Opinion
B297497
02-27-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. KEITH ALAN SHANKLIN, Defendant and Appellant.
Castaneda Barton, Sergio A. Castaneda, Veronica T. Barton and Alina L. Antounian, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Michael J. Wise, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. NA109280) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Richard M. Goul, Judge. Affirmed. Castaneda Barton, Sergio A. Castaneda, Veronica T. Barton and Alina L. Antounian, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Michael J. Wise, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
Defendant and appellant Keith Alan Shanklin was convicted by a jury of two counts of resisting, obstructing, or delaying a peace officer, a misdemeanor, and sentenced to two consecutive, one-year jail terms. He appeals, contending the trial court erred by improperly allowing the prosecutor to amend the information at the close of evidence, and by imposing an overly "harsh" sentence. We affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Facts
a. Background
Gardena High School has a staff parking lot, reserved for teachers, staff, and administrators. Persons authorized to park in that lot are provided with green parking permits to display in their vehicles, and signs alert drivers that only staff may park there. Parking for parents is available elsewhere on the campus and on the adjacent streets. When unauthorized persons park in the staff lot, school police officers or campus aides ask them to move.
The high school has a specific protocol for nonstudents who wish to visit. Such persons must check in at the office and obtain permission to be on campus. The visitor is then given a pass and is escorted by a campus aide to his or her destination. These measures are in place to protect campus security.
In 2018, Stacey Reagle and Alejandro Araujo were employed as uniformed police officers by the Los Angeles School Police Department, and were assigned to Gardena High School. One of their duties was to oversee student safety during daily dismissal at 3:17 p.m. At that time each day, approximately 1,500 students, plus teachers, routinely exited the campus.
Appellant Shanklin's son, 16-year-old K., was a student at the school in 2018. Shanklin's fiancée, Rochelle Santiful, also had a child who attended the school, E., who was 16 and disabled.
b. Prior incidents
In approximately late April 2018, the school principal asked Araujo to "keep the peace" because Shanklin was trespassing on campus. Shanklin had attempted to enter a classroom without permission and without checking in at the office. Araujo observed from a distance as the principal and two campus aides escorted Shanklin. Thereafter the principal informed Araujo that Shanklin was not allowed on campus without permission.
On May 3, 2018, Shanklin entered the campus without permission and demanded to see E. He was very angry and belligerent, yelling and cursing. He tried to open doors on the campus, causing a campus lockdown. The school principal put out an emergency call to Reagle for assistance. Reagle found Shanklin in the main office hallway, and he was asked to leave the school. Santiful and Shanklin thereafter filed a formal complaint against the school and Reagle. According to Reagle's trial testimony, she used no force whatsoever against anyone during the incident. She was trying to keep E. safe, because E. had accused Shanklin of child abuse. The complaint filed by Shanklin and Santiful against the school and Reagle was later determined to be unfounded.
c. The May 14, 2018 incident
On May 14, 2018, just as students were being dismissed for the day, campus aide NaDean Harris noticed a black SUV blocking the entrance to the staff parking lot. She alerted Officers Reagle and Araujo, who were standing at the front of the school overseeing dismissal. Reagle determined to wait a few minutes in hopes the vehicle would leave on its own. Neither Reagle nor Araujo was aware that Shanklin was the driver.
When the SUV failed to move after five minutes, the officers approached the car. Araujo stopped student foot traffic from crossing the staff parking lot driveway in front of the SUV, while Reagle motioned to Shanklin to move the car. When Shanklin ignored her, she tapped on the window and asked him to roll it down and move the car. He loudly yelled, "No" through the window and told her to leave him alone. Araujo walked toward the driver's side of the car. As he did so, Shanklin's son, K., entered the SUV. When Araujo was in front of the SUV, Shanklin suddenly accelerated the SUV forward "a couple feet," hitting Araujo's knee and knocking him backwards. There were students crossing the driveway behind Araujo at the time.
