See People v. Frey (1984), 103 Ill.2d 327, 469 N.E.2d 195; People v. Villareal (1983), 114 Ill. App.3d 389, 449 N.E.2d 198. The two cases cited by the defendant, People v. Sebag (1982), 110 Ill. App.3d 821, 443 N.E.2d 25, and People v. Miller (1977), 55 Ill. App.3d 1047, 371 N.E.2d 917, are factually inapposite. In both Sebag and Miller, the defendants were not represented by counsel at any stage in the proceedings.
Moreover, a reviewing court may consider a defendant's prior interactions with the criminal justice system in determining whether the defendant knowingly waived his right to a jury. See Id., citing Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d at 71; see also People v. Tooles, 177 Ill. 2d 462, 471 (1997); Turner, 375 Ill. App. 3d 1101, 1109; People v. Sebag, 110 Ill. App. 3d 821, 829 (1982); and People v. Phuong, 287 Ill. App. 3d 988, 991 (1997). ¶ 18 The facts and circumstances of this case support the finding that defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial.
¶ 39 Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously accepted his jury trial waiver, as the court's admonishments were perfunctory. Defendant proposes that the admonishments here were distinguishable from those deemed acceptable in People v. Tooles, 177 Ill.2d 462 (1997), and comparable to those deemed insufficient in People v. Sebag, 110 Ill.App.3d 821 (1982). Defendant also asserts that the record shows he "felt forced to waive his right to a jury trial due to
¶ 36 Defendant also relies on People v. Sebag, 110 Ill.App.3d 821 (1982), but his reliance on that case is similarly misplaced. In Sebag, the defendant was charged with battery and public indecency.
¶ 37 Defendant also relies on People v. Sebag, 110 Ill.App.3d 821 (1982), but his reliance on that case is similarly misplaced. In Sebag, the defendant was charged with battery and public indecency.
We find, under the circumstances presented, that defendant understandingly, knowingly, and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. ¶ 15 Defendant relies heavily on People v. Sebag, 110 Ill. App. 3d 821 (1982), for the proposition that the trial court did not properly ensure that he validly waived his right to a jury trial because it failed to explain his right, to ask him whether he actually understood what that right entailed, to inform him that it would be deciding his cause, and to ascertain whether he was waiving his right voluntarily. That case, however, is clearly distinguishable.
Accordingly, we find that defendant has failed to show that he did not knowingly waive his right to a jury trial. ¶ 9 Defendant analogizes his case to People v. Sebag, 110 Ill.App.3d 821, 66 Ill.Dec. 502, 443 N.E.2d 25 (1982). In Sebag, the defendant was charged with battery and public indecency.
People v. Reynolds, 359 Ill. App. 3d 207, 215 (2005).¶ 12 Defendant, nonetheless, contends that his case is similar to People v. Sebag, 110 Ill. App. 3d 821 (1982), where defendant was acting pro se, and the court simply told him he is entitled to have his case tried before a jury or judge, defendant then selected a bench trial, and the trial court found that he waived his right to a jury trial. Sebag, 110 Ill. App. 3d at 829.
Therefore, Phuong is not persuasive. Finally, defendant contends that the trial court's inquiry as to his understanding of the nature and function of a jury and the ramifications of giving up the right to a jury trial was as perfunctory as the inquiry in People v. Sebag, 110 Ill. App.3d 821, 828-29 (1982). Sebag recognized that "it is the duty of the trial court to see that a waiver of right to jury trial is expressly and understandingly made, and such obligation is not to be perfunctorily discharged."
¶ 18 Defendant argues that the court should have provided additional explanation of his rights because he was an unsophisticated pro se litigant. Defendant cites People v. Sebag, 110 Ill. App. 3d 821 (1982), where a jury waiver was found invalid in part because the defendant "was without benefit of counsel," "it [did] not appear that [the defendant] was advised of the meaning of a trial by jury," and it did not "appear that [the defendant] was familiar with criminal proceedings." Sebag, 110 Ill. App. 3d at 829.