Accordingly, we conclude that double jeopardy principles are not implicated in this case. People v. Gray (1977), 69 Ill.2d 44, 370 N.E.2d 797, and People v. Shlensky (1983), 118 Ill. App.3d 243, 454 N.E.2d 1103, relied on by defendant, are inapposite because both cases involved multiple prosecutions for the same acts, rather than distinct transactions occurring on separate dates. • 7, 8 We also conclude that the instant prosecution was not barred by collateral estoppel.
In applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel, courts are obliged to look at the record with "realism and rationality" in order to determine which factual questions have been decided. People v. Ward, 72 Ill.2d 379, 384, 21 Ill.Dec. 178, 181, 381 N.E.2d 256, 259 (1978); People v. Shlensky, 118 Ill. App.3d 243, 246, 73 Ill.Dec. 854, 857, 454 N.E.2d 1103, 1106 (1st Dist. 1983). Collateral estoppel bars subsequent actions only as to the matter actually litigated and determined in the prior suit, and not as to other matters which might have been litigated and determined.
This harmonizing principle is not vitiated by the fact that a new legal argument may occur to a litigant after it is too late to appeal. Not only does case law reject the notion of making an exception for such tardiness, but logic dictates that, if parties were permitted to reopen the subject matter of a decided order each time a new legal theory came to mind, litigation would seemingly have no end. Or, in the words of a trial judge in an analogous context, as quoted in People v. Shlensky (1983), 118 Ill. App.3d 243, 246: "`A judgment is broader and deeper than the State's conception of a judgment.
Padgett, supra, at 306, quoting People v. Hipkins, 97 Ill. App.3d 174, 53 Ill. Dec. 16, 20, 423 N.E.2d 208, 212 (1981). Accord People v. Shlensky, 118 Ill. App.3d 243, 73 Ill. Dec. 854, 454 N.E.2d 1103 (1983); People v. Scaggs, 111 Ill. App.3d 633, 67 Ill. Dec. 438, 444 N.E.2d 674 (1982). Therefore, the Court of Appeals held that the State could seek the death penalty in the instant cause.
The fact that the police report was physically produced two years after defendant disclosed its contents does not make the information contained in it, or the allegations arising from it, "new" for the purposes of seeking reconsideration under the Taylor rule. In essence, the State's motion to reconsider simply argued a new legal theory from facts that were before the court in 2004, which, as the State acknowledged in its response to the motion to dismiss and at oral argument, is prohibited by the Taylor rule. Williams, 138 Ill. 2d at 388, 563 N.E.2d at 390, quoting People v. Shlensky, 118 Ill. App. 3d 243, 246, 454 N.E.2d 1103, 1105 (1983) (adopting the trial court's observation that when the State does not prevail in litigation, it "`cannot thereafter retrace its steps, prowl back into the litigation, pull out separate issues not referred to by a Judge in observations made at the time of rendering judgment and upon these selected issues build a new indictment'"). Accordingly, we find that the production of the police report in support of the accusation that J.B. made a prior false allegation of rape is not a new event sufficient to trigger the court's ability to reconsider the suppression order two years later.
(2) Was terminated by a final order or judgment, even if entered before trial, which required a determination inconsistent with any fact necessary to a conviction in the subsequent prosecution.' Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 3-4(b)(2). Criminal Code section 3-4(b)(2) embodies the common law doctrine of collateral estoppel, which is included in the double jeopardy prohibition of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution. ( People v. Shlensky (1983), 118 Ill. App.3d 243, 246-47, 454 N.E.2d 1103, 1105-06.) The doctrine provides that when a valid and final judgment determines an issue of ultimate fact, the same parties cannot again litigate the issue in any future lawsuit. [Citation.]
• 2 Criminal Code section 3-4(b)(2) embodies the common law doctrine of collateral estoppel, which is included in the double jeopardy prohibition of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution. ( People v. Shlensky (1983), 118 Ill. App.3d 243, 246-47, 454 N.E.2d 1103, 1105-06.) The doctrine provides that when a valid and final judgment determines an issue of ultimate fact, the same parties cannot again litigate the issue in any future lawsuit.
In determining whether the issues in the prior and subsequent cases are the same, a court should realistically and rationally consider the record "within a practical framework and viewed with an eye to all the circumstances of the proceedings." People v. Shlensky (1983), 118 Ill. App.3d 243, 246, 454 N.E.2d 1103, 1106. The pivotal issue in this case is whether there is an identity of issues between the instant case and Stone v. Lloyds. While it seems clear that plaintiff's duty to disclose the facts surrounding the purchase of the art objects is an important issue, is it the cornerstone of his complaint, such that all his allegations necessarily rest upon it?
" Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 3-4(b)(2). Section 3-4(b)(2) of the Criminal Code embodies the common law doctrine of collateral estoppel, which is included in the double jeopardy prohibition of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution. ( People v. Shlensky (1983), 118 Ill. App.3d 243, 246-47, 454 N.E.2d 1103, 1105-06.) The doctrine provides that when a valid and final judgment determines an issue of ultimate fact, the same parties cannot again relitigate the issue in any future lawsuit.