Opinion
F073555
08-02-2018
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. STEVEN PATRICK SHEPARD, Defendant and Appellant.
Denise M. Rudasill, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, R. Todd Marshall and Michael Dolida, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. F15905914)
OPINION
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Timothy A. Kams, Judge. Denise M. Rudasill, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, R. Todd Marshall and Michael Dolida, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Steven Patrick Shepard appeals from his conviction for receiving a stolen motor vehicle. He argues his conviction must be reversed because proof of the corpus delicti of the underlying offense was insufficient. We reject this contention. Shepard further argues the trial court abused its discretion in failing to reduce his conviction to a misdemeanor at sentencing. This argument is moot because the court subsequently—during the pendency of this appeal—reduced the conviction to a misdemeanor. The judgment is affirmed.
FACTS
Shepard operated an automobile body shop on Floradora Avenue in Fresno; his brother Jason had some involvement in running and working at the shop as well. The shop was in a building containing three suites, A, B, and C, with a parking lot in front. Jose Romero occupied and ran his own automobile body shop from suite A, at one end of the building. Romero also used one third of the parking lot, the section fronting suite A. Shepard operated his shop from suites B and C and, accordingly, used two thirds of the parking lot. Romero's part of the parking lot was distinct from Shepard's; the cars were parked so as to create a walkway between the two.
Jason was the registered owner of the automobile body shop.
Shepard and Jason testified that their shop largely served family, friends, and acquaintances. Shepard would allow people he knew to bring cars to the lot, so they would have a place to work on them. Two witnesses, Diego Valencia and Gregory Jones, testified they had known Shepard for years and he would allow them to store cars on the lot for purposes of working on them.
In August 2015, Bobby von Martin and his son were restoring a 1972 Chevy Chevelle. The Chevelle was stolen and Martin put notices on Facebook, Craigslist, and other media, as well as flyers around town, asking for leads to help him get it back. Shepard contacted Martin and told him he knew where the car was; he showed Martin pictures of the Chevelle and assured Martin he would eventually help him get the car back.
Martin contacted police, who obtained a search warrant for Shepard's automobile body shop to look for the stolen Chevelle. On September 4, 2015, California Highway Patrol (CHP) investigators and Fresno Police Department officers executed the search warrant at the shop. CHP Investigator Steven Swanson led the team.
Numerous cars were parked on the shared lot at the property; around 15 cars were parked in front of suites B and C, and more in front of suite A. The Chevelle was found on Romero's section of the parking lot and eventually returned to Martin. Notwithstanding Shepard's contact with Martin, there was no evidence that Shepard or Jason had any connection to the Chevelle.
Shepard testified that he contacted Martin in the first place because he had seen Martin's notices and spotted the Chevelle on Romero's lot, where it was in the process of being repainted. Shepard was trying to find a way for Martin to get it back. However, Shepard was worried about the "gang members" who had brought the Chevelle to Romero's shop, and did not want to endanger himself or his family by alerting Martin to its precise location at that point. Martin also testified that Shepard told him he could not yet tell him the Chevelle's location because he was worried about potential consequences for his family.
When CHP investigators and police executed the search warrant at Shepard's shop, they asked Shepard and Jason about some of the cars on their lot. In front of suite C, officers noticed two Chevy Aveos parked side by side; both cars were extremely dusty indicating they had been sitting there undisturbed for some time. One of the Aveos, a brownish-beige one, had a sticker on it indicating it was a salvaged car from a wrecking yard; its salvaged status was subsequently confirmed with reference to DMV records. The salvaged Aveo was missing its dashboard, had extensive body damage, and its engine was partially taken apart.
On further investigation, the officers determined that the dashboard of the salvaged Aveo was in the other Aveo, which was a 2007 silver-gray model. The dashboard still had the publicly-visible vehicle identification number (VIN) of the salvaged Aveo on it (the dashboard VIN plate had not been tampered with). VINs on other locations within both cars were intact. At the conclusion of the search of Shepard's shop, both he and Jason were arrested and taken to jail. CHP investigators determined that the 2007 silver-gray Aveo had been reported stolen by Troylynn Espinoza in January 2015. Swanson testified that, in his opinion, a "dash swap" had been effected on the 2007 silver-gray Aveo, for purposes of switching in a different "public" or visible dashboard VIN.
