Opinion
2013-00952 Ind. No. 4408/11.
03-02-2016
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Dayquan SEGAR, appellant.
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Benjamin S. Litman of counsel), for appellant. Kenneth P. Thompson, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Camille O'Hara Gillespie, and Jeremy O. Bressman of counsel), for respondent.
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Benjamin S. Litman of counsel), for appellant.
Kenneth P. Thompson, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Camille O'Hara Gillespie, and Jeremy O. Bressman of counsel), for respondent.
Opinion
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Marrus, J.), rendered January 7, 2013, convicting him of burglary in the second degree and robbery in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and sentencing him to consecutive determinate terms of imprisonment of 15 years on the conviction of burglary in the second degree and 7 years on the conviction of robbery in the second degree, followed by a period of postrelease supervision.
ORDERED that the judgment is modified, as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, by reducing the term of imprisonment imposed on the conviction of burglary in the second degree from 15 years to 11 years; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's arguments regarding the legal sufficiency of the identification evidence are unpreserved for appellate review (see People v. Hawkins, 11 N.Y.3d 484, 872 N.Y.S.2d 395, 900 N.E.2d 946; People v. Phillips, 123 A.D.3d 1146, 999 N.Y.S.2d 533; People v. Jean–Marie, 67 A.D.3d 704, 888 N.Y.S.2d 154). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.155; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053; People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902).
The sentence imposed was excessive to the extent indicated herein (see People v. Delgado, 80 N.Y.2d 780, 587 N.Y.S.2d 271, 599 N.E.2d 675; People v. Dell, 11 A.D.3d 631, 784 N.Y.S.2d 114; People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 86, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675).