motion for reargument is denied in its entirety.
This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.
SO ORDERED.