Opinion
2012-2239 W CR
02-17-2015
The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. SEPTEMBER 18, 2014 TERM v. Ronald M. Ackridge, Appellant. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, v. NO. 2014-111 W CR RONALD M. ACKRIDGE, Appellant. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, v. NO. 2014-112 W CR RONALD M. ACKRIDGE, Appellant.
PRESENT: : , MARANO and TOLBERT, JJ.
Appeals from three judgments of the City Court of New Rochelle, Westchester County (Anthony A. Carbone, J.), rendered September 7, 2012. The judgments convicted defendant, upon his pleas of guilty, of criminal mischief in the fourth degree, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree and aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the second degree, respectively.
ORDERED that, on the court's own motion, the appeals are consolidated for purposes of disposition; and it is further,
ORDERED that the judgments of conviction are affirmed.
Defendant, represented by counsel, pleaded guilty to charges of criminal mischief in the fourth degree (Penal Law § 145.00), criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree (Penal Law § 220.03), and aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the second degree (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511 [2]). At the plea proceedings, defendant executed three misdemeanor conviction waiver of rights forms which detailed the rights defendant was waiving upon each guilty plea, including, but not limited to, his right to a jury trial and to cross-examine witnesses. Defendant also acknowledged therein that he had discussed these matters with his counsel, and that he was not coerced or forced to plead guilty. In addition, during the plea colloquies, defendant expressly stated that he had signed each of the waiver forms, that he understood the rights he was giving up by pleading guilty, and that he was freely and voluntarily pleading guilty to the aforementioned charges. Defendant was sentenced to time served.
On appeal, defendant contends that there was a complete absence of any indication that he had knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his rights upon pleading guilty to the charges, and that the record was silent concerning his waiver of his Boykin rights (Boykin v Alabama, 395 US 238 [1969]). Moreover, defendant argues that the written misdemeanor conviction waiver of rights forms he executed at the plea proceeding were insufficient to apprise him of the constitutional rights he was giving up before pleading guilty.
Initially, we note that defendant's Boykin claims are reviewable on direct appeal (see People v Tyrell, 22 NY3d 359 [2013]).
A trial court has a duty to ensure that a defendant, prior to pleading guilty, has intentionally relinquished or abandoned a "known right or privilege" (People v Harris, 61 NY2d 9, 17 [1983]). There is no requirement of a "uniform mandatory catechism of pleading defendants" (People v Nixon, 21 NY2d 338, 353 [1967]). However, presuming a waiver of such rights from a silent record is impermissible (see Carnley v Cochran, 369 US 506, 516 [1962]; see also People v Tyrell, 22 NY3d at 365; Hanson v Phillips, 442 F3d 789 [2d Cir 2006]).
Contrary to defendant's contention, the record affirmatively demonstrates his understanding and waiver of his constitutional rights. In each of defendant's separate plea colloquies, the record shows an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of known rights or privileges. Defendant, who was represented by counsel, expressly stated that he freely and voluntarily acknowledged his guilt. There is no indication that he harbored any doubt or reluctance to enter the pleas (see People v Tenance, 256 AD2d 928 [1998]). Defendant further acknowledged in the misdemeanor conviction waiver of rights forms, which were executed in open court as part of the proceedings, that he fully understood the waivers before he signed them and that he had had an opportunity to confer with counsel. Indeed, the record established that defendant consulted with his attorney about the constitutional consequences of his guilty pleas. We, thus, find that defendant's guilty pleas were knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered (see People v Harris, 61 NY2d 9 [1982]).
Accordingly, the judgments of conviction are affirmed.
Iannacci, J.P., Marano and Tolbert, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: February 17, 2015