Opinion
G062535
07-24-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ENRIQUE MORALES SEGOVIANO, Defendant and Appellant.
Thomas Owen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal and James M. Toohey, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County, No. C-90670 Larry Yellin, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Thomas Owen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal and James M. Toohey, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
MOTOIKE, J.
Defendant Enrique Morales Segoviano filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6 (the petition) which the trial court summarily denied. Segoviano argues the trial court's order denying the petition must be reversed because the court erroneously engaged in factfinding at the prima facie hearing. The Attorney General concedes the order denying the petition should be reversed and the matter should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing. We agree the trial court erred, reverse the order denying the petition, and remand for further proceedings.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1993, Segoviano was charged in a first amended information (information) with first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a); count 1); conspiracy to commit assault with a firearm (§ 182, subd. (a)(1); count 2); attempted second degree robbery (former § 664, § 211, former § 212.5, subd. (b), § 213, subd. (a)(2); count 3); and street terrorism (§ 186.22, subd. (a); count 5).
The information contained the special circumstance enhancement allegation Segoviano and one of his codefendants (Edel Gonzalez) committed the murder charged in count 1 during the commission of the attempted robbery charged in count 3. (Former § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(i).) The information further alleged, as to counts 1 and 3, Segoviano personally used a firearm in the commission of those offenses within the meaning of former sections 1203.06, subdivision (a)(1) and 12022.5, subdivision (a), and as to all counts alleged against him, committed the offenses for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in the association with a criminal street gang with the specific intent to promote, further or assist in any criminal conduct by members of that gang within the meaning of former section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1).
The information also charged Segoviano's codefendants Antonio Espinoza Gonzalez and Edel Gonzalez. Segoviano was jointly tried with Antonio Gonzalez; Edel Gonzalez, who was a minor at the time the offenses were committed, was tried separately.
In 1994, a jury found Segoviano guilty of all charges and found true all enhancement allegations. The trial court sentenced him to prison for life without the possibility of parole, plus a determinate term of nine years.
Segoviano appealed; a panel of this court affirmed Segoviano's judgment of conviction.
In 2022, Segoviano filed the petition, seeking resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6. The trial court appointed counsel to represent him. Following a prima facie hearing, the trial court summarily denied the petition. In its statement of decision, the trial court explained, the record "conclusively show[ed] [Segoviano] was convicted as the actual killer" and therefore ineligible for relief under section 1172.6, subdivision (a)(1).
Segoviano filed a timely notice of appeal from the order denying the petition.
DISCUSSION
Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015; Senate Bill 1437) amended the felony murder rule and eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine as it relates to murder "'to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.'" (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959 (Lewis).) Senate Bill 1437 also created procedures "for convicted murderers who could not be convicted under the law as amended to retroactively seek relief." (Lewis, at p. 957.)
A subsequent amendment to former section 1170.95 extended relief to defendants convicted of attempted murder based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine or manslaughter and also made procedural changes. (Sen. Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.); Stats. 2021, ch. 551, §§ 1, 2; Senate Bill 775.)
The process begins when a defendant previously convicted of a qualifying offense files a petition pursuant to section 1172.6. Once a superior court receives the petition, it shall appoint counsel if requested by the petitioner. (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)-(3).) The prosecutor must then file a response to the petition, and a reply may be filed by the petitioner. (Id., subd. (c).) The trial court shall then "hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief." (Ibid.)
At the prima facie hearing, the trial court may rely on the record of conviction. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 970-971.) The prima facie standard was "'intentionally and correctly set very low;'" therefore, the trial court's prima facie inquiry is limited to a "'"preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were proved."'" (Id. at p. 971.) A trial court should not "'reject the petitioner's factual allegations on credibility grounds without first conducting an evidentiary hearing.'" (Ibid.) Further, a trial court must not engage in "'factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.'"