Taken by surprise, Araujo took a step backwards. He and Reagle yelled to Shanklin to stop. Reagle moved to the front of the car to assist. Shanklin lurched the car a second time, again hitting Araujo's knees. Both Araujo and Reagle yelled for him to stop, and Araujo made an audiotaped radio call for assistance. Shanklin moved the SUV forward a third time, again hitting Araujo. Neither Reagle nor Araujo drew their service weapons because they were concerned about the safety of the students in the area, and believed that doing so would escalate the situation. Arajuo did not move out of the SUV's path because he was concerned about the safety of the students behind him.
Shanklin attempted to back out of the lot but was unable to do so. He stated he wanted to leave; Reagle told him he was not free to do so. Shanklin then forcefully opened the SUV door, exited the car, and rushed at Reagle, yelling, screaming, and using profanity. He appeared to be enraged. Reagle ordered Shanklin to get back in the car multiple times, to no avail. He finally complied when she reached for her pepper spray. He screamed that the officers were harassing him, he would sue them, and they would lose their jobs. After moving the SUV back and forth several times, he pulled into a nearby handicapped parking space in the staff lot. Other officers arrived and detained Shanklin. He was uncooperative, resisting, twisting, and turning. It took "three very large" officers to successfully handcuff him.
Araujo suffered bruising and swelling to his knee. He was treated at an urgent care facility and was prescribed antiinflammatory medication.
d. Defense evidence
Shanklin's son, K., testified that his father never lurched or accelerated the SUV at Araujo. He did not recall how the incident started, but Reagle approached the SUV's window and she and his father "started going at it," yelling at each other. The SUV was equipped with a safety sensor that beeped or flashed if the car was about to hit an object; K. never heard or saw the sensor go off during the incident. He acknowledged that the voice on the audiotape of the radio call, yelling and using profanity, was in fact his father's. When the officers tried to handcuff his father, Shanklin told them they were hurting him; he did not resist. Shanklin had repeatedly parked in the staff parking lot, and no one had ever told him to move.
Santiful testified that she had parked in the staff parking lot many times over the two to three years preceding the incident. Harris gave her permission to do so because E. is handicapped. Santiful was on the phone with Shanklin during the incident, but the conversation was muffled so she was unable to hear much of it. Santiful confirmed that the SUV had a safety sensor that beeped if the vehicle was about to hit something; she heard no beeping during her telephone conversation.
e. Rebuttal evidence
Harris testified that she never gave anyone in Shanklin's family permission to park in the staff parking lot.
2. Procedure
A jury convicted Shanklin of two counts of resisting, obstructing, or delaying a peace officer, a misdemeanor (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)). It deadlocked on count 1, felony assault on a peace officer (Araujo) and the lesser included offense of misdemeanor assault on a police officer (§§ 245, subd. (c), 241, subd. (c)), and the court declared a mistrial on that count. The trial court sentenced Shanklin to 365 days in jail on each of the section 148 counts, to be served consecutively. It waived all "court costs." Shanklin timely appealed.
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
The People also charged Shanklin with possession of a billy or blackjack (Pen. Code, § 22210), based on the discovery of a small wooden club or "tire buddy" in his vehicle. The jury acquitted Shanklin of this charge.
DISCUSSION
1. Amendment of the information
At the close of evidence, the People moved to amend the information to conform to proof by adding two counts of misdemeanor violation of section 148, subdivision (a)(1), as to Araujo and Reagle. The trial court found there was sufficient evidence to support the amendment. Defense counsel objected that had she known the information would be amended, she would have put on evidence that Shanklin was disabled and had difficulty putting his hands together behind his back, and needs "multiple sets of handcuffs to accomplish that." The court stated there was already evidence in the record that Shanklin was disabled, and in any event, a violation of section 148, subdivision (a)(1) does "not require any physical activity at all."
Shanklin contends amendment of the information was error because (1) there was insufficient evidence presented at the preliminary hearing to support the two new counts; and (2) the trial court precluded him from presenting evidence relevant to the new charges.