Swanson testified he asked Shepard, during the execution of the search warrant at the shop, how the 2007 silver-gray Aveo came to the lot. Shepard told him someone called Donte Greathouse had brought it in. A little later, after Swanson asked Shepard more questions about the Aveo, Shepard told him, in contrast, that a neighborhood resident called Ambrose had brought both Aveos to the lot.
At trial, Shepard, Jason, as well as Shepard's wife, testified that Greathouse, a family friend, was storing a different vehicle, a Mustang, on the lot. Shepard and Jason also testified that Ambrose, a friend and neighbor, stored a silver Saturn sedan on the lot.
Swanson testified he also talked to Jason. He asked Jason what type of work was being done on the 2007 silver-gray Aveo. Jason said he had the invoice for it and, at Swanson's request, gave the invoice to Swanson. The invoice (specifically, the "duplicate form" of the original invoice) had the name "High Tech Auto," the Floradora Avenue address of Shepard's automobile body shop, as well as a phone number written on it. The invoice was dated January 31, 2015, and referenced a work order for repair of the timing belt. The customer name listed on the invoice was Troylynn Espinoza (the original owner of the Aveo, who had reported it stolen); no contact phone number for the customer was listed. Swanson testified that Jason said the repair work listed on the invoice was in the process of being completed. However, the invoice had the words "two weeks" written on it, which Jason said (according to Swanson) reflected "the amount of time it would take to finish the labor, the work on the vehicle." Swanson further testified that, as for the salvaged Aveo, Jason initially told Swanson "[h]e bought it from an insurance auto auction or Copart"; later, Jason said the salvaged Aveo "belonged to a friend, but he wasn't sure which one."
Swanson testified that Shepard and Jason separately indicated that each had worked on the 2007 silver-gray Aveo's engine at some point. Swanson also testified that he received a phone call from Shepard about three weeks after the search warrant was executed at the shop. In the phone call, Shepard told Swanson that he knew something was wrong with the 2007 silver-gray Aveo and should have prohibited Ambrose from bringing it to the shop.
Swanson did not document this phone conversation in any report other than a supplemental report written and provided to the defense on the eve of his testimony on the issue.
Testimony of Troylynn Espinoza
Troylynn Espinoza testified for the People at trial. Espinoza testified that she owned a 2007 silver-gray Aveo in January 2015; she had owned the car for a couple of years at that point. Sometime that month, her Aveo was stolen. At the time the Aveo was in "[g]ood condition," both the engine and the interior, including the dashboard. The registration papers were in the glove box. Espinoza never took the car to any automobile body shop in Fresno and had never seen Shepard before. When shown the invoice for the Aveo that Swanson testified Jason had provided to him, Espinoza said she had never seen the invoice before, nor had she authorized the work noted on it. At one point, before the Aveo was stolen, Espinoza had its side mirror repaired. Espinoza testified: "I don't have a man to fix my car, so I looked on Craig's List, and I seen a gentleman who said he was reasonably priced. He came to my house and did the repair." The man who did the repair was called "Juan Sanchez"; Espinoza had no further contact with Sanchez. Espinoza had brought with her the receipt for the payment she made to Sanchez. The receipt showed the mirror repair was done on October 30, 2014.
Testimony of Diego Valencia
Diego Valencia, who was called as a witness by the defense, testified that he was a mechanic and had been one for 30 years. Valencia testified that he brought the 2007 silver-gray Aveo to Shepard's shop, to work on it for a client called "Juan Sanchez." He met Sanchez at a gas station at Chestnut and McKinley; Sanchez was with a woman. The Aveo was also at the gas station but was not in working order; its timing belt was broken. Valencia agreed to repair it for Sanchez. Since Valencia often worked as a mobile mechanic, he needed a place to work on the Aveo. He called Shepard, whom he had known for over 15 years; Shepard allowed Valencia to have the Aveo towed to his shop, where Valencia had often worked. When Valencia, Sanchez, and the Aveo arrived at the shop, Shepard was present but only briefly. Valencia asked Jason to prepare an invoice for the Aveo because Valencia "did not have a paper to fill it out"; he told Jason to "fill one out if he had any." Valencia testified he thought he brought the Aveo to Shepard's shop around May 2015. However, Valencia was not sure; his memory about many details regarding the Aveo was hazy.