Therefore, "[i]t is only where the record of conviction establishes the petition lacks merit as a matter of law that the court may deny the petition without a hearing." (People v. Lopez (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 566, 576.) If the trial court denies the petition without issuing an order to show cause, it must state its reasons. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ENGAGED IN IMPERMISSIBLE FACTFINDING TO CONCLUDE SEGOVIANO WAS INELIGIBLE FOR RESENTENCING UNDER SECTION 1172.6
Here, the trial court stated its reasons for summarily denying the petition in a detailed statement of decision. In its statement of decision, the trial court indicated: "Without reviewing the facts underlying [Segoviano]'s conviction or engaging in any factfinding, a review of the jury instructions and verdict forms alone establishes the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law." Notwithstanding the court's recitation of the correct legal standards, the statement of decision itself shows the trial court erred by relying on facts outside Segoviano's record of conviction to reach its conclusion.
In its statement of decision, the trial court stated: "[T]he People's argument that [Segoviano] was convicted as the actual killer appears persuasive in light of the other instructions, [Segoviano]'s sentence, and the jury's findings with respect to each defendant's firearm enhancement. Specifically, the People correctly note that only [Segoviano] was found to have personally used a firearm. Both of [Segoviano]'s co-defendants were only found to have been vicariously armed with a firearm. The manner in which [Segoviano] was charged in relation to his co-defendants is consistent with a finding that [Segoviano] was convicted of felony murder as the actual killer. While counsel for [Segoviano] correctly notes that [Segoviano] was not separately charged with personal discharge of a firearm, the instruction for personal use of a firearm (CALJIC 17.19) defined the term 'used a firearm' as including the intentional firing of a firearm. Thus, since petitioner is the only person found to have used (i.e. fired) the firearm, it follows that petitioner was the actual killer and that the other co-defendants were tried as accomplices." (Italics added.)
In a footnote in its statement of decision, the trial court noted Edel Gonzalez had been tried separately "and convicted of the same charges as [Segoviano], but the jury found that Edel was vicariously armed with a firearm per Penal Code § 12022(a)(1)."
In his opening brief, Segoviano argues the trial court erred because its determination "necessarily rested on judicial fact-finding" at the prima facie hearing to conclude the jury found Segoviano had fired a gun, actually killing the victim. He argues: "The court correctly stated [Segoviano] and Antonio's jury found Antonio was vicariously armed with a firearm and [Segoviano] personally used a firearm. However, these were the only arming allegations provided to that jury. The allegation as to [Segoviano] permitted a true finding for 'use,' which was defined in CALJIC 17.19 as 'to display a firearm in a menacing manner, intentionally to fire it, or intentionally to strike or hit a human being with it.' [Citation.] By adding in as a 'fact' from the record of conviction that Edel's jury found he was vicariously armed [citation], the court concluded [Segoviano] had to have been the one of those three persons who 'fired' a firearm. But [Segoviano] and Antonio's jury could have concluded that a third party (i.e. Edel) was the one who actually killed the victim, which could still result in a true finding of the 'use' allegation as to [Segoviano], which did not require a finding that he fired the gun. Thus, the court had to look at the facts to make a determination that only one gun was fired, that the gun was held by [Segoviano], and that the gun [Segoviano] fired shot a bullet that killed the victim, and therefore [Segoviano] was the actual killer."
In the respondent's brief, the Attorney General agrees the record of conviction fails to establish Segoviano is ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law. The Attorney General states the jury instructions and verdict forms for the personal use allegation and the felony murder special circumstance allegation, whether considered separately or together, do not in and of themselves conclusively establish Segoviano was the actual killer, without impermissible factfinding. The Attorney General concedes Segoviano is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on remand.
We agree the trial court erred by considering facts outside the record of conviction, namely, the fact that in his separate trial, Edel Gonzalez was convicted of the same charges as Segoviano, but unlike Segoviano, was found to have been vicariously armed with a firearm and not to have personally used a firearm. As the record of conviction does not establish Segoviano was ineligible for relief under section 1176.2 as a matter of law, we therefore reverse the order denying the petition and remand for an evidentiary hearing.
DISPOSITION
The postjudgment order is reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings.
WE CONCUR: MOORE, ACTING P. J., GOETHALS, J.