Under section 1009, a "court may allow amendment of an accusatory pleading at any time up to and including the close of trial so long as there is no prejudice to the defendant." (People v. Arevalo-Iraheta (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1574, 1580-1581; People v. Goolsby (2015) 62 Cal.4th 360, 367-368.) Due process requires that an accused be advised of the charges against him so that he has a reasonable opportunity to prepare and present his defense and not be taken by surprise by evidence offered at trial. (People v. Fernandez (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 540; People v. Graff (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 345, 360.) Therefore, an information cannot be amended to charge an offense not shown by the evidence taken at the preliminary hearing. (People v. Arevalo-Iraheta, at p. 1581; People v. Goolsby, at pp. 367-368; People v. Rogers (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1360; People v. McCoy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1531.) We review a trial court's decision to permit the filing of an amended information for abuse of discretion. (People v. Arevalo-Iraheta, at p. 1581.)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion here. The evidence presented at the preliminary hearing was sufficient to show a violation of section 148, subdivision (a)(1) as to both officers. That statute makes it a misdemeanor for anyone to willfully resist, delay, or obstruct any peace officer in the discharge or attempt to discharge any duty of his or her office. (In re R.W. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 145, 148; In re R.M. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 582, 588.) " 'The legal elements of a violation of section 148, subdivision (a) are as follows: (1) the defendant willfully resisted, delayed, or obstructed a peace officer, (2) when the officer was engaged in the performance of his or her duties, and (3) the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the other person was a peace officer engaged in the performance of his or her duties.' " (In re Amanda A. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 537, 546; Yount v. City of Sacramento (2008) 43 Cal.4th 885, 894-895.) "The offense is a general intent crime, proscribing only the particular act (resist, delay, obstruct) without reference to an intent to do a further act or achieve a future consequence. [Citation.]" (In re Muhammed C. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1329; In re Amanda A., at p. 546.) The resistance offered by the defendant need not be forceful, violent, or involve physical acts. (In re Muhammed C., at p. 1330; In re A.L. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 15, 22; People v. Williams (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 71, 92; In re Amanda A., at p. 546.)
There was sufficient evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing showing Shanklin resisted, delayed, or obstructed both Officers Araujo and Reagle in the performance of their duties. Araujo testified at the preliminary hearing that he was an officer with the Los Angeles School Police Department, assigned to Gardena High School; Officer Reagle was his partner; and when the incident occurred, both were wearing distinctive police uniforms. He and Reagle observed Shanklin's SUV blocking the staff parking lot driveway, and went to investigate. Reagle went to the driver's side window, asked Shanklin to roll it down, and asked him to move the car; he refused and yelled at her. Araujo went to assist Reagle. As he walked in front of the SUV, toward the driver's side of the car, Shanklin accelerated, hitting Araujo's legs. Araujo immediately told Shanklin to stop and raised his hand, motioning for him to do so. Shanklin again accelerated, hitting Araujo again. Reagle moved in front of the SUV, near Araujo, and both she and Araujo attempted to get Shanklin to stop. Nonetheless, Shanklin accelerated again, hitting Araujo a third time. At the time, there was "heavy foot traffic" behind Araujo, with children directly in the path of the car. Shanklin then attempted to reverse and maneuver out of the lot, and Reagle told him to stop. However, the SUV continued to go forward and backward in an attempt to leave.
Thus, the evidence showed Reagle and Araujo were peace officers. Given their uniforms, it was a reasonable inference that Shanklin knew they were peace officers. It was also a reasonable inference they were engaged in the performance of their duties: as school police officers, they were enforcing campus traffic rules and protecting the safety of students leaving school and crossing in the path of the SUV. And, there was evidence Shanklin resisted both officers. After Shanklin hit Araujo with the car the first time, Araujo twice told him to stop, but he accelerated and hit Araujo twice more. When Reagle told him to roll down his window and move the car, he refused and yelled at her. After Shanklin hit Araujo the second time, Reagle also moved in front of the vehicle and told him to stop, but he accelerated a third time. He also did not comply with the officers' commands to stop moving the car, instead reversing and attempting to maneuver away. It was a reasonable inference that Shanklin's conduct resisted and delayed the officers' attempts to enforce campus traffic safety measures. In short, the evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing was sufficient to allow amendment of the information. (See In re Muhammed C., supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1329-1330 [it was a reasonable inference that defendant willfully delayed officers' performance of their duties in violation of § 148, subd. (a)(1) where he repeatedly refused commands to step away from a vehicle and responded to officers' orders with a defiant hand gesture]; People v. Williams, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 92 [defendant's conduct of stepping in front of an officer who was writing a citation was a proper basis for a jury finding that defendant violated § 148, subd. (a)(1)].)
