Summary
In Scott, for instance, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in admitting the testimony of an expert witness on gangs, gang-related customs, and violent gang practices where defendant was being tried for murder.
Summary of this case from Murray v. New YorkOpinion
70 A.D.3d 977 897 N.Y.S.2d 138 The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Kwame SCOTT, appellant. 2010-01520 Supreme Court of New York, Second Department February 16, 2010
Law Office of Deron Castro, P.C., Forest Hills, N.Y. (Patrick Michael Megaro and Dale I. Frederick of counsel; Michael Zisser on the brief), for appellant.
Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove and Shulamit Rosenblum Nemec of counsel), for respondent.
STEVEN W. FISHER, J.P., DANIEL D. ANGIOLILLO, ARIEL E. BELEN, and PLUMMER E. LOTT, JJ.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Dowling, J.), rendered October 30, 2007, convicting him of murder in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in admitting the testimony of an expert witness concerning gangs, including their customs and violent practices. This evidence was highly probative of the defendant's motive, as well as explanatory of the defendant's actions and, thus, critical to the jury's understanding of the relationship between the defendant and the victim ( see People v. Cain, 16 A.D.3d 288, 792 N.Y.S.2d 60; People v. Avila, 303 A.D.2d 165, 754 N.Y.S.2d 885; People v. Edwards, 295 A.D.2d 270, 743 N.Y.S.2d 872).
The defendant's Batson challenge ( see Batson v. Kentucky,Batson 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69) was properly denied, as he failed to make the requisite prima facie showing of discrimination. It is incumbent upon a party making a challenge to articulate and develop all of the grounds supporting the claim, both factual and legal, during the colloquy in which the objection is raised and discussed ( see People v. Childress, 81 N.Y.2d 263, 268, 598 N.Y.S.2d 146, 614 N.E.2d 709; People v. Fryar, 29 A.D.3d 919, 814 N.Y.S.2d 755). In support of the Batson application, the defendant noted only that the prosecutor used challenges against several prospective black jurors. In the absence of a record demonstrating other circumstances supporting a prima facie showing, the Supreme Court correctly found that the defendant failed to establish a pattern of purposeful exclusion sufficient to raise an inference of racial discrimination ( see People v. Fryar, 29 A.D.3d 919, 814 N.Y.S.2d 755; People v. Harrison, 272 A.D.2d 554, 554-555, 708 N.Y.S.2d 433). Since the defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the Supreme Court did not err in failing to require the prosecutor to provide a race-neutral explanation for his challenges to prospective black jurors ( see People v. Childress, 81 N.Y.2d at 268, 598 N.Y.S.2d 146, 614 N.E.2d 709; People v. Fryar, 29 A.D.3d 919, 814 N.Y.S.2d 755; People v. Thomas, 210 A.D.2d 515, 516, 620 N.Y.S.2d 478). The defendant's remaining contentions either are without merit or do not require reversal.