Valencia worked on the Aveo's engine for two days. He did not work on the interior; he was a mechanic and had never worked on car interiors. Sanchez was supposed to collect the car after a short period but he never returned to claim it. Valencia never saw Juan Sanchez again. Valencia kept parts (worth around $1000) from the Aveo as payment for his work. Asked whether Juan Sanchez ever returned to the shop to work on the Aveo himself, Valencia responded: "No, not that I know of." Valencia did not know the Aveo was stolen, as it had a key and there was nothing suspicious about it.
Jason's Testimony
Jason testified the 2007 silver-gray Aveo was brought to the shop in "cold weather," about a year before the instant trial (which was in February 2016). Jason was at the shop when "[Valencia] and a guy got the [the 2007 silver-gray Aveo] on a tow truck so they can diagnose the engine." Jason assumed the guy was the Aveo's owner and the guy's girlfriend was with them. Jason did not know the girlfriend's name. Jason saw Valencia work on the car. Jason did not work on the car; nor did he ever see Shepard work on the car. They did not do that kind of work. The brown salvaged Aveo, which was "wrecked," was brought to the shop later. Jason testified that he did not speak to Investigator Swanson about the Aveos when the search warrant was executed at the shop, or at any point thereafter. He did not tell Swanson that he had worked on the Aveo; nor did he say the salvaged Aveo was a friend's car. However, Swanson had asked him to retrieve "whatever receipts" were kept in the shop, so Jason "gave him a stack of invoices," basically "whatever receipts were there." "[Swanson] took a big stack full of receipts."
Jason was shown a copy of the invoice relating to the silver-gray Aveo. He said he did not recognize the document and had not seen it before. The automotive body shop he and Steven operated was called High Tech Collision, while the invoice was from High Tech Auto. Jason said the discrepancy was significant because a receipt from their shop would never "say automotive because we don't do engine work or anything of that sort." Jason confirmed that Ambrose had a silver Saturn that was also parked in front of suite C, just like the 2007 silver-gray Aveo. Jason had not seen anyone work on the 2007 silver-gray Aveo since May or June 2015; he had never seen Shepard inside that car. Jason also testified that he had a history with one of the officers present at the shop during execution of the search warrant. He had filed a complaint against that officer for misconduct and "didn't want him at the shop."
Shepard's Testimony about the Aveos
Shepard testified that he never talked to Swanson about the Aveos. Shepard acknowledged that he had called Swanson after the search of his shop, but denied stating that he should not have let Ambrose bring the Aveo to the lot because he knew something was wrong with it. Rather, Shepard testified he called Swanson to ask for help in correcting the record after a local television news channel ran a story on the stolen Chevelle implicating Shepard and Jason. Swanson was unhelpful, instead accusing Shephard and Jason of "shooting firearms at [their] shop over the weekend."
Shepard testified Valencia had called him about a year ago (i.e., January 2015) about bringing the 2007 silver-gray Aveo to the shop. Later, Shepard testified he "couldn't tell you exactly" when the Aveo got to the shop; it could have been "April, May, June 2015, somewhere in there." Shepard then further clarified that he "honestly [did] not remember" when the Aveo came to the shop; it could very well have been January 31, 2015, as stated on the invoice Swanson apparently found at the shop. Shepard was not present when the Aveo arrived at the shop but Valencia told him it was towed there because it was "not running." Jason likely opened the gates to let them in.