Shanklin argues that he was prejudiced by the amendment because he was unable to present evidence of his disability at trial and, at the preliminary hearing, the court sustained the prosecutor's objections to several questions related to his arrest and handcuffing. But the fact he suffers from a disability that makes it difficult for him to place his hands behind his back was irrelevant to the newly added charges, as well as to the original charges. The People did not rely on evidence Shanklin was uncooperative when handcuffed as a basis for the section 148 counts. Indeed, it appears Officer Reagle was not one of the officers who handcuffed him. The People never argued that Shanklin resisted, obstructed, or delayed the officers by failing to cooperate during the handcuffing process; the basis for the charges was, instead, his failure to comply with Araujo's and Reagle's other commands and his striking Araujo with his SUV. The fact Shanklin had back problems or other disabilities was not a defense to his conduct towards Araujo and Reagle.
The questions included whether either officer told Shanklin he was under arrest or not free to leave; whether Araujo or "one of [his] partners" attempted to handcuff Shanklin; and whether he complained of injuries and said "he was in pain and couldn't get into the cop car."
Nor was Shanklin prejudiced by the trial court's refusal to allow him to present evidence regarding the basis for Santiful's complaint against the school and Reagle. Prior to the amendment, the trial court held an Evidence Code section 402 hearing to determine admissibility of evidence of the complaint. Santiful testified that the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) was doing an investigation regarding allegations of abuse and neglect of E. Before the DCFS representative arrived at the school, Santiful demanded to see E. Reagle refused to allow this, and informed Santiful that there was a "certain type of protocol" that she had to follow. Santiful stated that E. was "coerced" and the allegations of abuse and neglect were unfounded. The complaint Santiful made against the school and Reagle asserted that Reagle refused to allow Santiful to see E., did not tell Santiful "where they were taking" E., and was rude to Santiful; it also alleged that E. informed Santiful that Reagle put E. in handcuffs that were too tight. The trial court ruled that evidence the complaint was made was admissible, but evidence about its nature was not. The information regarding E.'s handcuffing was hearsay, and the evidence regarding the nature of the complaint was irrelevant.
The court's ruling does not demonstrate amendment of the information was an abuse of discretion. Omission of evidence about the specifics of the complaint against the school and Reagle had no more bearing on the section 148 charges than it did on the original charges. Moreover, evidence regarding the nature of Santiful's complaint was unlikely to have assisted Shanklin. The fact that DCFS was investigating claims of abuse and neglect of his fiancée's daughter, and that the fiancée was angry because she was not allowed to talk to E. during the investigation, was unlikely to paint Shanklin in a favorable light. Instead, based on the trial court's ruling, the jury heard that Santiful had filed a complaint that was pending when the charged incidents transpired, thereby allowing Shanklin to argue the officers were retaliating against him.
Shanklin also avers that Reagle was not performing a legal duty when she asked him to move his car; therefore, he did not anticipate having to defend against the section 148 charge. (See generally In re R.M., supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 585 [no violation of § 148, subd. (a)(1) when officer was not performing a legal duty].) In support of this contention, he argues that campus aide Harris testified at trial that she was normally the one who asked parents to move their cars. Harris testified that if she saw a car illegally parked in the staff lot, she would advise the driver to move. She also testified that when she noticed Shanklin's SUV in the staff lot, she informed the officers because "instead of me saying something to the person, I'd rather for the school police to say it." Thus, the record does not suggest dealing with illegally parked cars was a duty solely, or even primarily, assigned to her. In any event, Araujo testified at trial that when the school police officers saw a car without a parking permit in the staff lot, "we ask them if they are a staff member. If they are not, we ask them to move." Reagle testified that it was the duty of the school police officers to oversee "safe passage" for the students at dismissal: "Every day at dismissal we stand in front of the school to ensure that the students are safe, that people are driving and parking where they are supposed to for students' safety." (Italics added.) Thus, the evidence clearly showed that monitoring illegal parking was within the scope of the officers' duties. That a campus aide shared this duty does not demonstrate the officers were not performing a legal duty.
