Opinion
September 22, 1992
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Charles J. Tejada, J.).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People and giving them the benefit of every reasonable inference (People v Malizia, 62 N.Y.2d 755, cert denied 469 U.S. 932), we find that the evidence was sufficient as a matter of law to support a finding that defendant affirmatively participated in the robbery. Defendant blocked the complainants from any possible means of escape (see, People v Patton, 184 A.D.2d 483; People v Robinson, 127 A.D.2d 860), received an item of stolen property from his accomplice and personally took an item from another victim.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that defendant could be cross-examined on the underlying facts of a prior robbery conviction. The mere fact that the crime charged is similar to others defendant has previously committed does not of itself require preclusion, nor does the fact that a defendant may specialize in a particular type of crime insulate him from cross-examination with respect to those crimes (People v Cain, 167 A.D.2d 131, 133, lv denied 77 N.Y.2d 836; see also, People v Foster, 156 A.D.2d 252, lv denied 75 N.Y.2d 868; People v Rahman, 62 A.D.2d 968, affd 46 N.Y.2d 882).
The fact that a more lenient sentence was offered during plea bargaining does not indicate that defendant was "punished" for going to trial (People v Diaz, 177 A.D.2d 406, affd 80 N.Y.2d 780).
Concur — Sullivan, J.P., Carro, Milonas, Wallach and Kupferman, JJ.