Shepard said that at one point, Valencia introduced him to Juan Sanchez; it was Shepard's understanding that Juan Sanchez was the owner of the Aveo. The Aveo "didn't run" and had "motor issues." "[I]t had no signs of being stolen at all whatsoever." It had keys, the windows were up, everything was intact, and there was nothing suspicious about it. Shepard did not write the invoice for the car; he wrote invoices using all capital letters and this one was written in lower case letters (the defense showed several examples of invoices written by Shepard, all of which were written in all capital letters). In fact, Shepard had never seen this particular type of large invoice form before and did not have blank stock invoices that looked like it; he used smaller invoice forms at his shop. Furthermore, the invoice for the Aveo was captioned "High Tech Auto," whereas Shepard and his brother called their shop "High Tech Collision." Shepard testified: "I have never written an invoice that says High Tech Auto." The invoice had the address for Shepard's shop on it, as well as Jason's phone number. Next, the invoice listed Troylynn Espinoza's name and, under her name, an address that Shepard recognized. Shepard had that address when he ran a business, T & T Security, a long time ago at an apartment complex. Shepard did not know whether Jason filled out that invoice for Valencia or for Sanchez. Shepard was not there when the 2007 silver-gray Aveo was towed to his shop and had not discussed the issue with Jason.
Shepard testified that the salvaged Aveo arrived at the shop possibly "a couple of months after the original one got there." Shepard and the prosecutor had the following exchange:
"[THE PROSECUTOR]: So your testimony is that Juan brought both Aveos?
"[SHEPARD]: Juan had—Juan brought the original first Aveo there through [Valencia]. It had motor issues. [¶] ... [¶] What happened was [Valencia] was working on the vehicle. They had a problem. [Valencia] never got paid from Juan. [Valencia] wanted half the money for the work that he had done and he never got it. I don't know what their arrangements were. Um, after that, [Valencia] kept the parts from the motor. And the other guy, I guess, he needed another motor to go back in his vehicle, and it never happened. The motor that was in [the salvaged] Aveo was bad. It was hit in the front. The oil pan was damaged. It leaked oil. I have pictures of that all from the wrecking yard.
"[THE PROSECUTOR]: So you looked under the hood of the salvaged Aveo yourself?
"[SHEPARD]: Um, yes, I did at the wrecking yard, yes.
"[THE PROSECUTOR]: Okay. And your testimony is that the Juan person brought that salvaged Aveo to your business?
"[SHEPARD]: He was the purchaser of that vehicle."
Shepard said once the Aveos were at his shop, he would only occasionally walk by them as they were parked outside suite C, in an area where cars that were not running were stored. Shepard had no idea the dashboards in the Aveos had been switched, although he was aware of a dashboard sitting on the ground next to one of the Aveos. Shepard saw Valencia work on the 2007 silver-gray Aveo "[p]robably two, two to three time, as least." "[Sanchez] was with [Valencia] once or twice." Valencia stopped working on the 2007 silver-gray Aveo because Sanchez "never paid him half the money ... for doing half the tear-down on the vehicle." Sanchez himself came by "maybe five to six, no more than seven," times; he would come with his girlfriend. Sanchez once brought Shepard some beer to compensate him for storing the cars. Shepard talked to Sanchez about the original Aveo. Sanchez "assessed what [Valencia] had done to it and whatnot, and he wanted to figure out on how to get the motor back running and stuff." "[Sanchez] was calling [Valencia]. [Valencia] wouldn't answer the phone, so he got the other Aveo for the engine, but the engine in that Aveo was bad from the - it had major front end damage." Sanchez would stop by from time to time and "just tinker around," while Shepard would "come and go."
Later Shepard further explained: "[Sanchez] asked me—he said that he had a mechanic that would change the motor from the salvaged one to the stolen one, and that he wanted to know if he could change the motor there where he could get the vehicle back running. I told him yeah, I didn't mind, you know, at the time not knowing that the stolen vehicle was actually a stolen vehicle."
The court asked Shepard: "How is it that you went to the wrecking yard, and how is it that you came upon a salvaged Aveo there? [¶] ... [¶] As best you can remember. In other words, did [Sanchez] call you and say meet me at the salvage yard[?]" Shepard explained that after the cars were removed from his shop and he became aware that one of the Aveos was stolen, he "hunted [the] cars down" because he wanted to clear his name. He found the 2007 silver-gray Aveo at "the auction at Copart," and took several pictures of the car and all the VIN tags on it. He found the salvaged Aveo at the Jensen Pick and Pull "and took pictures of the numbers of that vehicle also."