Shanklin further complains that Reagle did not testify at the preliminary hearing, and the People offered evidence of an audio recording of the police radio call at trial, but not at the preliminary hearing. But Shanklin offers no authority for the proposition that an amendment is impermissible simply because the People offered additional evidence at trial. Instead, under section 1009, the " ' "test applied is whether or not the amendment changes the offense charged to one not shown by the evidence taken at the preliminary examination." ' " (People v. McCoy, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 1531.) As we have explained, that standard—of having shown the evidence at the preliminary hearing to support the charges—was met here.
2. Alleged sentencing error
As noted, the trial court sentenced Shanklin to 365 days on each section 148 charge, to be served consecutively. When pronouncing sentence, the court reasoned: "[T]he behavior described by the witnesses in this case of Mr. Shanklin is a man who does indeed believe that he doesn't have to obey any of the rules. He was parked in a parking lot right in front of a sign which says no parking except for staff. When directed by Officer Araujo and Officer Reagle to move, he did not move. In fact, according to the testimony, he lurched forward several times. Now, the jury has not convicted him of ever hitting or attempting to hit Officer Araujo, but the testimony is in the record that he starts lurching the car with all these students pouring out of Gardena High School at 3:17 p.m. . . . [Harris] saw him in the parking lot where he wasn't supposed to be and she is the one who called for police to go over there. And we heard the very clear and very calm testimony of Araujo how students were on that sidewalk. He had to go to one side, hand out to the left to stop the students. And as he gestured for Mr. Shanklin to come forward onto the street, just get out of the parking lot, Shanklin refused. Further, there was evidence that three weeks before he had also violated school policies by going onto campus attempting to see [E.], not checking into the office, and that he was quite irate yelling obscenities. . . . I have no confidence [he] would ever survive probation if he can't obey basic rules that are set forth for parents to follow at their school for their kids. So for this reason I am following the People's recommendation. Probation is denied. Defendant is sentenced to the maximum 730 days in county jail."
Shanklin contends the trial court abused its discretion in imposing an "overly harsh" sentence.
Determination of the appropriate sentence is within the trial court's broad discretion, and we review a trial court's sentencing decisions for abuse. (People v. Hicks (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 496, 512.) A trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision was so irrational, arbitrary or capricious that no reasonable person could agree with it. (People v. Clancey (2013) 56 Cal.4th 562, 579; People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377; People v. Downey (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 899, 909-910.) The party attacking the sentence has the burden to make such a showing; otherwise the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on review. (People v. Carmony, at pp. 376-377; People v. Jones (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 853, 861.) We will not interfere with the trial court's exercise of discretion when it has considered all facts bearing on the offense and the defendant to be sentenced. (People v. Kingston (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 272, 278; People v. Downey, at p. 910.) And, a decision will not be reversed merely because reasonable people might disagree; an appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge. (People v. Carmony, at p. 377; People v. Jones, at p. 861.)
To the extent Shanklin intends to argue the trial court abused its discretion by denying probation, we disagree. As with other sentencing decisions, whether to deny or grant probation rests within the trial court's broad discretion. (People v. Clancey, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 579; People v. Kingston, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 278; People v. Downey, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 909.) " ' "[O]nly in a very extreme case should an appellate court interfere with the discretion of the trial court in the matter of denying . . . probation. . . ." ' " (People v. Kingston, at p. 278.) California Rules of Court, rule 4.414 sets forth the criteria affecting a trial court's decision to grant or deny probation. Among other things, these criteria include the nature, seriousness, and circumstances of the crime as compared to other instances of the same offense; whether the defendant used a weapon or inflicted physical injury; whether the crime was committed due to an unusual circumstance, such as great provocation which is unlikely to recur; and his willingness and ability to comply with the terms of probation.
