Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. SC071747A
Richman, J.
Defendant Shervin Shahpar pleaded guilty to felony possession of a controlled substance and was placed on probation that included a “Proposition 36” drug treatment program. He appeals, and his appointed counsel has asked this court to independently examine the record in accordance with People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, to determine if there are any arguable issues that require briefing. Defendant was apprised of his right to file a supplemental brief, but he did not do so. We have conducted our review, conclude there are no arguable issues requiring briefing, and affirm.
“Proposition 36” probation refers to probation in which a defendant convicted of a nonviolent drug possession offense participates in a drug treatment program in lieu of incarceration. (Pen. Code, § 1210.1.)
BACKGROUND
On July 21, 2010, the district attorney for the County of San Mateo filed a complaint charging defendant with felony possession of a controlled substance (count 1; Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)) and misdemeanor possession of marijuana while driving a motor vehicle on a highway (count 2; Veh. Code, § 23222, subd. (b)).
The record before us is devoid of facts surrounding defendant’s arrest and the charges against him.
On October 7, 2010, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to count 1, and the trial court dismissed count 2. The court then suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on three years probation, a condition of which was participation in a Proposition 36 drug treatment program.
On October 27, 2010, defendant filed a notice of appeal. In the notice, defendant requested a certificate of probable cause allowing him to challenge the legality of his guilty plea. (Pen. Code, § 1237.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.304, 8.320.) He requested the certificate on the follow ground: “I hired a private attorney to represent me because of the complexity of my case involving immigration consequences. [B]efore signing the plea my lawyer assured me several times that Prop 36 will have no immigration consequences. My lawyer gave me false information, because now under immigration laws I’m under mandatory detention and will be sent to prison indefinitely, awaiting deportation. If I was informed correctly and knew the outcome... I would’ve never pleaded guilty. I believe my lawyer misled me and didn’t do enough research as my representative to avoid this outcome. I like to withdraw my plea due to incorrect information from my attorney. I belive [sic] I’m innocent and don’t deserve indefinite prison held for a minor possession. Please grant me this appeal and allow me to fight for my rights correctly.”
On November 10, 2010, the trial court denied defendant’s request for a certificate of probable cause.
DISCUSSION
As noted, defendant requested a certificate of probable cause to challenge his guilty plea on that ground that, contrary to his attorney’s purported representations, the plea subjected him to mandatory detention to await deportation. The trial court denied the request, and defendant did not seek review of that order by writ of mandamus. He therefore waived any challenge to the trial court’s ruling. (See In re Brown (1973) 9 Cal.3d 679, 683; People v. Castelan (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1185, 1188; 6 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Crim. Law (3d ed. 2000) Criminal Appeal, § 19, pp. 257-258.)
We note, though, that even if defendant had sought a writ of mandamus, such writ would have been denied because the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying defendant’s request. (See People v. Holland (1978) 23 Cal.3d 77, 84; Lara v. Superior Court (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 436, 440; People v. Warburton (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 815, 820.) Paragraph 8 of defendant’s signed declaration concerning his guilty plea represented, “I understand that if I am not a citizen, conviction of the offense for which I have been charged will have the consequences of deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States or denial of naturalization.” Likewise, during the hearing at which defendant entered his guilty plea, the trial court read defendant the same admonishment and expressly inquired, “ Do you understand that?” Defendant responded with an unequivocal, “Yes.” Defendant’s assertion that he would not have pleaded guilty had he been advised of the possible immigration implications of his plea therefore lacks merit.
Since defendant cannot challenge the validity of his guilty plea, the scope of reviewable issues before us is restricted to matters based on constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds going to the legality of the proceedings leading to the plea. (People v. DeVaughn (1977) 18 Cal.3d 889, 895-896.) And we conclude there were no arguable irregularities in the proceedings. Defendant’s guilty plea complied with Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 and In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122. He was represented by competent counsel who zealously guarded his rights and interests. And the sentence imposed was authorized by law.
Our independent review having found no arguable issues that require briefing, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
We concur: Kline, P.J., Haerle, J.