Investigator Swanson's Rebuttal Testimony
The prosecution recalled Investigator Swanson as a witness. Swanson testified that neither Shepard nor Jason mentioned to him, when he executed the search warrant at their shop, that Diego Valencia had brought the 2007 silver-gray Aveo to the shop.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The charges against Shepard and Jason were operating a chop shop (Veh. Code, § 10801, count one); unlawful vehicle identification number activity (Veh. Code, § 10802, count 2); and receiving a stolen motor vehicle, i.e., the silver-gray Aveo (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a), count 3). Shepard was also charged with cultivating marijuana but this charge was dismissed before trial for a lack of evidence. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11358, count 4).
The trial in the matter was a bench trial. After the prosecution rested, Shepard and Jason sought dismissal of all charges pursuant to Penal Code section 1118. With regard to Shepard, the trial court dismissed the counts of operating a chop shop and unlawful VIN activity. As for Jason, the trial court dismissed all charges against him. Thereafter, the only charge at issue was the receiving a stolen motor vehicle count against Shepard. The court ultimately found Shepard guilty of this count and sentenced him to probation. While this appeal was pending, the trial court reduced Shepard's conviction on this count to a misdemeanor.
We take judicial notice of the Superior Court's case docket, which reflects that on February 23, 2018, Shepard's conviction was reduced to a misdemeanor under Penal Code section 17.
DISCUSSION
I. Sufficiency of Proof of the Corpus Delicti of Receiving a Stolen Motor Vehicle
Shepard challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence underlying his conviction for receiving a stolen motor vehicle, specifically the sufficiency of the proof of the corpus delicti of this offense. He argues the prosecution failed to establish the corpus delicti of the offense of receiving a stolen motor vehicle independent of his own out-of-court statements. We disagree. The requisite independent proof of the corpus delicti of the offense of receiving a stolen motor vehicle (the 2007 silver-gray Aveo) was sufficient. Accordingly, we affirm Shepard's conviction for receiving a stolen motor vehicle (in his case, now a "misdemeanor for all purposes," under Pen. Code, § 17, subd. (b)).
A. The Corpus Delicti Rule
"In every criminal trial, the prosecution must prove the corpus delicti, or the body of the crime itself—i.e., the fact of injury, loss, or harm, and the existence of a criminal agency as its cause." (People v. Alvarez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1161, 1168-1169 (Alvarez).) "In California, it has traditionally been held, the prosecution cannot satisfy [the] burden [of proving the corpus delicti] by relying exclusively upon the extrajudicial statements, confessions, or admissions of the defendant." (Ibid.)
In People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353 (Ochoa), our Supreme Court explained the law of corpus delicti in some detail. "The law of corpus delicti contains 'two distinct, though related, concepts .... First, the corpus delicti is a necessary element of the prosecution's case in a criminal trial .... Thus, a precondition to conviction is that the state prove that a "crime" has been committed—otherwise there could not possibly be guilt, either in the accused or in anyone else. [¶] The second concept is closely related to the first. The "corpus delicti rule" prohibits the prosecutor from establishing the corpus delicti ... through the use of the extrajudicial statements of the defendant. [Citations.] Thus the state must prove the corpus delicti independently of the accused's out-of-court declarations." (Id. at p. 404.)
Ochoa clarified that "'The purpose of the corpus delicti rule is to assure that "the accused is not admitting to a crime that never occurred."'" (Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 405; see Alvarez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1169 ["[The corpus delicti] rule is intended to ensure that one will not be falsely convicted, by his or her untested words alone, of a crime that never happened."].) Thus, when a defendant's statements are offered to prove the commission of a crime, "'"slight corroborating facts"' [citation] must show independently 'that a crime has been committed by someone.'" (Ochoa, supra, at p. 405.) "No universal and invariable rule can be laid down in regard to the proof of the corpus delicti. Each case depends upon its own peculiar circumstances." (Ibid.) However, the "modicum of necessary independent evidence of the corpus delicti, and thus the [trier of fact's] duty to find such independent proof, is not great. The independent evidence may be circumstantial, and need only be a 'slight or prima facie showing' permitting an inference of injury, loss, or harm from a criminal agency, after which the defendant's statements may be considered to strengthen the case on all issues." (Alvarez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1181.) The evidence adduced to establish the corpus delicti of an offense will be deemed sufficient so long as "it permits an inference of criminal conduct, even if a noncriminal explanation is also plausible." (Id. at p. 1171.)