Here, the trial court reasoned that Shanklin was unlikely to be willing to comply with the terms of probation, given his disinclination to follow simple school rules. The evidence presented at trial amply supported this finding. Further, the court's comments regarding the presence of students during the incident indicate it found the offense serious, in that Shanklin's conduct potentially put students at risk.
Nor can we say the court abused its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences. Courts have discretion to determine whether sentences for multiple convictions should run concurrently or consecutively. (People v. Clancey, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 579; People v. Rodriguez (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1257, 1262.) California Rules of Court, rule 4.425, sets forth factors a trial court should consider when determining whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences. (People v. Caesar (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1060, disapproved on another ground by People v. Superior Court (Sparks) (2010) 48 Cal.4th 1, 18; People v. Rodriguez, at pp. 1262-1263.) Those factors include whether the crimes and their objectives were predominantly independent of each other, involved separate acts of violence or threats of violence, or were committed at different times or separate places, rather than being committed so closely in time and place as to indicate a single period of aberrant behavior. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.425(a).) The court may also consider circumstances in aggravation and "additional criteria reasonably related to the decision being made" if stated on the record. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 4.408(a), 4.425(b), 4.421.) A single factor will support imposition of a consecutive term. (People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 728-729.)
The People argue that because Shanklin first resisted Officers Araujo and Reagle, and then resisted the other officers who responded to the scene, there were "two independent events clearly reflecting independent objectives." We disagree. As to the charged counts, there was only one incident, at a single location, involving both officers. Nonetheless, imposition of consecutive sentences was proper because there were two victims. The naming of separate victims in separate counts is alone a sufficient basis for the imposition of consecutive terms. (People v. Caesar, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1060; People v. Calhoun (2007) 40 Cal.4th 398, 408.)
Shanklin maintains that the trial court improperly relied upon the evidence that he accelerated or lurched the SUV toward Araujo during the incident, because the jury deadlocked on count 1, assault upon a peace officer, as well as the lesser included offense of misdemeanor assault on a peace officer. (§§ 245, subd. (c), 241, subd. (c).) But the fact the jury was unable to reach a verdict did not preclude the trial court from considering this evidence when sentencing him. "Both the United States Supreme Court and [the California Supreme Court] have expressly held that a trial court, in exercising its discretion in sentencing a defendant on an offense of which he or she has been convicted, may take into account the court's own factual findings with regard to the defendant's conduct related to an offense of which the defendant has been acquitted, so long as the trial court properly finds that the evidence establishes such conduct by a preponderance of the evidence." (In re Coley (2012) 55 Cal.4th 524, 557; People v. Towne (2008) 44 Cal.4th 63, 85-86; People v. Carter (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 831, 845.) "Nothing in the applicable statute or rules suggests that a trial court must ignore evidence related to the offense of which the defendant was convicted, merely because that evidence did not convince a jury that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of related offenses." (People v. Towne, at pp. 85-86.)
Shanklin further argues that a two-year sentence is disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense. He asserts that he was upset because the school "would not let him see [E.]," whom he believed the school was mistreating. Therefore, he insists, his failure to follow school rules cannot be considered tantamount to an unwillingness or inability to follow probation rules. Even accepting arguendo that his argument is factually accurate, we see no dissonance between the failure to follow probation rules and school rules, and cannot fault the trial court's reasoning on this point. Shanklin also complains that the trial court failed to consider his son's testimony that he did not lurch the SUV at the officers, and his trial counsel's representations at sentencing extolling Shanklin's virtues as a father and churchgoer. There is no indication in the record that the trial court failed to consider these matters. But it was not required to credit the defense testimony or adopt defense counsel's arguments, and the fact it did not do so does not show an abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
EDMON, P. J. We concur:
EGERTON, J.
DHANIDINA, J.