Opinion
October 18, 1993
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Demakos, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
We disagree with the defendant's contention that the hearing court should have suppressed his statements because the police knew that he had a pending case and that he actually had counsel on that case. In People v. Bing ( 76 N.Y.2d 331), the Court of Appeals overruled the decision in People v. Bartolomeo ( 53 N.Y.2d 225) and held that a defendant's representation by counsel on a prior, pending charge is not a bar to the waiver of his rights, in the absence of counsel, with regard to new, unrelated charges (see also, People v. Middleton, 180 A.D.2d 761; People v. McEachern, 166 A.D.2d 614). Accordingly, the hearing court properly denied suppression of the statements of the defendant who, after being read his Miranda warnings, failed to invoke his right to counsel. In any event, although the record indicates that the police had knowledge that the defendant was possibly involved in other matters, the defendant told them that any other police matters he had been involved in had ended long ago. Therefore, there was no duty for the police to make further inquiry. They had a right to rely on the defendant's statement that he was not represented by counsel (see, People v Lucarano, 61 N.Y.2d 138; People v. Daniels, 159 A.D.2d 513).
The defendant also contends that the jury selection process was unfair since the court improperly denied several of the codefendant's challenges for cause. That codefendant was tried jointly with this defendant, and his appeal is decided herewith (see, People v. Copeland, 197 A.D.2d 629). This issue is unpreserved for appellate review at least with respect to two of the prospective jurors whom the defendant now claims the court erroneously failed to dismiss, since at the voir dire, the defendant's counsel failed to challenge them for cause (see, CPL 270.15; People v. Foster, 100 A.D.2d 200, 207, mod on other grounds 64 N.Y.2d 1144, cert denied 474 U.S. 957). As to the other two prospective jurors, we find that, although initially a question was raised regarding each prospective juror's ability to render an impartial verdict, subsequently each prospective juror unequivocally stated that his prior state of doubtfulness would not influence his verdict and that he could render an impartial verdict based solely on the evidence (see, CPL 270.20 [b]; see generally, People v. Blyden, 55 N.Y.2d 73, 77-78). Accordingly, the defendant's contention that the court erred in refusing to discharge either of them is without merit.
The defendant also contends that during the jury selection process the prosecutor improperly exercised 10 of his peremptory challenges in order to remove black members of the venire. However, the defendant failed to articulate and develop all of the grounds supporting this claim, both factual and legal, during the last colloquy in which the objection was raised. The perfunctory statement that 10 excluded prospective jurors were black did not establish the existence of facts and other relevant circumstances sufficient to raise an inference that the prosecutor had used his peremptory challenges to exclude individuals because of their race. Thus, the defendant's objection was properly overruled (see, People v. Childress, 81 N.Y.2d 263, 268; see also, People v. Smith, 81 N.Y.2d 875).
We have reviewed the defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be unpreserved for appellate review (see, CPL 470.05) or without merit. Thompson, J.P., Ritter, Santucci and Joy, JJ., concur.