Opinion
A150773
03-28-2018
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CHARLES LEROY SHAFFER, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Napa County Super. Ct. No. CR173868)
Pursuant to a negotiated disposition, defendant Charles Leroy Shaffer pleaded no contest to involuntary manslaughter. The court then found defendant not guilty by reason of insanity and committed him to Napa State Hospital. Defendant raises only one issue on appeal: whether the trial court erred in not awarding him conduct credits based on time spent in county jail prior to his commitment. We affirm.
This appeal is appropriately decided by Memorandum Opinion pursuant to California Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1
BACKGROUND
We confine our discussion of the facts to those relevant to the credit issue on appeal.
Defendant was charged with one count of murder, with an enhancement that he used a deadly weapon in committing the crime. He pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity, and the court appointed two alienists to conduct psychiatric evaluations. (Pen. Code, § 1026.) Both concluded defendant met the statutory criteria to be found not guilty by reason of insanity.
Pursuant to a negotiated disposition, defendant changed his plea to no contest to an amended charge of involuntary manslaughter, and admitted the deadly weapon allegation.
The court dismissed the murder charge, and found defendant not guilty by reason of insanity. The court committed him to Napa State Hospital for a maximum term of five years, and awarded him 778 days of actual custody credits based on his time served in county jail, but denied conduct credits.
DISCUSSION
Defendant acknowledges that a long line of cases, beginning with People v. Smith (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 817 (Smith), have held that neither "equal protection [nor] due process requires an award of precommitment conduct credits for jail time to reduce the maximum term of a defendant committed to state hospital pursuant to Penal Code section 1026." (Id. at p. 826; see People v. Mord (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 1090, 1104; People v. Campos-Castillo (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 926, 929-930.)
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Defendant claims, however, that Smith "did not conduct an analysis under the rules of statutory construction." He asserts that under such an analysis, the "plain language of section 1026.5" demonstrates the Legislature intended "the calculation of the maximum term of commitment to include conduct credits pursuant to section 4019."
Section 1026.5 provides in relevant part: "(a)(1) In the case of any person committed to a state hospital or other treatment facility pursuant to Section 1026 or placed on outpatient status pursuant to Section 1604, who committed a felony on or after July 1, 1977, the court shall state in the commitment order the maximum term of commitment, and the person may not be kept in actual custody longer than the maximum term of commitment, except as provided in this section. For the purposes of this section, 'maximum term of commitment' shall mean the longest term of imprisonment which could have been imposed for the offense or offenses of which the person was convicted, including the upper term of the base offense and any additional terms for enhancements and consecutive sentences which could have been imposed less any applicable credits as defined by Section 2900 .5. . . ." (§ 1026.5, subd. (a)(1), italics added.)
Section 2900.5, in turn, provides in pertinent part: "(a) In all felony and misdemeanor convictions, either by plea or by verdict, when the defendant has been in custody, including, but not limited to, any time spent in a jail . . . , all days of custody of the defendant, including days . . . credited to the period of confinement pursuant to Section 4019, . . . shall be credited upon his or her term of imprisonment, or credited to any base fine that may be imposed. . . . " (§ 2900.5, subd. (a).)
Section 4019 provides for conduct credit for a prisoner detained in city or county jail, or other specified facilities, under certain circumstances, including where the defendant was confined "under a judgment of imprisonment" (§ 4019, subd. (a)(1)), as a condition of probation (id., subd. (a)(2)), "for contempt pursuant to a proceeding" (id., subd. (a)(3)), or "following arrest and prior to the imposition of sentence for a felony conviction" (id., subd. (a)(4), italics added).
Defendant maintains he is entitled to custody credits under section 4019, subdivision (a)(4). This is so, he claims, because that subdivision "doesn't actually require imposition of sentence," and "since no 'sentence' was imposed, [his time in county jail] was in fact prior to imposition of a sentence." Defendant's strained reading is at odds with the plain meaning of the statute and every case to consider it.
The trial court ordered a term of commitment under section 1026, it did not pronounce sentence. Because no sentence was imposed, nor would be imposed, his time in county jail was simply not "prior to imposition of a sentence." Indeed, People v. Mord held "the statute specifically denies precommitment conduct credits." (People v. Mord, supra, 197 Cal.App.3d at p. 1104.)
Nevertheless, defendant claims Mord supports his position, noting it states, " 'Confinement of a person found to be insane and sentenced under section 1026 of the Penal Code is for care and treatment, not punishment.' " (Mord, supra, 197 Cal.App.3d at p. 1104, italics added, quoting People v. Bodis (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 435, 437.) Given Mord's explicit holding, it is apparent its use of the word "sentenced" was not a declaration that a term of commitment is a "sentence" within the meaning of section 4019, subdivision (a)(4).
Defendant further claims the legislative purpose and intent in providing for conduct credits supports an award of such credits to him.
" ' "The basic rules of statutory construction are well established. 'When construing a statute, a court seeks to determine and give effect to the intent of the enacting legislative body.' [Citation.] ' "We first examine the words themselves because the statutory language is generally the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. [Citation.] The words of the statute should be given their ordinary and usual meaning and should be construed in their statutory context." [Citation.] If the plain, commonsense meaning of a statute's words is unambiguous, the plain meaning controls.' " ' [Citation.] In that case, ' " ' "there is no need for construction and courts should not indulge in it." ' " ' [Citation.] Thus, if the language is unambiguous, the plain meaning governs and it is unnecessary to resort to extrinsic sources to determine legislative intent." (Borikas v. Alameda Unified School Dist. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 135, 146.)
The language of the applicable statutes is unambiguous, as well-established precedent has recognized. We therefore heed the above maxim of construction and decline to look beyond the words of the statutes, themselves.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of commitment is affirmed.
/s/_________
Banke, J. We concur: /s/_________
Humes, P.J. /s/_________
Margulies, J.