¶ 139 It is well established that the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides for the right of self-representation in criminal proceedings. People v. Foster, 391 Ill.App.3d 487, 491 (2009). A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to represent himself if he makes an unequivocal request to do so. People v. Shelton, 401 Ill.App.3d 564, 574 (2010). In the case at bar, defendant concedes that his request to represent himself was unequivocal and properly accepted by the trial court. However, defendant asserts that as a pro se litigant he was also entitled to transcripts and a publicly-funded expert witness.

"To overcome this strong presumption, defendant must demonstrate trial counsel's decision was so unreasonable and irrational that no reasonably effective defense attorney faced with similar circumstances would pursue that strategy." People v. Shelton, 401 Ill. App. 3d 564, 583-84, 929 N.E.2d 144, 163 (2010). "The decision

The State maintains that the questions were proper and invited by defendant's testimony that he did not sexually abuse N.J. ¶ 29 "A trial court has discretion to allow the prosecution wide latitude during cross-examination of the defense witnesses." People v. Shelton, 401 Ill. App. 3d 564, 582 (2010). "The proper scope of cross-examination extends to matters raised on direct examination, including all matters which explain, qualify, or destroy the testimony on direct examination."

An issue is moot when a court cannot grant "any effectual relief" to defendant. People v. Shelton, 929 N.E.2d 144, 162, 401 Ill. App. 3d 564, 340 Ill. Dec. 840 (2010). Therefore, the Illinois Supreme Court never had a fair opportunity to adjudicate this issue.

Furthermore, the cases defendant cites do not compel reversal. See, e.g., People v. Shelton, 401 Ill.App.3d 564, 583 (2010) (aggravated battery conviction affirmed over the defendant's claim of trial court bias); People v. Harris, 384 Ill.App.3d 551, 561-67 (2008) (murder guilty plea affirmed over the defendant's claim of trial court bias). Accordingly, we will not reverse defendant's convictions based on the trial court judge's commentary.

"In order to show bias, defendant must demonstrate that the judge displayed 'active personal animosity, hostility, ill will, or distrust toward the defendant.'" People v. Romero, 2018 IL App (1st) 143132, ¶ 96 (quoting People v. Shelton, 401 Ill.App.3d 564, 583 (2010)).

To show bias, a defendant must "demonstrate that the judge displayed 'active personal animosity, hostility, ill will, or distrust toward the [party].'" People v. Shelton, 401 Ill.App.3d 564, 583 (2010). The fact that a judge displayed irritation or displeasure with a party "is not necessarily evidence of judicial bias...."

Or perhaps my all-time favorite in this vein-"Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs." People v. Shelton, 401 Ill.App.3d 564, 575, 929 N.E.2d 144, 156 (2010) (quoting United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991)).

To show bias, a defendant must "demonstrate that the judge displayed 'active personal animosity, hostility, ill will, or distrust toward the defendant.'" Romero, 2018 IL App (1st) 143132, ¶ 96 (quoting People v. Shelton, 401 Ill.App.3d 564, 583 (2010)). Judges must be fair and dispassionate arbitrators above all else.

For example, "[a] sentencing challenge is moot where defendant has completed serving his sentence." People v. Shelton, 401 Ill.App.3d 564, 582, 929 N.E.2d 144, 162 (2010); see also People v. Melton, 2013 IL App (1st) 060039, ¶ 28, 4 N.E.3d 99 (" [A] challenge to the validity of an imposed sentence becomes moot once the entire sentence has been served.").