Graynedv. City of Rockford (1972), 408 U.S. 104, 110, 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 228-29, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2300. We note that all statutes are presumed to be constitutional ( People v. Schwartz (1976), 64 Ill.2d 275, 281), and the party challenging the statute has the burden of clearly establishing its constitutional infirmity ( People v. Bales (1985), 108 Ill.2d 182, 188). In considering a vagueness challenge to a statute, absent a contrary legislative intent, a court will assume "the words used in a statute have their ordinary and popularly understood meanings.
First, defendant contends that the phrase "exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty" is unconstitutionally vague and therefore violates the due process requirements and, second, that the felony sentencing scheme which offers the prospect of release to every offender sentenced to a term of imprisonment excepting a small class of murder defendants violates equal protection of the law. We note at the outset that a statute enjoys a strong presumption of constitutionality ( People v. Schwartz (1976), 64 Ill.2d 275, 281), and the burden of showing invalidity is on the party challenging the enactment ( People v. McCabe (1971), 49 Ill.2d 338, 340). A statute is unconstitutionally vague if its terms are so ill defined that their meaning will ultimately be determined by the opinions and whims of the trier of fact rather than any objective criteria.
In People v. Schwartz (1976), 64 Ill.2d 275, this court said with respect to challenges for vagueness and overbreadth: "A criminal statute violates the requirement of due process of law if it fails to adequately give notice as to what action or conduct is proscribed.
A criminal statute violates due process if it fails to give adequate notice as to what action or conduct is proscribed. ( People v. Schwartz (1976), 64 Ill.2d 275, 280; People v. Vandiver (1971), 51 Ill.2d 525.) "Impossible standards of specificity, however, are not required." People v. Schwartz (1976), 64 Ill.2d 275, 280, citing Jordan v. De George (1951), 341 U.S. 223, 231, 95 L.Ed. 886, 892, 71 S.Ct. 703, 707-08.
Subsequent to the filing of our opinion in Klick, the General Assembly enacted the statute upon which these cases are based. Pub. Act 80-795, passed June 26, 1977, approved September 18, 1977. In People v. Schwartz (1976), 64 Ill.2d 275, considering the contentions that the statute there involved was vague and overbroad the court said: "A criminal statute violates the requirement of due process of law if it fails to adequately give notice as to what action or conduct is proscribed. ( People v. Vandiver (1971), 51 Ill.2d 525.) Impossible standards of specificity, however, are not required. ( Jordan v. DeGeorge (1951), 341 U.S. 223, 231, 95 L.Ed. 886, 71 S.Ct. 703; People v. Dednam (1973), 55 Ill.2d 565.
Impossible standards of specificity are not required, and courts will assume, absent contrary legislative intent, that the words of the statute have their ordinary and properly understood meanings. ( People v. Schwartz (1976), 64 Ill.2d 275, 280, 356 N.E.2d 8, 10.) In addition to the language used, consideration is given to the legislative objective and the evil the statutory provision seeks to remedy.
The Adoption Act was meant to "prevent profiteering in the placement of children and to eliminate so-called `baby markets' and `baby brokers.'" People v. Schwartz, 356 N.E.2d 8, 11 (Ill. 1976). CAC offers support and travel services for persons wishing to adopt children from China, but CAC does not act as the adoption agency for those children.
Grayned v. City of Rockford (1972), 408 U.S. 104, 110, 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 228-29, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2300. We note that all statutes are presumed to be constitutional ( People v. Schwartz (1976), 64 Ill.2d 275, 281), and the party challenging the statute has the burden of clearly establishing its constitutional infirmity ( People v. Bales (1985), 108 Ill.2d 182, 188). In considering a vagueness challenge to a statute, absent a contrary legislative intent, a court will assume "the words used in the statute have their ordinary and popularly understood meanings. [Citations.]
Further, a statute enjoys a presumption of constitutionality. ( People v. Schwartz (1976), 64 Ill.2d 275, 281.) Finally, a legislative classification will be upheld against an equal protection challenge if any set of facts can be reasonably conceived which will sustain the classification.
Too, it is axiomatic that if a statute contains language with an ordinary and popularly understood meaning, courts will assume that that is the meaning intended by the legislature. People v. Haywood (1987), 118 Ill.2d 263, 276; People v. Schwartz (1976), 64 Ill.2d 275, 280. In 1981, the General Assembly enacted Public Act No. 82-682 (effective November 12, 1981), which amended section 39.2 of the Act, giving county and municipal governments a limited degree of control over new solid waste disposal sites within their boundaries. Prior to the amendments to the Act, approval of permit applications for landfill facilities, in general, was entrusted to the Agency.