Defendant also argues that Dukes' motive to fabricate (to assist the civil case against the jail) predated his prior statements. ¶ 56 The defense objected at trial to the admission of the challenged statements and included the issue in defendant's posttrial motion. We review the trial court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. Short, 2014 IL App (1st) 121262, ¶ 102. "An abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court's ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court."
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Short, 2014 IL App (1st) 121262, ¶ 109. Whether an attorney labored under a per se conflict of interest is an issue that we review de novo.
To date, our supreme court has limited per se conflicts, requiring automatic reversal, to one of three situations: "(1) where defense counsel has a prior or contemporaneous association with the victim, the prosecution, or an entity assisting the prosecution; (2) where defense counsel contemporaneously represents a prosecution witness; and (3) where defense counsel was a former prosecutor who had been personally involved in the prosecution of defendant." Id.; People v. Short, 2014 IL App (1st) 121262, ¶ 111. We have previously rejected the argument that an attorney's allegation of his or her own ineffectiveness automatically creates a per se conflict.
¶ 35 To succeed on appeal, appellate counsel would have had to first establish that an error occurred, i.e., that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Nowell's prior consistent statements. See People v. Short, 2014 IL App (1st) 121262, ¶ 102 (we review the trial court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion). The threshold for finding an abuse of discretion is high and will not be overcome unless the trial court's ruling was arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or no reasonable person would have taken the view adopted by the trial court.
¶ 52 Defendant acknowledges defense counsel arguing his or her own ineffectiveness is not one of the per se conflicts identified by our supreme court but asserts, citing People v. Lawton, 212 Ill. 2d 285, 818 N.E.2d 326 (2004), and People v. Willis, 134 Ill. App. 3d 123, 479 N.E.2d 1184 (1985), we should find such a conflict exists under the circumstances presented. The State, citing People v. Perkins, 408 Ill. App. 3d 752, 762, 945 N.E.2d 1228, 1237 (2011), People v. Sullivan, 2014 IL App (3d) 120312, ¶¶ 46-47, 6 N.E.3d 888, and People v. Short, 2014 IL App (1st) 121262, ¶ 116, 20 N.E.3d 817, disagrees.¶ 53 We reject defendant's invitation to find a per se conflict exists, and thus automatic reversal is required, anytime defense counsel argues his or her own ineffectiveness.
A trial court's evidentiary rulings will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Short, 2014 IL App (1st) 121262, ¶ 102, 386 Ill.Dec. 441, 20 N.E.3d 817. ¶ 41 Ryheam's testimony that he told his father that Thompson and Nance were the shooters was not hearsay; it was admissible as a prior identification.
24, 2014). See also People v. Short, 2014 IL App (1st) 121262, ¶ 117 (rejecting an identical claim), appeal denied, No. 118725 (Mar. 25, 2015). Defendant asks that we not follow Perkins or Sullivan, and recommends that we follow "the rationale" of People v. Lawton, 212 Ill. 2d 285 (2004).
Generally, a witness's testimony cannot be corroborated by proof of prior statements consistent with his or her trial testimony. People v. Short, 2014 IL App (1st) 121262, ¶ 102. However, a prior consistent statement may be admitted to rebut a charge that the witness's testimony has recently been fabricated.
The case required the jury to decide whether it believed Harvey and Carter's trial testimony or their grand jury testimony. Evidence that Harvey had first told police that he was not at the shooting could tip the balance in favor of Harvey's trial testimony and, in turn, Carter's trial testimony. Cf. People v. Short, 2014 IL App (1st) 121262, ¶ 103 (finding the failure to allow evidence of the defendant's prior consistent statement was harmless where the evidence was substantial, and the defendant admitted he shot the victim). ¶ 60 The State observes that Harvey did manage to testify a single time at trial that he initially told the officers who came to his home that he was not present for the shooting, notwithstanding that defendant was not permitted to present additional evidence of Harvey's prior consistent statement. The State argues that as a result, any further evidence of Harvey's prior consistent statement would be cumulative and could not impact the jury's verdict.
A court need not expressly state that it is conducting a Krankel inquiry. People v. Short, 2014 Il App (1st) 121262, ¶ 121.