The latter, having been repealed (L. 1957, ch. 698), the correct reference should have been to sections 1620 and 1622 of the new law. An incidental result of the drafting error in 1959 was considered by the Court of Appeals in People v. Shapiro ( 7 N.Y.2d 370). The court refused to allow an absurd result to flow from an obvious oversight.
Moreover, the Trooper’s testimony that defendant exceeded the maximum state speed limit by 25 miles per hour was, alone, sufficient to establish defendant’s guilt (see People v Olsen, 22 NY2d 230, 232 [1968]). Finally, contrary to defendant’s further contention on appeal, it was unnecessary to establish the posting of 65 miles per hour speed limit signs as defendant was charged with driving at a rate of 90 miles an hour, which is in excess of the state’s 65 mile per hour maximum speed limit (see People v Shapiro, 7 NY2d 370 [1960]; People v Schnitzler, 37 Misc 3d 143[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 52288 [U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2012]; see People v Neal, 24 Misc 3d 130[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51347[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2009]). Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
Moreover, the trooper's testimony that defendant exceeded the maximum state speed limit by 25 miles per hour was, alone, sufficient to establish defendant's guilt (see People v. Olsen, 22 N.Y.2d 230, 232, 292 N.Y.S.2d 420, 239 N.E.2d 354 [1968] ). Finally, contrary to defendant's further contention on appeal, it was unnecessary to establish the posting of 65 miles per hour speed limit signs as defendant was charged with driving at a rate of 90 miles an hour, which is in excess of the State's 65 mile per hour maximum speed limit (see People v. Shapiro, 7 N.Y.2d 370, 197 N.Y.S.2d 715, 165 N.E.2d 564 [1960] ; People v. Schnitzler, 37 Misc.3d 143[A], 2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 52288 [U], 2012 WL 6554675 [App.Term, 9th & 10th Jud.Dists.2012] ; see People v. Neal, 24 Misc.3d 130[A], 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 51347[U], 2009 WL 1886823 [App.Term, 9th & 10th Jud.Dists.2009] ).
The Justice Court did not err in denying defendant's motion, made after the People had rested, which sought dismissal upon the ground that the People had not proven which traffic control device he had violated. Defendant was charged with violating a 55 mile per hour speed limit, which is generally the maximum speed limit applicable throughout the State (with exceptions not relevant here), and, thus, it was unnecessary for the People to establish the posting of 55 mile per hour speed limit signs ( see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1683 [a] [15]; People v Shapiro, 7 NY2d 370; People v Hodos, 186 Misc 2d 841, 843). The other issues raised herein are similarly lacking in merit.
The Justice Court did not err in denying defendant's motion, made after the People had rested, which sought dismissal upon the ground that the People had not proven which traffic control device he had violated. Defendant was charged with violating a 55 mile per hour speed limit, which is generally the maximum speed limit applicable throughout the State (with exceptions not relevant here), and, thus, it was unnecessary for the People to establish the posting of 55 mile per hour speed limit signs ( see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1683 [a] [15]; People v Shapiro, 7 NY2d 370; People v Hodos, 186 Misc 2d 841, 843). The other issues raised herein are similarly lacking in merit.
Ct., Erie County, 1961], affd. 11 N.Y.2d 943), except that, in a prosecution for speeding in a 50-mile-per-hour zone, proof as to the absence of signs is presumptive evidence that no greater speed limit was established. ( People v. Shapiro, 7 N.Y.2d 370; People v. Aubin, 231 N.Y.S.2d 466 [County Ct., Jefferson County, 1962].) Even though the court knows that the signs were properly posted, judicial notice cannot be taken of such posting.
The prosecution was privileged to prove its case by resorting to this presumption. ( People v. Shapiro, 7 N.Y.2d 370.) Prosecution of such a charge by the District Attorney's office is not essential; the Town Attorney or trooper could have prosecuted it.
In the event the State Traffic Commission exercises its authority to fix a rate of speed lower than 50 miles an hour, it must give adequate warning of such restricted speed. ( People v. Shapiro, 7 N.Y.2d 370.) In this case the People were required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that the State Traffic Commission had in accordance with the law established the restricted speed zone, and (2) that the defendant was operating his motor vehicle in such restricted zone at a rate of speed greater than that permitted, and (3) that adequate signs were erected to warn users of the highway of such restricted speed zone.
In the event the State Traffic Commission exercises its authority to fix a rate of speed lower than 50 miles per hour, it must give adequate warning of such restricted speed. ( People v. Shapiro, 7 N.Y.2d 370.) Subdivision 4 of section 56 Veh. Traf. of the Vehicle and Traffic Law refers to section 95-c of the same law.
It now appears accepted that the exception contained in the statute in question can be proven either by proof of the absence of signs or by the introduction of a proper certificate of the State Traffic Commission. ( People v. Granger, 10 Misc.2d 321; People v. Van Wieren, 15 Misc.2d 106; People v. Shapiro, 7 N.Y.2d 370, 373.) Therefore, in the instant case, since Trooper Brennan was competent to testify on direct knowledge to the absence of signs to prove the exception, he certainly was competent to allege the exception in the information on direct knowledge.