The longstanding rule in California was that "'once the corpus delicti has been proved by ... evidence [independent of the defendant's out-of-court statements], the extrajudicial statements then become admissible to determine the defendant's connection with the crime." (Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 404-405.) In Alvarez, the California Supreme Court modified this rule, after the electorate passed Proposition 8 in June 1982, adding the "Right to Truth-in-Evidence" provision to the California Constitution. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28(d); see Alvarez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1165 [Proposition 8, adding § 28, subd. (d) to article 1 of the Cal. Const., abrogated "any corpus delicti basis for excluding the defendant's extrajudicial statements from evidence"].) Alvarez explained: "Because of the adoption of section 28(d) [of article I of the California Constitution] through Proposition 8, there no longer exists a trial objection to the admission in evidence of the defendant's out-of-court statements on grounds that independent proof of the corpus delicti is lacking. If otherwise admissible, the defendant's extrajudicial utterances may be introduced in his or her trial without regard to whether the prosecution has already provided, or promises to provide, independent prima facie proof that a criminal act was committed." (Alvarez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1180.)
However, Alvarez clarified that Proposition 8 did not eliminate the underlying corpus delicti rule itself. Thus, for the evidence supporting a conviction to be legally sufficient, the prosecution is still required to establish the corpus delicti of the relevant crime by proof that is distinct and separate from the defendant's extrajudicial statements. (Alvarez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 1165, 1180 ["section 28(d) did not abrogate the corpus delicti rule insofar as it provides that every conviction must be supported by some proof of the corpus delicti aside from or in addition to such statements, and that the jury must be so instructed"].) Furthermore, "section 28[, subdivision] (d) did not affect the rule to the extent it (1) requires an instruction to the jury that no person may be convicted absent evidence of the crime independent of his or her out-of-court statements or (2) allows the defendant, on appeal, directly to attack the sufficiency of the prosecution's independent showing." (Alvarez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1180.)
B. The People's Forfeiture Argument
The People assert that Shepard has waived his challenge to the sufficiency of the proof of the corpus delicti at issue here because he did not raise a corpus delicti objection to the admission of his extrajudicial statements at trial. The People rely on People v. Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 404-405 (Wright), which held that the defendant had forfeited his challenge to admission of his extrajudicial statements on corpus delicti grounds because he had not objected to their admission at trial. The People also cite two court of appeal cases, People v. Martinez (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1098, 1103-1104 and People v. Sally (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1621, 1628, both of which, in turn, relied on Wright in holding that a defendant's failure to raise a corpus delicti objection to the admission of his extrajudicial statements waived any challenge, on appeal, to the sufficiency of the independent proof of the corpus delicti.
Wright was overruled on other grounds by People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 458-459.
However, in Alvarez, our Supreme Court noted: "[California] courts traditionally consider claims of instructional error, and of insufficient proof, on their own merits, without reference to whether the defendant affirmatively sought, on corpus delicti grounds, to prevent the admission of his out-of-court statements, or whether those statements were properly allowed in evidence." (Alvarez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1178.) Alvarez further clarified: "No decision of this court, including Wright, has suggested that an evidentiary objection at trial is a prerequisite to raising instructional and sufficiency claims on appeal." (Alvarez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1172, fn. 8; see People v. Parra (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 222, 224, fn. 2 ["sufficiency of the evidence issues are never waived"]; People v. Lara (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 658, 675 [failure to raise corpus delicti objection to admission of extrajudicial statements does not waive claim that corpus delicti instruction was improperly omitted].) Finally, Alvarez explained that, in any event, in light of article 1, section 28, subdivision (d) of the California Constitution, as added by Proposition 8, "a corpus delicti objection to the introduction of [the] defendant's statements is no longer valid." (Alvarez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1177.)
In light of Alvarez's guidance, we conclude Shepard has not forfeited his corpus delicti claim and will address the merits of this claim.
