In a number of cases, Illinois courts have held that confessions following polygraph examinations were properly suppressed. For example, in People v. Sickley (1983), 114 Ill. App.3d 167, 448 N.E.2d 612, a high school guidance counselor was faced with losing his job after 18 years with a school system for allegedly taking indecent liberties with a student. Prior to his indictment on these charges, the school district arranged for him to take a polygraph test.
Sickley later submitted to a lie detector test, and at the conclusion of the test, he was repeatedly urged to explain what happened to the boards in order to get his job back. He finally wrote out a letter of apology dictated to him by the polygraph examiner. That letter was the subject of an order of suppression in the criminal cause brought against Sickley, and the suppression, on the grounds that it was involuntary, was affirmed on appeal by this court in People v. Sickley (1983), 114 Ill. App.3d 167, 448 N.E.2d 612. The hearing officer found that the letter of apology was not credible under the circumstances. At the hearing, Audrey testified that Sickley put his hands under her shirt and touched her chest and that he put his hand on her hip inside and outside her pants.
While we hasten to express our distaste for the deceptive practices employed in this case, we find that Masokas' conduct, in and of itself, was not so heavily laden with trickery as to render defendant's statement untrustworthy. ( Cf. People v. Sickley (1983), 114 Ill. App.3d 167; State v. Cayward (Fla.App. 1989), 552 So.2d 971.) We have yet, however, to consider Masokas' deceptive conduct in conjunction with the other factors in the totality of the circumstances.
Thus, while the State is technically correct that statements made after being informed of failing a polygraph examination are not automatically inadmissible ( Thomas, 137 Ill.2d 500, 561 N.E.2d 57), such a practice can be considered as a factor in the voluntariness of a confession. (See People v. Sickley (1983), 114 Ill. App.3d 167, 448 N.E.2d 612.) This practice, combined with the defendant's mental capacity and his suggestibility, can become a coercive tactic designed to make the defendant confess and can undermine the voluntariness of the confession.
Two of the other cases cited by defendant are distinguishable because they held only that the State has the burden of proving that statements were made voluntarily. People v. Sickley (1983), 114 Ill. App.3d 167, 172, 448 N.E.2d 612 (the State has the burden of showing that a statement was made without compulsion); People v. Genus (1979), 74 Ill. App.3d 1002, 1007, 393 N.E.2d 1162 (defendant has the burden of proving that a statement was not given incident to a lawful arrest while the State has the burden of proving the statement's voluntariness if defendant seeks to suppress it as involuntarily given). • 4 In contrast to Jones, at least one authority has stated that the United States Supreme Court has not determined who has the burden of proof in motions to suppress in situations other than consent to searches.
The State has the burden of showing that a statement was made without compulsion of any sort. This does not mean that only statements induced by physical coercion or promises of leniency or immunity are involuntary. Consideration is to be given to the details of the interrogation and the characteristics of the accused." ( People v. Sickley (1983), 114 Ill. App.3d 167, 171-72.) Only by producing all material witnesses to a confession, or satisfactorily explaining their absence, can the State discharge its burden of proving the confession voluntary.
We believe that the mere fact that the accused confessed to a particular crime following a polygraph examination does not by itself render the confession inadmissible in evidence. ( People v. Taylor (1974), 58 Ill.2d 69, 76-77, 317 N.E.2d 97; People v. Stevens (1957), 11 Ill.2d 21, 27, 141 N.E.2d 33; People v. Stickley (1983), 114 Ill. App.3d 167, 172, 448 N.E.2d 612; People v. McCue (1977), 48 Ill. App.3d 41, 45, 362 N.E.2d 760; cf. People v. Sims (1946), 395 Ill. 69, 71-72, 69 N.E.2d 336; People v. Eickhoff (1984), 129 Ill. App.3d 99, 100-106, 471 N.E.2d 1066.) Yet, the polygraph examination is a form of interrogation. ( People v. Franklin (1987), 115 Ill.2d 328.) We note that the Illinois Supreme Court stated in Baynes that "[n]o other form of evidence is as likely to be considered as completely determinative of guilt or innocence as a polygraph examination."