Notwithstanding defendant's waiver, we choose to address the merits of this issue. See People v. Shelton, 252 Ill. App.3d 193, 200 (1993); People v. Raso, 234 Ill. App.3d 1099, 1100-01 (1992). Defendant urges that this court adopt the holding of a small minority of jurisdictions which have required a defendant's waiver of the right to testify to be on the record.

We will, however, review the merits of said issue pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 366(a)(5) (134 Ill.2d R. 366(a)(5)), which provides that this court may, in the exercise of its responsibility to insure that a cause has a just result, ignore the doctrine of waiver and grant any relief that the case may require. See People v. Shelton (1993), 252 Ill. App.3d 193, 200. Section 103-5(a) of the Speedy Trial Act (Act) provides as follows: "Every person in custody in this State for an alleged offense shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction within 120 days from the date he was taken into custody unless delay is occasioned by the defendant."

Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 366(a)(5) (134 Ill.2d R. 366(a)(5)), however, this court may, in the exercise of its responsibility to insure that a cause has a just result, ignore the doctrine of waiver and decide a case on grounds not properly raised or not raised at all by the parties. People v. Shelton (1993), 252 Ill. App.3d 193, 200; Palomar v. Metropolitan Sanitary District (1992), 225 Ill. App.3d 182, 188, 587 N.E.2d 1067, 1071; City of Wyoming v. Illinois Liquor ControlComm'n (1977), 48 Ill. App.3d 404, 407-08, 362 N.E.2d 1080, 1083; Occidental Chemical Co. v. Agri Profit Systems, Inc. (1975), 37 Ill. App.3d 599, 603, 246 N.E.2d 482, 485. • 3 In the present case, defendant failed to preserve these issues for review.

"When a defendant contends on appeal that he was precluded from testifying at trial, however, his conviction cannot be reversed on the basis that he was precluded from exercising his right to testify, unless he contemporaneously asserted his right to testify by informing the trial court that he wished to do so." People v. Shelton, 252 Ill. App. 3d 193, 201 (1993). Accord People v. Smith, 176 Ill. 2d 217, 234 (1997).

Finally, a trial judge is not required to inform a defendant of his right to testify because it is difficult for a judge to determine the appropriate time that he should advise a defendant concerning his right to testify, since "the judge cannot know that a defendant has not testified until the defense rests and such a moment is not an opportune time to engage in a discussion with defendant which might lead to a rupture with defense counsel . . . or might undo a trial strategy based on the defendant's not testifying." People v. Shelton, 624 N.E.2d 1205, 1211 (Ill.App.Ct. 1993) (citations omitted); see also Ortiz, 82 F.3d at 1070 (stating "defense counsel, not the court, has the primary responsibility for advising the defendant of his right to testify and for explaining the tactical implications of doing so or not"); Annotation, 72 A.L.R.5th § 12, at 450-55 (noting courts' reluctance to require an on-the-record inquiry is based in part on fear that judges would become enmeshed in decisions involving trial strategy). See generally Ledezma, 626 N.W.2d at 147 ("Generally, the advice provided by counsel [as to whether the defendant should testify] is a matter of trial strategy . . . .").

As there is nothing in the record indicating that the vacated convictions had any effect on the separate sentence Mr. Smith received for AHC, it is unnecessary for us to remand for resentencing. People v. Shelton , 252 Ill. App. 3d 193, 209, 191 Ill.Dec. 827, 624 N.E.2d 1205 (1993). ¶ 33 CONCLUSION

During the court's questioning, defendant did not contemporaneously assert that he wished to testify. See In re Joshua B., 406 Ill. App. 3d 513, 515 (2011) (citing People v. Shelton, 252 Ill. App. 3d 193, 201 (1993) (a defendant's conviction cannot be reversed where a defendant contends on appeal he was prevented from testifying at trial unless he contemporaneously asserted his right to testify by informing the trial court he wished to do so)). ¶ 22 This court has addressed this issue before under similar circumstances, but on direct appeal rather than on appeal from postconviction proceedings. See People v. McCleary, 353 Ill. App. 3d 916 (2004).

¶ 74 Here, the charge of official misconduct in count 1 was based on the same physical act of battery alleged in count 12, the charge of official misconduct in count 3 was based on the same physical act of mob action alleged in counts 6 and 7, and the charge of official misconduct in count 4 was based on the same physical act alleged in one of the charges of obstructing justice alleged in count 8, 9, 10, and 11. As such, the convictions for official misconduct violate the one-act, one-crime doctrine. See Kotero, 2012 IL App (1st) 100951, ¶ 26; see also People v. Price, 369 Ill. App. 3d 395, 405 (2006) (no one-act, one-crime violation occurred where the trial court sentenced the defendant on a charge of official misconduct but not on the underlying charge of theft); Moshier, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 882 (where a charge of official misconduct was based on the same act alleged in a charge of theft, the conviction for official misconduct violated the one-act, one-crime rule and was vacated); People v. Shelton, 252 Ill. App. 3d 193, 208 (1993) (where six counts of official misconduct and one count of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver were based on the same act, the sentences for official misconduct violated the one-act, one-crime rule and were vacated).¶ 75 Where a one-act, one-crime violation exists, the conviction for the less serious offense should be vacated and only a conviction for the most serious offense may be sustained.

As there is nothing in the record indicating that the vacated convictions had any effect on the separate sentence Mr. James received for armed violence, it is unnecessary for us to remand for resentencing. People v. Shelton , 252 Ill.App.3d 193, 209, 191 Ill.Dec. 827, 624 N.E.2d 1205 (1993). ¶ 60 D. Presentence Credit

Therefore, defendant's conviction for bribery is affirmed. See People v. Shelton, 252 Ill. App. 3d 193, 207 (1993). Furthermore, while defendant argues that she only agreed to pray and fast in exchange for the $800.00, that argument is based almost entirely on her trial testimony, testimony that the trial court judge found to be "very suspect" and "self serving."