People v. Seibech

11 Citing cases

  1. People v. Stack

    244 Ill. App. 3d 393 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)   Cited 20 times
    In Stack, following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted "of unlawful possession of weapons (ammunition) by a convicted felon."

    new that because of his past criminal record, he could not possess a gun or ammunition, and that he could be punished for doing so; (2) he was employed and had been dating D.S., a coemployee; (3) they were not dating at the time of his arrest, but he wanted to see her on that day, to find out why the relationship ended; (4) he had given the woman a set of keys to the car, and she refused to return them; (5) she had used the car in the 10 days prior to his arrest, and she could have used it that day without his knowledge or permission; (6) he had also given rides to people on the day of his arrest; (7) he did not see any bullets on the seat and was not aware they were there; (8) he did not put the bullets there; (9) he did not have a weapon; and (10) he admitted the other items found on the seat were his. He said he had told Officer Avery that "Joe" was driving, but he was being sarcastic and decided not to tell the officer that he meant to say "Joe Momma" was driving. Defendant cites People v. Seibech (1986), 141 Ill. App.3d 45, 489 N.E.2d 1138, where the defendant's conviction for unlawful use of weapons was reversed because the State failed to prove defendant had knowledge of the presence of the firearm found on the floor behind the driver's seat of defendant's car. There, the court noted that "[k]nowledge on the part of an accused of the existence of a firearm within his possession may be inferred from circumstantial evidence."

  2. People v. Harris

    2018 Ill. App. 162193 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018)

    See Bailey, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 891-92 ("courts should also consider any other relevant circumstantial evidence of knowledge including whether defendant had a possessory or ownership interest in the weapon or in the automobile in which the weapon was found"). Defendant also relies on People v. Seibech, 141 Ill. App. 3d 45 (1986). In Seibech, this court reversed the defendant's conviction for unlawful use of a weapon and FOID violation based on the testimony of a defense witness, who testified that he had left the firearm in defendant's car.

  3. U.S. v. Easterly

    95 F.3d 535 (7th Cir. 1996)   Cited 1 times

    If, however, we go to 720 ILCS 5/24-2(b)(4), we find another exception to the prohibition against carrying a gun in a motor vehicle — you can carry it either "broken down," so that it is not functional, or in a place where it is inaccessible to the driver and passengers, such as the trunk. When the two provisions are put together, it becomes apparent that the hunter is allowed to carry his gun to and from the hunting site in his motor vehicle, but it must be broken down or inaccessible, People v. Seibech, 489 N.E.2d 1138, 1140 (Ill.App. 1986) — and the defendant's gun was neither. So he did commit the more serious offense.

  4. People v. Gilmore

    2020 IL App (1st) 182555 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020)

    Id. at 224-25.¶ 23 Defendant's reliance on People v. Seibech, 141 Ill. App. 3d 45 (1986) is misplaced. In Seibech, the defendant was convicted of unlawful use of weapons and failure to possess a FOID card on evidence showing that a firearm was recovered from his vehicle after he had dropped off two passengers, who hunted earlier in the day.

  5. People v. Smith

    2020 Ill. App. 3d 160454 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020)   Cited 4 times
    In Smith, this court found the defendant's knowledge of the presence of a gun in his car could be inferred where the gun was a large shotgun that was too big to be concealed in the car, the gun was stored in an open-ended bag, and the defendant was on a road trip with his brother and would have loaded and unload the car multiple times.

    Generally, driving one's own vehicle with a weapon gives rise to the presumption the driver has knowledge of the weapon, but the presumption is rebuttable. People v. Seibech , 141 Ill. App. 3d 45, 49, 95 Ill.Dec. 410, 489 N.E.2d 1138 (1986). Similarly, a defendant's presence in the car, without more, does not establish that he knew the weapon was in the vehicle.

  6. People v. M.M. (In re M.M.)

    2019 IL App (1st) 191038 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019)

    In People v. Tates, 2016 IL App (1st) 140619, the defendant was located in a living room and the contraband was located in plain view and he fled from the residence, but there was no evidence that he had control over the contraband because he was merely a visitor to the residence. Finally, in People v. Seibach, 141 Ill. App. 3d 45 (1986), there was additional testimony from both the defendant and his friend that negated the State's theory that the weapon was the defendant's.¶ 20 In sum, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we find that a reasonable fact finder could conclude that M.M. was in constructive possession of the handgun.

  7. People v. Davis

    2016 Ill. App. 141787 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016)   Cited 1 times

    We note that we have already considered those factors in Bailey that we find particularly relevant in Davis's case: the weapon's size and visibility.¶ 20 Davis also analogizes his case to People v. Seibech, 141 Ill. App. 3d 45 (1986). In Seibech, the appellate court reversed defendant's conviction for unlawful use of a weapon because it found the State did not prove the defendant had knowledge of the rifle found on the floor behind the driver's seat of defendant's car.

  8. People v. McIntyre

    2011 Ill. App. 2d 100889 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011)   Cited 28 times
    In McIntyre, 2011 IL App (2d) 100889, ¶ 18, unlike in this case, the contraband was found on the side of the seat closest to the front passenger door.

    We conclude that it may not, as the State failed to establish that defendant possessed the weapon. See People v. Seibech, 141 Ill.App.3d 45, 50, 95 Ill.Dec. 410, 489 N.E.2d 1138 (1986) (noting that a defendant must knowingly possess a weapon, either actually or constructively, in order to be found guilty of unlawful possession of a weapon without a FOID card). ¶ 20 For these reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County is reversed.

  9. People v. Brown

    327 Ill. App. 3d 816 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002)   Cited 43 times
    Affirming defendant's conviction for UUWF based on constructive possession, where the circumstantial evidence was corroborated by defendant's statement to the police about the weapon

    Defendant's knowledge of the existence of a firearm within his possession my be inferred from circumstantial evidence.Stack, 244 Ill. App.3d at 399, 613 N.E.2d at 370; quoting People v. Seibech, 141 Ill. App.3d 45, 48, 489 N.E.2d 1138, 1141 (1986). We note the existence of defendant's prior felony convictions is not at issue.

  10. People v. Roberts

    263 Ill. App. 3d 348 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)   Cited 24 times
    In Roberts, the court concluded that the defendant had not validly waived her right to a jury trial where neither "defendant nor her attorney, while [the defendant] was present, made any affirmative statement waiving a jury trial or requesting a bench trial."

    Because of the difficulty in proving knowledge, when actual or constructive possession is established, generally the element of knowledge can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. People v. Jackson (1961), 23 Ill.2d 360, 365, 178 N.E.2d 320, 322; Flores, 231 Ill. App.3d at 818, 596 N.E.2d at 1207 (constructive possession of cannabis found under hood of car led to reasonable inference of knowledge); People v. Seibech (1986), 141 Ill. App.3d 45, 48, 489 N.E.2d 1138, 1141 (knowledge of existence of firearm inferred from circumstantial evidence). Possession may be either actual, requiring actual physical dominion, or constructive, from which possession may be inferred if the defendant had exclusive control over the premises where the controlled substance was found.