Opinion
D069832
02-28-2017
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SUSANA MARIE SERRANO, Defendant and Appellant.
William Hassler, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorneys General, Melissa Mandel, Alana C. Butler and Stephanie H. Chow, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. SCD261133) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Louis R. Hanoian, Judge. Affirmed. William Hassler, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorneys General, Melissa Mandel, Alana C. Butler and Stephanie H. Chow, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted Susana Marie Serrano of false personation (Pen. Code, § 529, subd. (a)(3)); forgery of documents (§ 470, subd. (d)); burglary (§ 459); and filing false instrument (§ 115, subd. (a)). The court placed her on four years' probation on condition that Serrano spend 180 days in the custody of the San Diego Sheriff and pay certain fees and fines, including $26,250 in restitution to Value T. Sales, Inc. for lost rental income. Serrano's sole contention is that the trial court erroneously ordered her to pay that restitution. We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion, and affirm the judgment.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code. --------
BACKGROUND
In 2005, Serrano bought a condominium in Oceanside and rented it to her brother. Serrano stopped paying her mortgage on the property in 2009. After she was sent several notices of trustee's sale, the property was sold in November 2013 to Value T Sales, a property management company. Although the property was bought in the name of the "California Credit Corporation 401k Profit Sharing Plan," the check used to purchase the property erroneously stated the name as "California Credit Corporation 401k Plan," and the deed of trust originally stated that erroneous name.
In February 2014, Serrano filed documents with the California Secretary of State creating a corporation called "California Credit Corporation 401k Plan."
In March 2014, a Value T Sales employee requested the trustee correct the deed to reflect that "California Credit Corporation 401k Profit Sharing Plan" was the true owner of the property.
In April 2014, Serrano filed articles of incorporation with the California Secretary of State creating a corporation called "California Credit Corporation 401k Profit Sharing Plan."
In May 2014, Serrano filed with the San Diego County Recorder's Office a grant deed transferring ownership of the property from "California Credit Corporation 401k Profit Sharing Plan" to a corporation she owned called the Housing Resource Center.
In February 2015, Serrano filed a rescission of grant deed, thus returning the property from the Housing Resource Center to "California Credit Corporation 401k Profit Sharing Plan."
Serrano's brother occupied the property between the November 2013 property sale date and July 2015. Serrano appeared on his behalf in each of several unlawful detainer actions.
In ordering restitution, the court ruled: "[Serrano's] actions caused [the victims] to be deprived of the benefit of their purchase, their property that they bought at the sale, and whatever they lost in terms of rent[.] . . . [S]he's responsible for that because it's directly related to her filing the false deed, filing the false documents with the court[.]"
DISCUSSION
Serrano contends: "The premise upon which the trial court based its restitution order—that the claimed rental losses were caused by [her] criminal acts because those losses were 'directly related to [her] filing the false deed' does not withstand even minimal scrutiny. Since almost all those losses were incurred before [she] drafted that deed, her actions were clearly not a substantial factor in causing those losses." She concedes that her opposition to the unlawful detainer actions filed by Value T Sales "may have caused some or all of those rental losses"; nonetheless, she argues that fact does not support the court's restitution award.
Restitution is constitutionally and statutorily mandated in California. (Cal. Const., art I., § 28, subd. (b), par. (13); § 1202.4.) Section 1202.4, subdivision (a)(1) authorizes restitution for the "victim of a crime who incurs an economic loss as a result of the commission of a crime." Section 1202.4, subdivision (f) states: "[I]n every case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant's conduct, the court shall require that the defendant make restitution to the victim or victims in an amount established by court order, based on the amount of loss claimed by the victim or victims or any other showing to the court. . . . The court shall order full restitution." Section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3) further provides: "To the extent possible, the restitution order . . . shall be of a dollar amount that is sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims for every determined economic loss incurred as the result of the defendant's criminal conduct[.]"
"A restitution order is intended to compensate the victim for its actual loss and is not intended to provide the victim with a windfall." (People v. Chappelone (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1172.) But, "[t]here is no requirement the restitution order be limited to the exact amount of the loss in which the defendant is actually found culpable." (People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1121; Chappelone, at p. 1172.) The court need only use a rational method that is reasonably calculated to make the victim whole. (Chappelone, at p. 1172.)
In determining whether there is a causal connection between the defendant's act and the victim's loss, the trial court may apply tort principles of causation. (People v. Jones (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 418, 425 [there is "no reason why the various principles involved in determining proximate causation under California tort law should not also apply in awarding victim restitution under California criminal law"].) In California, courts apply the substantial factor test in determining proximate cause. (People v. Holmberg (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1321.) This test requires " ' "that the contribution of the individual cause be more than negligible or theoretical." ' " (Ibid.) A force that has " ' "only an 'infinitesimal' or 'theoretical' part in bringing about injury, damage or loss is not a substantial factor" [citation], but a very minor force that does cause harm is a substantial factor.' " (Id. at p. 1322.)
We evaluate the court's restitution order for abuse of discretion. (People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 663; People v. Millard (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 7, 26.) " ' "A victim's restitution right is to be broadly and liberally construed." [Citation.] " 'When there is a factual and rational basis for the amount of restitution ordered by the trial court, no abuse of discretion will be found by the reviewing court.' " [Citations.]' [Citation.] However, a restitution order 'resting upon a " 'demonstrable error of law' " constitutes an abuse of the court's discretion. [Citation.]' [Citation.] 'In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence [to support a factual finding], the " 'power of the appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,' to support the trial court's findings." [Citations.] . . . "If the circumstances reasonably justify the [trial court's] findings," the judgment may not be overturned when the circumstances might also reasonably support a contrary finding.' " (Millard, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 26.)
We conclude that sufficient evidence supported the court's finding that Serrano's conduct deprived Value T Sales of possession of the condominium from November 2013 until July 2015, during which time her brother occupied it. As she concedes, she further contributed to Value T Sales suffering lost rent by defending her brother in the unlawful detainer actions. "Under certain circumstances, restitution has been found proper where the loss was caused by related conduct not resulting in a conviction [citation], by conduct underlying dismissed and uncharged counts [citation], and by conduct resulting in an acquittal [citation]." (People v. Carbajal, supra, 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1121.) We point out that "restitution is also related to the goal of deterring future criminality." (Id. at p. 1124.) We conclude that in light of Serrano's misconduct, the court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Serrano to pay restitution for Value T Sales's lost rental income.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
O'ROURKE, J. WE CONCUR: BENKE, Acting P. J. HUFFMAN, J.