Opinion
2012-10-10
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Usama SIDBERRY, appellant.
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Jonathan M. Kratter of counsel), for appellant. Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Diane R. Eisner, and Oded Zaluski of counsel), for respondent.
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Jonathan M. Kratter of counsel), for appellant. Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Diane R. Eisner, and Oded Zaluski of counsel), for respondent.
RANDALL T. ENG, P.J., REINALDO E. RIVERA, L. PRISCILLA HALL, and SANDRA L. SGROI, JJ.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Dwyer, J.), rendered August 17, 2010, convicting him of assault in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution ( see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish his guilt of assault in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt ( seePenal Law § 120.05[1] ). Moreover, upon our independent review pursuant to CPL 470.15(5), we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence ( see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902). The evidence was sufficient to establish that the defendant repeatedly punched the victim in the face and head, causing the victim's serious head injuries, and the defendant's intent to cause serious physical injury within the meaning of Penal Law § 10.00(10) may be inferred from his conduct and the surrounding circumstances ( see People v. Ramos, 19 N.Y.3d 133, 136, 946 N.Y.S.2d 83, 969 N.E.2d 199;People v. Bracey, 41 N.Y.2d 296, 301, 392 N.Y.S.2d 412, 360 N.E.2d 1094;People v. Moore, 89 A.D.3d 769, 931 N.Y.S.2d 886;People v. Spurgeon, 63 A.D.3d 863, 864, 880 N.Y.S.2d 707; see also People v. Seabrooks, 289 A.D.2d 515, 735 N.Y.S.2d 590).
The defendant's contention, in effect, that the verdict was repugnant because he was acquitted of manslaughter in the first degree in connection with the death of the victim, who died more than two months after the assault, is unpreserved for appellate review ( see People v. Satloff, 56 N.Y.2d 745, 746, 452 N.Y.S.2d 12, 437 N.E.2d 271;People v. Shamsiddeen, 98 A.D.3d 694, 949 N.Y.S.2d 783;People v. Tharpe, 92 A.D.3d 701, 702, 937 N.Y.S.2d 888;People v. Hicks, 88 A.D.3d 817, 818, 930 N.Y.S.2d 658), and, in any event, without merit.