Given the possibility that we would find this claim forfeited for the lack of an appropriate objection below, Shepard has raised an alternative claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. However, since we will resolve his claim on the merits we need not separately address his alternative claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
C. Analysis of the Substantive Claim
People v. Reyes (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1491, 1498 (Reyes) explains, with reference to the requirement of independent proof of the corpus delicti, that the trier of fact "may not consider a defendant's out-of-court statement unless [it] concludes that 'other evidence shows that the charged crime ... was committed.'" Reyes further notes, in the context of considering the sufficiency of the proof of the corpus delicti, that "[a] crime consists of specified elements; if evidence of any of the requisite elements is lacking, a defendant has not committed a crime." (Ibid.; see People v. Foster (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301, 1345 [clarifying, in upholding CALJIC No. 2.72—the jury instruction on corpus delicti—that the "elements of a crime must be proved by evidence independent of any admission made by the defendant outside of the trial"]; also see CALJIC No. 2.72 ["No person may be convicted of a criminal offense unless there is some proof of each element of the crime independent of any [confession] [or] [admission] made by [him] [her] outside of this trial."].)
Shepard's corpus delicti challenge relates to his conviction for receiving stolen property, i.e., a motor vehicle. Generally, proof of the corpus delicti does not require proof of the identity of the perpetrator of the crime, or proof that the defendant, specifically, committed the crime. (People v. Cobb (1955) 45 Cal.2d 158, 161.) However, because the crime of receiving stolen property is a possessory offense, proof of the corpus delicti of this offense requires a showing that the defendant was the perpetrator. (See People v. Land (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 220, 224 [offense of receiving stolen property encompasses actual or constructive possession of the property at issue, although such possession need not be exclusive]; see also Smith v. United States (1954) 348 U.S. 147, 154 [with regard to crimes that do not encompass a "tangible" injury, "it cannot be shown that the crime has been committed without identifying the accused"].)
The elements of the offense of receiving stolen property (motor vehicle) are: (1) a vehicle was stolen; (2) the defendant had possession of the stolen vehicle; and (3) the defendant knew the vehicle was stolen. (People v. Russell (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1425, disapproved on other grounds by People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 874, fn. 14; In re Anthony J. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 718, 728.) Stated more simply, for purposes of the corpus delicti rule, the crime of receiving stolen property includes: (1) the receipt of stolen property and (2) the knowledge that the property was stolen. (People v. Barnes (1962) 210 Cal.App.2d 740, 744 [corpus delicti of receiving stolen property properly established based on "prima facie showing" that the property was received with knowledge it was stolen]; People v. Riccio (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 995, 1000 (Riccio); see also People v. Hawkins (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 675, 680 ["For a variety of crimes, it is often held that the corpus delicti includes evidence of the defendant's mental state."].)
Shepard acknowledges that independent evidence "clearly" shows he was "in receipt of a car that was stolen," i.e., the 2007 silver-gray Chevy Aveo, but argues the evidence, excluding his extrajudicial statements, fails to demonstrate that he "knew the Chevy Aveo was stolen." His corpus delicti challenge thus relates only to the sufficiency of the proof of the knowledge element of the offense. We are satisfied, however, that the corpus delicti was established here because evidence independent of Shepard's out-of-court statements supports a "reasonable inference" that Shepard knew the 2007 silver-gray Aveo was stolen. (Riccio, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at p. 1001 [proof of corpus delicti of receiving stolen property sufficient when evidence supported "reasonable inference" that the defendant knew property at issue was stolen].)
"An inference is a deduction of fact that may logically and reasonably be drawn from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in the action." (Evid. Code, § 600, subd. (b)).
Here, the stolen, 2007 silver-gray Aveo was found in the parking lot of Shepard's automobile body shop. Furthermore, the stolen Aveo was parked right next to a salvaged Aveo and the dashboard of the salvaged Aveo, including its public VIN plate, had been fitted into the stolen Aveo. Investigator Swanson testified that, in his opinion, this constituted a "dash swap" for the purpose of switching the "public" or visible VIN on the stolen vehicle with the "public VIN" of the salvaged vehicle. In addition, among the stack of receipts Swanson obtained from the office of Shepard's automobile body shop was an invoice for the 2007 silver-gray Aveo in the name of Troylynn Espinoza. At the same time, Shepard, Jason, and Valencia each suggested, in their respective trial testimony, that Juan Sanchez was the owner of the 2007 silver-gray Aveo. (See People v. Martinez (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1098, 1104 [a defendant's trial testimony is admissible to prove the corpus delicti].)
"Expert opinion testimony may support the corpus delicti when two conditions are met. First, the opinion must be '[r]elated to a subject that is sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact.' (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a).) Second, the opinion must be based on 'matter ... perceived by or personally known to the witness ... that reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the subject to which [the expert's] testimony relates ....' (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (b).)" (People v. Powers-Monachello (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 400, 412.) However, "[e]xpert opinion testimony cannot support a finding of the corpus delicti unless the opinion is supported by independent evidence." (Id. at p. 413.) We conclude Swanson's expert opinion may properly be considered in evaluating the sufficiency of the proof of the corpus delecti. In any event, Swanson's expert opinion is not determinative for purposes of our ultimate conclusion as to the sufficiency of the proof of the corpus delicti here.
This record supports a reasonable inference that Shepard—as the owner of the automobile body shop where the 2007 silver-gray Aveo, the invoice in the name of Troylynn Espinoza, and the salvaged Aveo were found—knew that the 2007 silver-gray Aveo was stolen. (See Riccio, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1000-1001 ["For corpus delicti purposes ... the evidence need only create a reasonable inference—'by no means the only, or even the most compelling [one]'—that the crime has occurred."]; Barnes, supra, 210 Cal.App.2d at p. 745 ["Possession of stolen property, accompanied by suspicious circumstances, will justify an inference that the property was received with knowledge that it had been stolen."]; People v. Martin (1973) 9 Cal.3d 687, 696 ["Possession of a stolen item in and of itself is a factor which could assist a reasonable person in formulating a strong suspicion that the recipient knew the item was stolen."].) Accordingly, we conclude the corpus delicti of the offense was properly established.
The trial court, in rejecting Shepard's Penal Code section 1118 motion to dismiss the charge of receiving stolen property, explained: "The Defendant's multiple misstatements about how the Aveo got onto his property, whose vehicle it was, as well as his admission to Investigator Swanson that he knew there was a problem with the Aveo and shouldn't have allowed it there, leads the Court to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew the vehicle was stolen." Shepard now argues the court's comments, along with its dismissal of the charge of receiving a stolen motor vehicle against Jason, suggests that independent proof of the corpus delicti of the offense, specifically as to the knowledge element, was insufficient. However, this argument is flawed for two reasons. First, the court's above-noted comments, as well as its dismissal of the identical charge against Jason, reflect the court's assessment that the totality of the evidence presented in the People's case in chief, was sufficient to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Shepard was guilty of the charge but not Jason. In other words, the court's comments spoke to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, not to the sufficiency of the proof of the corpus delicti of the underlying crime. Accordingly, the court's comments, along with its dismissal of the receiving a stolen motor vehicle charge against Jason, do not suggest with respect to the charge against Shepard, that proof of the corpus delicti of the underlying offense was insufficient. Second, in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the corpus delicti of an offense or a conviction, we are not bound by the trier of fact's interpretation of the evidence but, rather, consider the evidence from the vantage point of a reasonable trier of fact.
In light of our conclusion that proof of the corpus of delicti of the offense of receiving a stolen motor vehicle that Shepard was charged with, was sufficient, we affirm his conviction.
Given our conclusion, we reject Shepard's derivative argument that the trial court's failure to grant his Penal Code section 1118 motion on the receiving stolen property count violated his due process rights.
II. Reduction of Conviction to a Misdemeanor
Shepard next argues the trial court erred in failing to reduce, at sentencing, his conviction for receiving a stolen motor vehicle to a misdemeanor. However, this claim is moot as the trial court subsequently, during the pendency of this appeal, reduced the conviction to a misdemeanor. (See Superior Court Case Docket in case No. F15905914.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
SMITH, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
FRANSON, Acting P.J. /s/_________
PEÑA, J.